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“Seeking innocence is a distraction of the highest order to critical thought”
(Imani Perry, Vexy Thing 2018, p. 102).
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This book has been challenging to write. It is interdisciplinary to its core, 
a product of my own journey through knowledge collections that span 
literary studies, a range of critical, cultural and political theories, and 
psychology and psychotherapy. My hope is that it synthesizes its inform-
ing discourses clearly for those who are new to some of them, and inter-
estingly for those who are not.
The title of this book was originally, and probably rather grandiosely, 
Complicities: A Model for Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century. About 
halfway through writing it, I realized I was not, in fact, offering the reader 
a model for anything. “Model” suggests something that can be followed, 
a series of principles and actions that can be laid out and pursued as with 
an instruction manual. I changed the title to “theory,” which more accu-
rately captures what I am doing here: offering a way to think about 
human subjectivity that can be useful to critical psychologists and prac-
ticing psychotherapists if they are convinced that the humanities-style 
approach I detail is worthwhile. My colleague in the Beatrice Bain 
Research Group of the Gender and Women’s Studies Department at the 
University of California Berkeley, Robin Clark, assessing the first part of 
the manuscript, declared it a manifesto, and that is perhaps the most 
accurate descriptor of all. This book is a summary of everything I have 
learned as I traversed disciplines. It aims to capture what I have learned 
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accordingly, and how I think about what it means to be human—a con-
cern both of literature, my first home, and psychotherapy, my second. So 
ultimately, this book may be offering a philosophy, a way of thinking that 
encodes a set of beliefs about the world and how it could be.
This may well be informative to critical psychologists and others con-
cerned with social justice, feminism, decolonialism and other theories of 
human being. But how does it apply to therapeutic practice? In the final 
chapter, I offer some suggestions. I apply my theory to the modalities I 
use with clients, and hope to open up possibilities for doing, as well as 
thinking about, psychotherapy.
There are no case studies. I know providing some might well help to 
ground the more theoretical moments, especially in the first chapter. This 
is why there are no case studies: I have come to believe that it is a form of 
making use of clients in a way that does not feel congruent with my 
therapeutic philosophy. I consider each therapeutic relationship an invi-
tation to a unique journey with someone. When the relationship goes 
well, the connection is special. I might even use the word sacred, although 
that will be the most spiritual this theoretical book will get. It does not 
feel right to me to share this journey for the purposes of my own gain. I 
learned this from a client whose journey I hold very close to my heart. I 
want to honor that lesson, and all my clients’ sacred sharings. Instead, 
where appropriate, I will talk about my own journey. I hope this func-
tions to ground some of the ideas.
This book, then, is unashamedly theoretical, although it does also aim 
to be accessible. For readers not used to the tone and jargon of critical 
theory, I hope the parts that require more from you are made up for by 
the illustrations and applications that come up from the third chapter 
and are the focus of the last chapter.
I would like to take a moment to address the choice of the notion of 
complicity to capture what I am trying to say. Complicity has a negative 
connotation. It suggests that one is guilty of collaborating with a wrong. 
In a sense, that is the point: As I will argue in detail, the term is meant to 
invoke the idea that we subjects of Western modernity are none of us 
unimplicated in the systems of oppression whose historical trajectories I 
account for in this book. It suggests that to be human is to be made by, 
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participants in, resistors to, and beneficiaries of, the systems and institu-
tions that we cannot help but inherit. Some suffer more, but no one of us 
is better than the other, a theoretical statement that will be fully explored 
in the course of the book. But another argument of this book is that 
binary thinking has to go if we want to improve things. Therefore, the 
binary innocent/guilty is not a helpful way to approach the idea of com-
plicity. It keeps us in the realm of good/bad, self/other, right/wrong. If 
Complicities argues anything, it argues that we have to think about our-
selves and each other in more complicated terms. This is how we finally 
exceed the terms that Western Enlightenment and then colonial pro-
cesses, as consolidated in the psy disciplines as one of the technologies of 
modern subjectivity, have given us.
One last set of explanations about style choices: I have used the upper-
cased adjective Black to denote people of African descent. I do this to 
acknowledge that the specific history of oppression African people have 
suffered, because of the historical forces I detail in this book, has created 
specific material and identity outcomes for Black people. I have not used 
the uppercase for other descriptors of racialized groups indicated with 
reference to color. White supremacist groups sometimes capitalize white, 
a usage I have no intention of sharing. I wish to avoid the implication 
that white people share a history which outcome has been the need for a 
shared identity of solidarity. I do think, as I detail in this book, that until 
a majority of white people accept that whiteness is also a racialized con-
struction, we cannot get very far in the project of racial justice. “Brown” 
is too general a term, used for many groups of people, to indicate specific, 
shared histories or identities.
I use the pronoun “he” to describe the subject of Western epistemol-
ogy and personhood. When I use “he” to talk about the subject of the 
West, it is deliberate. As I argue in the book, the human subject of 
Western thought is, in the first place, male. So my “hes” are not thought-
less sexist throwbacks, and they do not occur everywhere. I hope the 
reader will bear with me on this, and allow the assertion implicit in the 
gendering of the Western liberal subject. I hope the book’s argument of 
this position convinces you.
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The first two chapters provide, broadly, the larger theoretical outlines 
for the argument. They address the necessity for an interdisciplinary 
mode, a psychological humanities; account for the emergence of psychol-
ogy and its associated disciplines as part of a specific Western episteme; 
and locate the liberalism and whiteness of dominant subjects of Western 
culture against which human being has been forced to articulate itself in 
the places made, or affected, by Western systems of thought, economy, 
politics and meaning, including the psy disciplines. The third chapter 
focuses on race, the fourth on gender, sex and sexuality, the fifth on 
American public youth culture in the age of social media and the last 
chapter on how this all might affect psychotherapy practice. I hope this 
book’s ambitious heart speaks to yours.
Berkeley, CA Natasha Distiller
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logistics to enable me to work, and continues to do so. My clients have 
allowed me to accompany them, and each journey has been a privilege to 
participate in.
This book, as with all things I do, is for Jesse and Lee, my most pre-
cious complicit relationships.
“This is the kind of writing—I hope—members of allied health and medical 
disciplines have been waiting for, irrespective of whether they focus explic-
itly on providing support for the psychological aspects of human being or 
whether they work in fields that intersect with mental health practice.
Complicities offers a gentle, generous, highly knowledgeable, and acces-
sible introduction to and application of transdisciplinarity at its best. 
Using arguments, ideas and theories from the critical humanities and 
cutting-edge approaches to neurobiology and psychotherapy, Natasha 
Distiller invites the reader into a world in which diversity and complexity 
are openly at play and the taken-for-granted is given a chance to dissolve. 
Guided by the author’s carefully selected and convincingly elaborated 
gestures towards diverse knowledges, binary distinctions between e.g., 
self and other, mind and body, individual and context, power and oppres-
sion, clinician and client, clinical and everyday encounters, therapy and 
advocacy, are slowly replaced with a third space in which human being 
has always already been understood and practiced as intersubjectivity, 
relationality, mutuality, and being-with. This third space, which corre-
sponds to the complicit mindset and the notion and practice of complic-
ity as the only way in which we can live a human life, offers an alternative 
to the injustices and suffering that result from a rigid adherence to binary 
disciplinary, colonial, scientific, and capitalist regimes.
Complicities can be read as a guide to be (human and a professional) 
which allows us to drop the relentless but familiar fight for the upper hand 
position in all our relations (e.g., as expert, objective observer, a person who 
owns what is morally good and true) in favour of nurturing a non-judg-
mental stance towards human lives being with each other in the world. If 
we learn to acknowledge and accept our imperfection, vulnerability, and 
complicity as human beings, we can, so the book suggests, truly connect 
with each other and develop and maintain healing relationships.
Reading the book once is not enough. It leaves the reader with the 
desire to start all over again, for another go at engaging with the diverse 
dimensions and implications of the notion and practice of complicity.”
—David Azul, La Trobe University, Bendigo, Australia
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1
Introduction: The Personal  
Is Still Political
The second wave of feminist activism in the United States gave us the 
adage, “the personal is political.” It allowed women to insist that the 
difficulties they were having were not caused by their personal qualities or 
individual choices, but were the product of a system that positioned them 
as women, and structured their lives and the horizon of possibilities for 
their material and emotional experiences accordingly (see Shaw & Lee, 
2015). The core lesson was (and is) that a person’s individual experience 
is not theirs alone. Their sense of self is formed within, in relation to, and 
by, external forces. Feminism began with the understanding that gender 
is one apparently personal quality that is in fact formed by social factors, 
and, under patriarchy, in relations of power and oppression.
Naomi Alderman’s feminist dystopian fiction, The Power (2016), 
explores the consequences of changing gender dynamics within a system 
of power. The book shows what happens when women are given superior 
physical power over men, and seize the reins of control accordingly. What 
begins as a satisfying ability to finally stand up to sexualized brutality 
becomes a reinscription of more of the same: patriarchal values, where 
might conveys right, remain in place, even as gender positions are 
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inverted. Merely changing structural positions does not alter the nature 
of the structure.
The voice of someone who is most likely god says, at the book’s conclu-
sion (Alderman, 2016, p. 360),
I’m giving you the crib sheet right now. Maybe you’ll understand it and 
maybe you won’t… Who’s bad and who’s good? Who persuaded the other 
one to eat the apple? Who has the power and who’s powerless? All of these 
questions are the wrong questions.
It’s more complicated than that, sugar. However complicated you think 
it is, everything is always more complicated than that… You can’t put 
anyone in a box. Listen, even a stone isn’t the same as any other stone, so I 
don’t know where you all think you get off labelling humans with simple 
words and thinking you know everything you need. But most people can’t 
live that way, even some of the time. They say: only exceptional people can 
cross the borders. The truth is: anyone can cross, everyone has it in them.
Alderman slyly skewers sexism—the kind we have in our present 
world, where women are treated differently because of the social meanings 
made of their sexual difference—and also insists that human beings all 
have the ability to abuse, when the terms of valued personhood are based 
on who is stronger. The supernatural voice who sums it up in the extract 
above makes the point that Complicities aims to illustrate and unpack: 
There is a self/other binary at work in the power dynamics of Western 
social, interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics. This binary has a 
specific material history. It is not inevitable. And it creates realities both 
psychological and material. In deconstructing binary thinking, and the 
version of the human that results, and by focusing on the messiness and 
complexity of human interactions in practice, a new model for human 
being emerges. This is a way out of the us and them positions that in the 
end serve to keep the structure in place.
The main argument of this book is that to be human means to be com-
plicit in the systems we inherit, and are structured by. These systems, in a 
world which relies on binary thinking, are always systems of power. They 
comprise both symbolic structures like language, apparently natural units 
like the family, and larger social formations like communities and 
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countries. They also include group and individual experiences which are 
given narrative shape and thus specific meanings, like history, and like 
identity. To be complicit means that human being is not an individualized 
enterprise. Each subject is made through genealogies, histories, 
inheritances which are by definition communal, and through their link-
ages and reactions to, and reliances on, other subjects.
To accept this argument is to see a way out of the current dominant 
binary thinking that continues to structure most ideas of human 
subjectivity at work in psychotherapy. The modern idea of the self as it is 
espoused through the psy disciplines (psychology, psychotherapy, 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis), a Western technology of knowing, is 
based on a self/other structure. Such a formulation also maps onto an 
oppressor/oppressed model for subjectivity, which currently informs 
much of the liberation work of identity politics. For a social justice- 
oriented psychotherapy practice, this can be limiting. Complicities will 
flesh out these assertions, concentrating in various chapters on aspects of 
modern identities important to liberation politics and practices. It will 
also connect modern identification practices to the liberalism that has 
helped shape the Western subject of psychotherapy, via the discipline of 
psychology and the work it has done to help construct the modern world. 
In the final chapter, some practices for social justice-oriented psychotherapy 
will be considered.
This work takes place under the rubric of the psychological humani-
ties, which recognizes the conceptual limits of traditional psychological 
approaches to human being. This initial chapter is the most theoretical. 
Because, as an exploration of the potential of the psychological humanities 
as an interdiscipline, explored below, I draw on concepts that will be 
differently familiar to readers depending on their knowledge base, I 
considered it important to map out the frames of reference that inform 
my thinking. Some readers find theoretical language alienating, one of 
the relevant critiques against forms of high theoretical writing that 
nevertheless claims to be engaged with social justice issues and wants to 
be relevant to the world. I have done my best to make these ideas both 
interesting and accessible. If at times they are hard going, I beg your 
indulgence and assure you they are applied in later chapters.
1 Introduction: The Personal Is Still Political 
4
My starting point, in feminism, locates my work within the group of 
psychological theories of human being that are concerned with 
acknowledging and addressing issues of social justice. Feminist therapy 
followed early feminist insight, born out of consciousness raising groups 
where women’s experiences were validated. It was a practice that began by 
refusing the normative gender assumptions of the patriarchal authority 
that had structured the discipline (Rothblum & Cole, 2018; Williams, 
1995). It grew to actively value the wisdom and experiences of all othered 
voices (Brown, 2018). Other psychologies concerned with political and 
psychic liberation also insist that knowledge is never neutral, that the 
standpoint of the observer-commentator shapes what they can understand 
and that institutions create systems of privilege and oppression that define 
and affect people along axes of gender, race, class, ablebodiedness, 
ethnicity, neurodiversity, location, nation and other markers of hierarchy 
and access. Transnational, postcolonial, indigenous and decolonial 
perspectives extend the definition of systems and the understanding of 
how they work to a global scale. Cultural and hermeneutic awareness has 
long been a part of the discipline and practice of psychology and 
psychotherapy, as will be discussed in more detail below. The 
acknowledgment that we are not, in fact, independent liberal subjects, 
free to choose (our identities, our experiences, our relation to ourselves 
and our access to resources if we just work hard enough), is not at all new.
And yet, in popular culture and in mainstream American political dis-
course, the modern subject is still the subject of liberalism, free indeed to 
choose his fate, at best, or fettered by injustice so that he cannot achieve 
this rhetorically god-given right. In the twenty-first century, he is 
neoliberalized into being responsible for ensuring his selfhood is 
profitable, as I will explain in Chaps. 2 and 5. He is, in the first place, 
gendered, classed and raced, although he believes these things do not 
matter to his ability to succeed. The discourses and technologies of 
psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry and psychotherapy have been 
central to the creation, authorization, dissemination and popularization 
of this liberal human subject. What we have today, as a result, is a popular 
idea of what it means to be a person that is saturated with historical 
meanings and specific economic processes, presented as natural, and 
dependent on binary thinking. This is true, despite decades of theoretical 
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work in the academy which seeks to deconstruct, interrogate, problematize 
and locate the relations of power that comprise our institutions and the 
meanings we make of the world, ourselves and each other.
The unified self in search of its correct path, free to make the right or 
healthy choices to achieve knowledge of itself and thus be a better version 
of itself, is the model of the self that is still necessary in most versions 
of  the psychotherapy session. Throughout this book, I use the term 
“psychotherapy”to refer to the practice of counseling undertaken by ther-
apists who may or may not be psychologists: They might be licensed 
professional counselors, marriage and family therapists, or analysts. Such 
practitioners did not necessarily pass through academic psychology to 
achieve their licensure. They also did not necessarily encounter in much 
detail any of the more humanities-inflected ideas about human being of 
the last half century. In what follows, I am bringing together for a very 
broad church ideas about the theory and practice of psychology and 
psychotherapy, informed by feminist, queer, critical race, postcolonial 
and decolonial, and cultural studies insights developed most extensively 
in the academic humanities.
Who am I talking about, and for? On the one hand, a disembodied 
idea called the human subject. The statement that to be human means to 
be implicated in psychic and material structures is a statement intended 
to be universal. On the other hand, the subject under discussion here is 
the subject of psychology, which is to say, the subject of Western 
modernity. This subject is not, in theory or practice, universal, although 
the scientific subject of psychology can sometimes forget that it is not a 
collection of neurons and response times, of evolutionary logic and 
developmental absolutes. The human being I am invoking is a diverse 
collective, intended to acknowledge our very real experiential differences, 
the ways our systems of power and our institutions name and position 
people very differently based on the meanings made of their histories, 
communities and embodiments. And in so doing, shape (but not 
determine) their senses of selves. Through our differences, through our 
very different investments, profits and losses in the meanings made of our 
differences, “we” are connected. This is an audacious claim for a middle- 
class white person to make, and from that standpoint, it is an assertion of 
privilege. But my voice is also informed by being assigned female at birth 
1 Introduction: The Personal Is Still Political 
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and socialized female, by being queer, by being from the global South, by 
being an immigrant. I am a both-and, which is what I am suggesting the 
theoretical “we” I invoke should be seen as as well: both universalizing 
and specific, looking for a universal connection across humans, and 
acknowledging of inequality: the historical, structural, invested 
components which deny the connections across different human beings, 
and the suffering this causes. I say a little more about humanism in Chap. 
2, a discussion which also illustrates how an education in the humanities 
simultaneously enables an awareness of what “we” share, and of how “we” 
are constructed according to historically invested differences.
Complicities navigates a familiar tension. There are liberation theories 
that want to name systems of power and oppression, and the injustices 
they cause, in order to advocate for material change in real people’s lives 
and in the experience of their communities. And there are deconstructive 
theories that, in refusing normative and normativizing definitions of 
personhood, citizenship, morality, wellness, subjectivity and so on, have 
often been accused of working against material change in their focus on 
the constructed nature of oppressive phenomena. Such tensions have 
been evident within feminism and queer theory for decades, as I will 
discuss in more detail in Chap. 4.
It is important to acknowledge the constructed nature of subject posi-
tions, in order to make explicit the politics at play and the investments in 
presenting as natural what are human systems of meaning, made by peo-
ple through time and space with something at stake. What it means to be 
female, or black, or disabled, or Jewish, to name a few examples, is, for 
the purposes of human systems, entirely located in context. I will con-
tinually illustrate this claim throughout this book. On the other hand, 
strategic essentialisms (Danius & Jonsson, 1993) are often necessary for 
political work, especially in the context of a rights-based system that 
needs recognizable groups, endorsed by born-that-way arguments, before 
rights can be conferred (Bonthuys, 2008; Brown, 1995; Butler, 1993). 
Essentialism also has psychic value, especially in a Western system based 
on individualism and individuality. If we understand that subjectivity is 
made from the systems that structure it, and also feeds back into these 
systems to continue and to change them, then the “problem” of 
deconstruction verses essentialism falls away and is revealed as another 




Binary thinking sets up a relation, presented as natural, between two 
ideas (people, concepts, identities) that are constructed as reliant on each 
other’s apparently obvious and immutable meanings. These meanings are 
assumed to be opposite and are almost always hierarchical. One half of 
the binary benefits, materially and-or psychically, in other words, from 
the relation. Accordingly, that half will work to protect the binary 
structure. One consequence, explored in more detail in Chap. 4, is the 
way transgender people are so violently policed for threatening the gender 
binary (male/female).
Binary thinking has been an important part of systems of Western 
meaning-making and has helped enable the construction of the neoliberal 
geopolitical global world order of modernity, which has emerged from 
nineteenth century colonialism, as will be explored in more detail in 
Chap. 2. Postcolonial theory, among other lessons, illustrated how binary 
thinking endorsed colonial thoughts and deeds.
Postcolonial theoreticians pointed out how colonizing discourse, the 
sense that colonizing cultures made of what they were doing, is constructed 
around a binary system: self/other; good/bad; white/black; master/slave; 
male/female; subject/object. The terms of these related binaries rely on 
each other. They are obviously constructed with a hierarchical logic: It is 
better to be white, master, male and therefore a subject. It is psychologically 
better, in that it guarantees a specific sense of self, and it is better in terms 
of access to privilege, resources, authority and power. The disempowered 
side of the binary, the side of the other/object/slave, is sometimes called 
the subaltern: the one without the representational and therefore political 
power in this system (Spivak, 1988). The subaltern is the necessary other 
to the colonizing self. The relationship across the two sides of the binary 
is not only hierarchical; it is constituting. The colonizer cannot be a 
colonizer without a colonized. If we understand this dynamic, we 
understand what is at stake for the colonizing self in the act of taking 
power: his very existence. This is the oppressor/victim binary, already 
embedded in a complicity more complex than the us and them of current 
identity politics can allow.
1 Introduction: The Personal Is Still Political 
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Binary thinking is reductive. Cohen (2005) has shown how binary 
thinking cannot accommodate intersectionality. She argued that queer 
theory set up a new binary, hetero/queer, which also corresponded to 
bad/good. She pointed out that, because it relied only on sexuality as the 
oppression it accounted for, this kind of queer theory overlooked the 
ways in which someone could be heterosexual and still oppressed, and 
queer and still hold privilege. She gave the examples of poor women of 
color on welfare, whose heterosexuality did not fit the required, respect-
able norm; or enslaved people, whose heterosexuality was denied as part 
of the denial of their humanity.
Since the beginning of feminist theorizing, from the Combahee River 
Collective (1983), through the works of Lorde (2007) and into the writ-
ings of Hill Collins (2015) and the legal scholarship of Crenshaw (1989), 
among others (see Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983), the fact of intersectional-
ity has been reiterated by feminists of color (see Nash, 2019). It has been 
taken up, if inadequately, in some branches of psychology (McCormick-
Huhn et al., 2019). But this well-known truth, that people are made up 
of different parts that impact each other, tells us that you cannot account 
for someone’s experiences by separating out aspects of their identity, and 
that context affects how we experience ourselves and others. It also tells us 
that, because binaries artificially impose and reduce identities as con-
structs, we better serve lived experience and the complex work of libera-
tion from oppression by focusing on the ways we are made together, by 
each other, and by the systems in which we come into being and which 
we reproduce and change by being in them.
What’s the difference between complicity and intersectionality? 
Intersectionality can sometimes be used to endorse identity politics, as it 
can be read as relying on the reification of identity categories in order to 
make its point. Complicity wants to move us beyond identity politics, in 
part by challenging the conceptual underpinnings to identity categories. 
This does most emphatically not mean that I am arguing for an apolitical 
view of what it means to be person. If I am arguing for a kind of humanist 
vision, it is a humanism that is first and foremost and always embedded 
in structural relations of power, since to be human, in this model, is to be 
complicit in systems. This is one of the ways I am suggesting binary think-
ing is wholly inadequate to any project of the psychological humanities, 
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of which more below. We have to acknowledge the operations of power 
and privilege, of history and trauma, of who gets to decide and define 
who has to be other to the mythical norm (Lorde, 2007). And we have to 
acknowledge that these operations, as central as they are to the construc-
tion of discourses that shape lives and subjectivities and opportunities and 
violences, are not anywhere near the sum total of what it means to be 
human. These power dynamics are fundamentally human, and they are 
also limiting of what it really is to be human. They structure, and in so 
doing, constrain. We are not, in fact, ineluctably separated from each 
other by the different ways our lives, experiences and senses of selves are 
shaped by the structures we inherit, are made by, and go on to perpetuate, 
challenge or change. As the theories which interrogate the relationship 
between self and other illustrate, and the insistence these theories enable 
that we are each dependent on the other, an other, another, we are all 
complicit in the system (some of these theories are discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter). We are therefore also all complicit in each 
other. Not equally, not ahistorically, not to mutual benefit. But nonetheless.
While oppressive systems operate via the construction and violent 
assertion of artificial binaries (the apartheid regime’s attempt to segregate 
racial identities is one example, Posel, 2001; heterosexuality’s construction 
of homosexuality is another, Katz, 2007), human being is, and always has 
been, nonbinary. Cultural, systemic and personal meanings are 
intertwined. And, as attachment theory and the neuroscience of early 
childhood development illustrate, an individual’s sense of self is 
thoroughly woven into the senses of selves of other humans on a physical 
level, as well as an emotional one (Bowlby, 1982; Gerhardt, 2004; 
Mascolo, 2016; Musholt, 2018; Pyne, 2016; Schore, 2003; Siegel, 2003; 
Stern, 1985). Branches of academic and applied psychology have long 
been engaging with this reality, as will be explored in more detail below. 
The image of the fold is also sometimes offered to counter the idea of a 
self-contained self. The fold, as we will see below, speaks to the ways the 
idea of an inside is constituted by the outside.
Thus Complicities builds on the by-now-apparent insight that humans 
are embedded in social contexts, that individual subjectivity is shaped by 
the structures and forces it inherits, and which it perforce responds to. 
Structural injustice matters to—and in and on—all of us, because we are 
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all complicit in each other. And injustice makes use of binary thinking to 
construct realities where some are rendered superior because others are 
rendered inferior, or dangerous, or both.
Binary thinking limits what is humanly possible. To do our best work 
as therapists, we benefit from a nonbinary view of what it means to be 
human. This means escaping the model of the individual created for and 
presented to us by mainstream scientific psychology, of which more 
below and in the following chapter.
We ourselves are part of the work of helping our clients. We are inter-
subjectively complicit, a notion that I will return to throughout this 
book. How we understand what our clients suffer from will inform what 
version of healthy selfhood we are helping them toward (e.g., Hardy, 
2008 and Duran & Duran, 1995 have argued for creating diagnoses that 
recognize the damage done by racial oppression). A knowledge of the 
constructed and invested nature of the psychological self, as well as of its 
real power as a discourse of knowledge creation, is a necessary component 
of this process. In order to do this, we need a double vision, a both-and: 
at the same time as we want to resist the binary thinking upon which the 
Western subject of psychology has been built, we simultaneously have to 
continue acknowledging that historical forces have created structures 
which perpetuate systems of inequality.
Part of the work of seeing the systems of meaning at play here is learn-
ing about where they come from. The modern subject of psychotherapy, 
as will be explored in more detail in this chapter and the next, is com-
plicit in the emergence of systems of modernity: liberalism, democracy 
and the individuality they create and police; capitalism and neoliberal-
ism, and the racism and gender politics they create and profit from, as the 
chapters which follow will explore.
The self who is the product of the self/other binary is itself an effect of 
Western history, embedded in culture, economics, politics, gender, race, 
class, uses of religion, uses and constructions of sexuality, notions of 
ablebodiedness. This means that both the self and the other on which it 
depends can be understood not only as starting points for power relations, 
but also as products of them. Rose (1998, p. 188), following Deleuze, 
offers the idea of the fold: The self is an effect of the ways in which the 
forces of the exterior world “form an inside to which it appears an outside 
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must always make reference.” The illusion of depth, the pleats and cavities 
it causes, “only exist in relation to the… forces… that sustain them.” 
What this means, Rose (ibid) argues, in relation to the subject created by 
psychology and its related disciplines, is that the
[S]ubject is assembled… in terms of a problem of “self-mastery”: bringing 
to bear upon oneself—the inside acting upon itself—the power that one 
brings to bear upon others… [T]he power that is brought to bear upon 
others is figured as a power relation between this inside of oneself and this 
inside of the other.
The self ’s experience of itself is reliant not only on its experience of its 
other, but on a relation of power with that other. The self/other binary 
relation is an effect, not only of external, institutional forces providing 
meanings and allocating resources accordingly, but of the processes of 
subjectification out of which the modern self emerges. This specific binary 
relation, which in and out of our systems of power maps on the logic of 
subject/object, is central to Cartesian modernity; it is the “epistemologi-
cal hallmark of modern thought” (Coelho & Claudio, 2003, p. 194).
But if the self/other relation emerges out of material, systemic and dis-
cursive practices that create the self ’s sense of itself as well as its need for 
its other, this is in fact another level of complicity. The binary is artificial. 
The processes that create it rely on rhizomatic relations between selves and 
structures as well as selves and others. And as we will see shortly, the idea 
of complicity I am developing relies on the idea that human subjectivity 
is folded, not split, that we are enfolded by human being into each other.
We are each of us dependent on each other in many ways. The modern 
human is subjected by language, by interpersonal neurobiology, by 
gender and race and age and politics and technology as I explore them 
later in this book. Human being has also been subjected by binary 
thinking, which some branches of feminism, queer theory, cultural 
studies and postcolonial theories have all offered ways to challenge. Rose’s 
(1998) formulation suggests that the binary is not only false because it 
constructs immutable relations between positions, identities and bodies 
it sets up as opposite, at worst, or exclusive to each other, at least. It is also 
false because its very technologies of possibility belie the fact that the self 
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is reliant on another to be itself. Despite the logic the binary seeks to 
assert, that the self must abjure the other, the Western self is a self because 
of its other. The imperative to power-mastery that has so far accompanied 
this truth is what is ensured by the structuring of this relation as binary, 
which is also a denial of the constitutive complicity of human being.
Rose’s (1998) model has an additional consequence for understanding 
the impact of binary thinking on the modern subject’s construction. He 
describes how the psy disciplines have inscribed a modern subject 
compelled to have interiority, and structured by the psy technologies 
(theories and schools of thought, research, institutions, practices of 
counseling, ideas of wellness and mental illness, psychiatric and penalizing 
incursions into and onto specific notions of the body, the brain, the soul 
and so on). This subject is told it is free to choose. As part of this process, 
the subject is to decide on the self it should be: “To be the self one is one 
must not be the self one is not—not that despised, rejected, or abjected 
soul. Thus becoming oneself is a recurrent copying that both emulates 
and differs from other selves” (Rose, 1998, p. 192). This suggests that 
binary thinking can be located in the modern self ’s relationship with its 
self, too. In needing abjected other selves to help us pick the right, healthy, 
self, Rose’s (1998) process of subjectification articulates an additional role 
of the binary in helping to internally structure this self. We also see a way 
the self becomes other to itself, can become its own other, in believing it 
must improve itself—one of the imperatives of psychotherapy.
The binary, in other words, goes very deep into the Western subject, as 
well as making that subject reliant on its others. It is perhaps not surprising 
that theories which suggest human subjectivity does not operate in 
practice as it is assumed to by binary thinking have not achieved the 
status of common sense outside of parts of academia.
 Complicities
I develop the idea of the complicit subject from the work of Sanders 
(2002), who examined apartheid as an exemplary complicity-generating 
system. He argues, using the figure of the South African intellectual, that 
when you are a product of a system, you cannot avoid collaboration with 
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that system, even when you oppose it. He explores how the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) sought to make the point that 
complicity makes us responsible, and that, according to the report 
published by the Commission, “it is only by recognizing the potential for 
evil in each one of us that we can take full responsibility for ensuring that 
such evil will never be repeated” (qtd. in Sanders, 2002, p. 3). The TRC 
report wanted to focus its readers’ attention not only on the large-scale 
human rights violations that were patently abusive and wrong, but on the 
daily workings of life under apartheid that helped perpetuate the larger 
system in countless little ways.
The TRC report, Sanders argues (2002, p. 3), is resisting “the intuition 
that in order to combat evil one must be, or must proclaim oneself to be, 
untouched by it.” Neither Sanders nor the TRC report engages with the 
question of evil from a psychotherapeutic point of view, which would 
want to ask where such dark energy comes from. Binary thinking suggests 
it is human nature to project our inner darkness outward, onto our others 
(McWilliams 2020). Thinking complicitously suggests a more complex 
involvement with the systems of power which help create and shape, and 
then make use of, the desire to control and hurt others. Thinking 
complicitously disallows a stance of pure resistance, as Sanders (2002) 
explores. It suggests that in order to resist, we have to acknowledge our 
involvement in the system.
This is relevant to a contemporary identity politics that, fed by a divi-
sive political climate, sometimes paints itself into a corner, relying on 
binary thinking to articulate its objections to oppression. Instead of 
mobilizing the recognition of structural oppression to enable structural 
change, it reifies the oppressor/oppressed binary, but flips its moral 
assignations. Once the othered position becomes saturated with a morally 
righteous victimhood, it becomes nigh impossible to do anything other 
than reproduce the binary terms of an oppressive system ad nauseam. 
One consequence is that human being is reduced to structural markers, 
where we can never exceed the terms given to us for who we can be (see 
Brown, 1995; Gamson, 1995). Another is that some subjects are reduced 
to the status of evil, where privilege and ignorance become, not structural 
consequences, but markers of individual badness (DiAngelo, 2018). The 
1 Introduction: The Personal Is Still Political 
14
capacity to engage in structural change is unfortunately and radically 
foreclosed by this discourse.
McWilliams (2020) offers an analytic point of view on how uncom-
plicit thinking entrenches the structural positions which perpetuate 
oppression. Her account helps illuminate some of the dynamics at play in 
current progressive discourses. She (McWilliams, 2020, p. 184) says the 
(here naturalized) human tendency to create a self/other binary is at work 
when someone feels politically enlightened. This is a version of narcissis-
tic entitlement that relies on “a claim of moral authority.” Such a position 
is not only problematic because reliant on the hierarchical thinking of the 
binary, and an assertion of power over another. It also renders this 
putatively morally superior woke self particularly vulnerable to shame: 
“That position of framing myself as among the enlightened… sets me up 
to be hurt and humiliated whenever I am caught out in some prejudice 
or microaggression, at which point I tend to resort to paranoid-schizoid 
defenses against such feelings,” which results in an inability to own any of 
one’s own badness, and a need to project it onto the other in the form of 
an assumption about their destructive intent (McWilliams, 2020, p. 184). 
This helps explain the white fragility (DiAngelo, 2018) of liberal, well- 
intentioned white people. It also accounts for the one-upmanship of 
cancel culture (brown, 2020; Ross, 2019); Butler (1993, p. 311) asks, “Is 
it not a sign of despair over public politics when identity becomes its own 
policy, bringing with it those who would ‘police’ it from various sides?” 
brown (2020, p. 12) puts it in more recent parlance as a tendency within 
current movements toward “gleeful othering, revenge, or punishment of 
others, particularly when these things deepen our belonging to each 
other, usually briefly, until we too fuck up.”
Sanders (2002) says that the notion of complicity extends responsibil-
ity from one’s relationship to specific unjust systems, or in specific deeds, 
to one’s responsibility as a human to other humans. Etymologically, com-
plicity indicates “a folded-together-ness… in human-being” (Sanders, 
2002, p.  5). Furthermore, suggests Sanders (2002, p.  9), following 
Derrida, the notion of complicit human being contaminates binary 
positions, by folding together “oppositional pairs,” creating “an ethico- 
political discourse on complicity.” Sanders (2002, p.  10) goes on to 
differentiate between “complicity in the general sense” and “complicities 
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in the narrow sense,” the little, daily, thoroughly enmeshed sense of 
complicities that I wish to invoke as the notion of human being for which 
I am advocating. I hope it is clear that this model of complicity is also 
fundamentally “ethico-political.” It is intended to acknowledge, not 
overlook, the consequences of structural oppression and the material use 
of differences in systems of power (the political awareness), while also 
arguing for a shared human responsibility which is necessary for a better 
politics (the ethical part).
The idea of the human subject as made by foldedness, the image of 
“the basic folded-together-ness of being, of human-being” is also the 
place “of self and other” (Sanders, 2002, p. 11). In being folded with the 
other as a condition of human being, complicity is established. And the 
binary on which self and other structures depend is revealed as actually a 
relationship of complicity and not a relation of exclusion, opposition and 
hierarchy.
Sanders (2002, p. 15) also charts how asserting “[a] basic human fold-
edness” at once functions to deny the commitment to apartness that 
underlies oppressive systems (like apartheid, literally “apart-ness”), and, 
in necessarily having to be specific in each articulation of resistance to 
oppression, must needs be limited by, defined by, the details of the 
oppressive moment against which it is speaking. It is both a general 
appeal to human being, and a necessarily limited, partial, materially and 
historically specific one. In this way, the image of the rhizome (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987) superimposes onto the metaphor of the fold. If 
foldedness challenges the artificial binary structuring of self and other, 
the rhizome bespeaks the connections between subjects and structures, 
within which selves are folded.
 The Science of Psychology 
and the Psychological Humanities
Complicities brings the work of the humanities to the work of psycho-
therapy. Like the task of articulating a complicit human subjectivity, this 
is both not a new undertaking, and one that has recently acquired new 
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impetus. It is worth noting that as late as 2019, Marecek was still tracking 
an uneven application of interdisciplinarity, and feminist, critical and 
social justice-related concerns in psychology, particularly in the 
United States.
Psychology as a discipline emerged from philosophy, in the first 
instance, and from the medicalization of behaviors, some of which 
became modern identities, in the second (Adriaens & De Block, 2013; 
Devonis, 2014; Foucault, 1977; Mascolo, 2016). It has what Rose (1998, 
p.  41) calls “a long past but a short history.” Philosophical questions 
about the nature of perception, how we know what we know, how we 
know what is real, why we make sense of the world the way we do, how 
and why our senses work, where and what our souls are and how or if 
they influence what we think, go back to the ancient Greeks. Psychology 
as a science began in the late nineteenth century, arguably with a lab 
experiment tracking response times to aural stimuli (Laubscher, 2015). 
Psychology emerged together with modern medicine and sexology, as the 
drive to understand, measure, categorize and rank along biological lines 
became mainstream in a specific set of political, cultural and economic 
circumstances. These included colonialism, scientific racism, the 
consolidation of modern democracies and the early global capitalism 
implicated in all these; and the invention of the hetero/homo binary 
along with the consolidation of modern gender and sexual norms 
(Adriaens & De Block, 2013; Katz, 2007; Saini, 2017; Schiebinger, 
2004; Severson & Goodman, 2020; Teo, 2005). Psychology has also 
always had a metapsychological, critical component (Teo, 2005). The 
brief account I provide here will focus on the twentieth century, largely 
British and American, developments.
The process of developing psychology into a scientific field, apparently 
capable of accounting accurately for human thought and behavior via 
measurable experiments, was directly implicated in nineteenth century 
European colonial racism, in American racism, in misogyny and in 
ableism (Devonis, 2014; Guthrie, 2004; Kendi, 2016; Rippon, 2019; 
Saini, 2017; Showalter, 2007; Silberman, 2015; Teo, 2005). Or, as 
McWilliams (2020, p. 181) puts it, “[O]ur track record is replete with 
malignant othering, from our early enchantment with the eugenics 
movement, through our enthusiasm for IQ testing…, to our more recent 
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collusion with torture.” Psychology has been used to emphasize differences 
rather than connections, in people and groups, what Devonis (2014, 
p. 113) calls the, “implicit reinforcement of discrimination via method.” 
And as a discipline, psychology has been implicated in the construction 
of modern categories of normalcy and deviance which often operated 
along the lines of social difference and operations of social power; 
“psychology in fact did not solve problems but produced problematizations 
in which neutral issues were turned into highly problematized objects” 
(Teo, 2005, p. 144).
As a result, science’s apparent objectivity is not only implicated in 
human cultural and political systems that belie its claims to truth-telling. 
It is also implicated in the idea that to be a self is something that can be 
known, tracked and improved upon. I am not suggesting that science is 
not real, but I am insisting that science cannot offer us unmediated access 
to the Lacanian real, the place outside of the symbolic realm within which 
human subjectivity finds itself. Biological facts exist; physics has laws; 
numbers can be counted; but the meanings we make will always be 
structured by the cultures in which we make them. When claims to the 
absolute truth of human being continue to be made in the name of a 
science of behavior, it is high time to push back.
Modern academic psychology has relied on a certain notion of the self 
as “the primary reality and unit of study” (Jordan 1997, p. 9), in the con-
text of a scientifically structured discourse. As a result, it has helped 
develop the modern version of what it means to be human, begun in the 
Enlightenment. Today, in the West, “to be human is first of all to be ratio-
nal individuals, with bodies programed by genetics” (Severson & 
Goodman, 2020, p. 2). These are the consequences: “At the start of the 
21st century,… [e]xpressive individualism reigns supreme in various psy-
chological approaches, promoting individuation and autonomy as pri-
mary achievements that facilitate health and wellbeing” (Goodman & 
Freeman, 2015, p. 5). The colonial inheritances of this psychological dis-
course of normality remain unspoken within the scientific frame that 
endorses it (Adams et  al., 2015; Adams et  al., 2017; Bhatia, 2020; 
Maldonado-Torres, 2017; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). This is despite strands 
of psychology, developed in the twentieth century, that are, variously, 
humanistic and/or based in phenomenological awareness of 
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meaning- making, or influenced by cultural, political, linguistic, philo-
sophical or psychoanalytic theories. The humanities offers even self-
reflexive psychological theories the chance to get outside of the limits of 
psychology’s own discursive constraints (Olson, 2012; Papadopoulos, 
2008; Teo, 2005; Teo, 2019).
The psychological humanities (Martin, 2017; Teo, 2017; Teo, 2019) 
seeks to bring psychology back into more direct and, dare I say it, honest 
relation to the fields of academic study that focus on the mediated nature 
of human understanding and meaning-making processes. In 2009, the 
American Psychological Association asserted that psychology is a natural 
science (the science of behavior), leading almost immediately to calls to 
consider psychology a human science instead (Laubscher, 2015, p. 7). 
The APA’s vision of psychology was one of hypotheses, laboratories, 
equipment, observation, measurements, experiments and the use of 
scientific method to formulate and test objective facts about human 
behavior. From a humanities point of view, as I have suggested, science is 
not a way to access unmediated truth, it is a technology of truth creation. 
And for practicing psychotherapists, our psychological work’s official 
claims to scientific status—meaning objective, measurable, standardized, 
manualizable, controllable—cannot hold. “[M]any everyday psychologists 
know in their hearts that a major realignment of the profession’s 
philosophy of science is desperately needed,” Cushman (2019, p. 153) 
reported, following the audience response to his 2013 address to the 
APA. As he asserts, “Most of our work as therapists is not the application 
of universal scientific truths won during long hours of objective research. 
Therapy, I think, is not scientific… it is a kind of moral discourse, and 
worse yet, one that has political consequences” (Cushman, 2019, p. 79). 
Richards (2012, p.  347) insists on the inescapably reflexive nature of 
psychology as a discipline; it cannot escape being of the situated humanity 
it wants to talk about: “Psychology’s problem in this respect rests in large 
part on its desperate aspirations to the status of a natural science in quest 
of universal laws, and psychologists’ own self-images of themselves as this 
kind of scientist.”
One method of engagement with the scientification of psychology has 
been the attempts to assert the scientific nature of the human part of psy-
chology (Brooke, 2015; Freeman, 2019; Sugarman, 2019), to make the 
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claim that while it may not be a STEM science, it should still be taken 
seriously as a science and can be called upon to account for itself as such 
(“physics envy,” Held, 2020). This is one way to address the anxieties raised 
in our culture when we argue for psychology’s status as contingent, as con-
tingent as the human meanings it seeks to understand. What grounds can 
it stand on, if its findings are inevitably relative? The million dollar ques-
tion becomes, “Can psychology as a discipline presume to be both truly 
scientific and genuinely human?” (Gantt & Williams, 2015, p. 32).
Mascolo (2016) argues that this is the wrong question. Psychology’s 
desire to be considered a science, as it emerged from philosophy, he 
suggests, has embedded psychology in “methodological fetishism—the 
privileging of method over theory in the hope that the careful use of 
scientific methodology would ultimately lead to psychological knowledge” 
(Mascolo, 2016, p.  544). He suggests that the discipline’s concern to 
understand human experience by solving the objective/subjective 
dichotomy, through self-definition and focus on method, is misplaced. 
Psychological knowledge emerges from encounters between people, who 
bring their own already established knowledges of the construct under 
scrutiny. These subjective knowledges also have to have a shared dimension 
in order to be intelligible to all participants in the psychological enterprise. 
The process is not either objective or subjective. (Notably, binary thinking 
is inadequate to and reductive of the task at hand). In other words, he 
(Mascolo, 2016, p. 544) says, psychology is an intersubjectively produced 
knowledge, and therefore “a genuine psychological science must itself rest 
on intersubjective foundations.” We will return to intersubjectivity below, 
and in future chapters. For now, it is worth noticing that intersubjectivity 
is offered here as a solution to the false binary of objective/subjective or 
science/not science that has helped to structure psychology. He concludes 
(Mascolo, 2016, p. 553):
A debate over whether a given discipline is or is not a science would seem 
to be more of a battle about status and prestige than about identifying 
alternative pathways to reliable knowledge. A better question might be, 
given its subject matter, how can we study psychological processes in 
systematic, reliable and useful ways? If such conditions can be satisfied, the 
question of whether or not disciplinary practices are “scientific” would be 
irrelevant.
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Implicit in this formulation is a challenge to the meaning of the “sci-
entific.” Why is scientific method so reified, why is it endorsed as the best 
way to achieve knowledge? Mascolo’s (2016) exploration of the meaning 
of the question, “Is psychology a science?” begins by reminding us that 
psychology emerged from philosophy via the Cartesian separation of 
mind and body, with the mind being privileged as the seat of rational 
selfhood. This way of thinking has always been gendered, raced and 
classed.
Gantt and Williams (2015) reiterate that psychology has emerged out 
of Enlightenment notions of the individualized and rational self. They 
also suggest that the humanistic branches of psychology that developed 
in the 1960s are “Romantic” (p.  42) and a “retreat into subjectivism” 
(p. 43), in other words, not available to be scientific. They suggest a third 
option is necessary, where the study of human meaning can be scientific, 
and can also take seriously the centrality of society and context to human 
being. They advocate for a model based on a science of understanding, 
which gives us access to the living complexities of human meaning. They 
contrast this to the dominant model of scientific explanation, which, in 
compartmentalizing and seeking authority over, takes the human out of 
its project altogether. The commitment of all of the contributors to this 
edited collection (Fischer et al., 2015) is to argue for the scientific validity 
of an approach to psychology that accommodates social scientific and 
humanities insights about human meaning and experience.
This project speaks to an ongoing investment in the ability of science 
to prove things, so that we can rest assured a psychological humanities 
can still be taken seriously, implicitly by certain people in specific 
institutions. Such an investment, needless to say, is still operating within 
a privileged understanding of the realm of “science” as carrying a truth 
value that no other discourse can be expected to match, and the 
assumption that such a truth is both necessary and possible. This approach 
is located on the science side of a science/humanities binary, and limits 
what the humanities can truly offer in terms of changing the thinking 
about the responsibility of science in helping to create the world it goes 
on to reflect, and changing the subject of psychology.
The question of the humanities’ knowledge of things that are not facts 
(often understood in psychoanalysis, which is more welcoming to 
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literature and other cultural artifacts as sources of human truth) and 
therefore cannot be grasped through scientific method is central to the 
idea that a psychological humanities can expand the boundaries available 
to psychology:
[T]he main problem from the perspective of the psychological humanities 
is the degree to which reflexivity is able to escape the borders of a given 
horizon. Clearly this reflexivity cannot be conducted alone in a monologue 
but requires engagement with the Other and horizons that are radically 
different from one’s own… psychologists need to move beyond the natural 
sciences in order to understand human mental life. (Teo, 2019, pp. 276–7)
Freeman (2019) offers the (from a scientific perspective) radical sug-
gestion that psychology invests more in poetics than in theory. 
Significantly, he calls for psychology to develop a “poetics of the Other.” 
In this formulation, not only is the other conceived of as more important 
than the self in the understanding of experience (which is not, in certain 
quarters, a new idea, as will be discussed below), but poetics are elevated 
over what Freeman (2019, p.  1) calls “theoretics.” Freeman’s call is to 
reimagine psychology away from a “scientific” discursive frame. He 
advocates for a new kind of psychological thinking, one which takes 
extremely seriously, even centrally, the wisdom to be gained from 
“humanizing” (2019, p.  5) the scientific theorizing on which modern 
psychology as a discipline is built.
Freeman’s project is in part to challenge the definition of scientific 
theory that informs modern psychology’s sense of itself. He wants to 
complicate the idea that the humanist, the poetic, the directly meaningful, 
is somehow other to the abstraction, deduction and generalizing 
tendencies of a modern notion of the theoretical. Psychology, he argues, 
has never been the kind of science it has aspired to be. He argues for the 
importance of narrative and biography to understanding clinical work 
(and Martin, 2017 argues for the importance of understanding biography 
to understand the development of the theories that structure and guide 
clinical work). Poetry, for Freeman (2019, pp. 9–10), is a place where 
hidden meaning is revealed, where the world is made visible. Psychologists, 
he suggests, like artists, share the task of restoring attention to the details 
of life that habitually slip away from us (see Stern, 2014).
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In tracking the work of the poetic, Freeman (2019) gestures to the 
work that language does. This occurs in the difference between the felt 
experience of life in the body, and what happens when we humans make 
sense of experience. In finding the world through words, the subject 
experiences its own reality: “Something has been realized, made real; and 
in this making, the world without may be re-found” (Freeman, 2019, 
p.  13). It is the unknown, made known and thereby experienced as 
familiar or remembered, that constitutes the poetic otherness of what it 
truly means to be human. This cannot be captured by theory, Freeman 
(2019) says. It exceeds attempts to pin it down, to weigh, measure, 
account for and track it. The poetic cannot be captured and still be poetic. 
(This reminds me of Kristeva’s, 1980 notion of the semiotic). While I 
appreciate Freeman’s valuing of a nonscientific approach, I prefer a more 
theorized version of “the poetic,” reactive as I am to the suggestion that 
science has concrete, material theory and the humanities has an 
untheorized, universal realm of art. This is simply a misrepresentation of 
the highly political, philosophically complex, richly theoretical work 
done within the discipline of the humanities over the past half century.
Stern (1985) has already offered an explanation for how language, in 
bringing the child along developmentally, splits her from her bodily 
experience, from what she can know of herself, at the same time as it 
enters her into the world outside herself. This underscores Freeman’s 
point that science cannot be a theory of the real because it cannot not 
leave out the human element of the human experiences it is trying to 
map; “it is patently unprepared to address the living presence of human 
reality” (Freeman, 2019, p. 14). Scientific language cannot capture what 
the poetic (or perhaps the semiotic, which in Kristeva’s, 1980 lexicon is 
where poetic language comes from) lets us know is there prior to our 
attempts to impose form on it. “[H]uman reality, understood as presence 
or phenomenon rather than object, eludes the kind of conceptual—and 
theoretical—containment science generally seeks… [H]uman reality, as 
living presence, eludes such entrapment” as the provable experiment or 
the inventory seeks to impose on what it means to be human (Freeman, 
2019, pp.  15–16). If we take seriously that the self is reliant on the 
other—on an other, on another—to be a self at all, we are in the realm of 
the poetic, according to Freeman (2019). We are also in the realm of the 
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psychoanalytic unconscious, of attachment theory, of literary 
psychoanalysis, of interpersonal neurobiology and of a notion of human 
being as complicitous.
Despite its reliance on scientific method to validate its work, psychol-
ogy has never been an exclusively academic enterprise. Its authority is 
formulated on its espoused relationship between practice and theory 
about that practice (Devonis, 2014; Rose, 1998). This allows its pro-
nouncements on human truths to be apparently evidence-based. This, of 
course, denies the exercises of power that the normative and normativiz-
ing energies of psychology have been responsible for (Foucault, 2006; 
Rose, 1998; Teo, 2005). Authority to know is authority over that which 
must be known. In the terms of a Western subject that has been shaped 
by binary logic, what needs to be controlled for is the constituting other.
 Self/Other
Disciplines involved with revealing the construction of racial difference, 
and working in the fields of gender and sexuality, have amply illustrated, 
both theoretically and materially, the role of the constituting other for the 
modern self. Whiteness, straightness, maleness, ablebodiedness and 
Europeanness have all been shown to need their debased binary other 
halves in order to be themselves (e.g., de Beauvoir, 1997; Dean, 2001; 
Fanon, 1967; Katz, 2007; Lorde, 2007; McRuer, 2006; Said, 1979).
Some branches of psychological theory and practice, and especially 
psychoanalytic thought, have long insisted on the importance of the 
other to the self/other mode of subject constitution (Benjamin, 1988; 
Churchill, 2015; Coelho & Claudio, 2003; Dean, 2001; Musholt, 2018). 
And yet in 2015, Goodman and Freeman’s (2015) edited collection on 
psychology and the other begins with the declaration that “the figure of 
the Other is an… underutilized […] vehicle for exploring and 
reconceptualizing classic psychological… issues” (Goodman & Freeman, 
2015, p. 5). They (ibid, p. 4) critique modern psychology’s construction 
of “tools and techniques” that “serve… to objectify experience, contain it, 
render it more… measurable… But in this very objectification and 
containment, they also serve to take us away from what is truly Other.” 
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In this critique, we can hear an echo of Freeman’s (2019) objections to 
scientific theorizing, which by its nature cannot tolerate the unmeasurable, 
the unknowable, and also considers these things suspicious by virtue of 
their “Romantic” or, indeed, subjective qualities. The application of the 
critical theories of otherness of the last half century seems to have affected 
psychology very unevenly.
Goodman and Freeman (2015, p. 2) define the other as everything 
that is not the self: “namely, the world itself.” Both the human subject 
and the subject of psychology, they say, lose the world when we contain 
the other. And we contain the other because, in its overwhelming 
otherness, it threatens the boundaries of the self. They characterize the 
self ’s relation to the other as necessary: We need it and we reject it. They 
further suggest that this “perpetual dance” is “ubiquitous” and “univer-
sal.” “But what happens,” they (Goodman & Freeman, 2015, pp. 2–3) ask,
[W]hen these idol-making and experience-rending tendencies are paired 
with a social order, philosophical heritage, and economic system that 
reinforce the centripetal force of the ego?… In this context, the self… 
becomes an idol of its own… It may be that we have told a story of 
ourselves—as modern subjects—that… requires us to live in constricted 
life-spaces, unable to truly attend to the abundance of the world around 
us… This has left us… ethically depleted, deprived of those existential 
resources that serve to move us beyond the confines of the hungry ego.
I am uncertain about the assertion that a self/other binary is a universal 
structure for humanity, being leery of claiming the authority to make my 
culture’s experience true for all. But what is useful about Goodman and 
Freeman’s (2015) presentation of the work of the (Western, late capitalist, 
neoliberal) self ’s relation to its other, is their location of the consequences 
of this relation in our very specific present.
If nineteenth century psychology assumed the Victorian, patriarchal 
and colonial right to make brutal use of its others (Perry, 2018; and see, 
e.g., the fate of Sarah Baartman, Crais & Scully, 2009; or the scientific 
racism espoused by pioneering psychologists, Richards, 2012; Teo, 2005), 
twentieth century psychology, with the help of feminism, queer theory 
and critical race studies, noticed this dynamic. For example, Jordan’s 
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(2010) feminist approach helped develop the practice of relational- 
cultural therapy, which challenges the notion and the valorization of the 
bounded self (see Miller, 1986). James Baldwin wrote about how 
twentieth century heteronormative masculinity needed to construct the 
homosexual as other in order to shore up its own, artificially simple 
desire, a point Katz (2007) used to show how heterosexuality is a back- 
formation from its homosexual other. McRuer (2006), in turn, showed 
heterosexuality’s reliance on ablebodiedness, and therefore on the dis-
abled as well as queer other.
McWilliams (2020) details psychoanalytic theory’s recognition of the 
centrality of the other to the modern self, and discusses the idea that we 
need others to hold the badness we cannot tolerate in ourselves. She 
identifies four main affects that feed the tendency toward destructive oth-
ering: fear, rage, envy and shame. Shame, she (McWilliams, 2020, p. 189) 
concludes, is above all “the common denominator of most toxic other-
ing.” Because shame and the other difficult emotions she identifies are 
part of being human, she says we cannot prevent ourselves from othering, 
we can only be vigilant about taking responsibility for what is happening 
when we do. She (McWilliams, 2020, p. 190) calls this, “the project of 
owning our own darkness, tolerating the shame it causes, and trying not 
to project it.” This version of the self cannot escape a binary formation 
with its other, a point I will return to in Chap. 3.
What does a notion of the complicit subject bring to this standard ver-
sion of the Western self? For one, the arguments made in this book about 
the relationship between the liberal individual self of current mainstream 
Anglo-American culture, the traditional project of psychotherapy, and 
current identity politics and the social injustices they seek to address, 
problematize the assumption that binary thinking is inevitable. To fully 
embrace the intergenerational, structurally saturated, rhizomatic, 
enfolded, complicit self is to reject the power dynamics our world cur-
rently depends upon and reproduces. These power dynamics have been 
presented to us in various ways as inevitable: by Freud’s notion of the 
destructive drives underpinning “the” human psyche, by the “scientific” 
uses of biology to create gender and racial differences, by capitalism, by 
colonialism, by neoliberalism, by the assertion that we cannot help but 
hate and/or fear difference if we are to be human. If we challenge the 
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structuring idea of the binary not as an underlying inevitability of what 
it means to be human, but as a technology of subjectification for the 
modern human, we open up different ways of being human. These ways 
have always existed. And they have been explored in much academic the-
orizing of the past 50 years or so, if not in mainstream academic (i.e., 
“scientific”) and popular psychology.
Central to my thinking on this, and to the thinking of many others 
across disciplines, is the work of Judith Butler. For my purposes here, 
most directly relevant is The Psychic Life of Power (Butler, 1997), which 
explores how to become a subject is to become a self within processes of 
subjection and subordination:
[T]o persist in one’s being means to be given over from the start to social 
terms that are never fully one’s own. The desire to persist in one’s own being 
requires submitting to a world of others… Only by persisting in alterity 
does one persist in one’s “own” being. (1997, p. 28)
Additionally, Butler’s work points out the destructive power of socially 
inscribed norms to police access to the category of recognizable humanity 
(see Livingston, 2020). Othered groups are rendered socially unintelligible, 
their lives unlivable, their suffering ungrievable (Butler, 2003; Butler, 
2016). Who gets to define the terms of the system and its performances 
of proper humanity becomes an important question. As she explores this 
question, Butler’s work offers a detailed exposition of the fact of human 
complicity, the interdependence of self and other that systems of 
inequality violently deny (Butler, 2020).
Butler is most well known for her critiques of gender norms and how 
their reiterations are forged through repetition into apparent truths, 
endorsed at the expense of those who cannot or do not offer the correct 
performances (Butler, 1999). But her work also allows us to be suspicious 
of the norms of healthy psychological subjectivity that have been 
circulated and enacted by the psy disciplines, and the other discourses of 
modernity that have emerged together with, and complicit in, psychology. 




 The Subject of Psychology
Theories of the human in psychology are inevitably metapsychological; 
they make universal claims about human nature. Atwood and Stolorow 
(1993, p.  3) were arguing in 1979 that modern psychology had frag-
mented into different approaches to the question of subjectivity, each 
approach presenting itself as “the foundation for a science of man.” But, 
as Atwood and Stolorow (1993, p. 4) point out, the different approaches 
are embedded in their originators’ “ideological and conceptual orienta-
tions to the problem of what it means to be human,” as focalized through 
their own experiences. The assumptions about and theories of human 
subjectivity offered by the different psychological schools of thought tell 
us more about the lives and subjectivities of their proponents than they 
do about universal humanity, and complicate psychology’s claim to objec-
tive scientific status. Indeed, preempting many of the more recent argu-
ments in favor of a psychological humanities, Atwood and Stolorow 
(1993) assert that the problem of metapsychology arises from psycholo-
gy’s attempts to be scientific. They (1993, p. 177), in turn, offer “a theory 
of subjectivity itself… a depth psychology of human experience, purified 
of the mechanistic reifications of classical metapsychology.” Their solu-
tion to the problem of subjectivity in trying to understand subjectivity 
was, of course, intersubjectivity:
[A] field theory or systems theory… that… seeks to comprehend psycho-
logical phenomena not as products of isolated intrapsychic mechanisms, 
but as forming at the interface of reciprocally interacting subjectivities… 
From this perspective, the very concept of an individual mind or psyche is 
itself a psychological product crystallizing from within a nexus of intersub-
jective relatedness. (Atwood & Stolorow, 1993, p. 178)
Intersubjectivity speaks to one element of the complicities of human 
being. It is a useful way to help theorize complicity in the therapeutic 
relationship. Intersubjectivity has a philosophical as well as a psychological 
tradition (Coelho & Claudio, 2003; Glaveanu, 2019). These tend to be 
divorced from the scientific branch of psychology, and the idea of 
intersubjectivity has been most extensively developed in the psy fields by 
1 Introduction: The Personal Is Still Political 
28
psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic intersubjective field is defined by the 
notion of the third, although this third space has been variously 
characterized as clinicians have sought to name the consequences of 
cultural and psychic complicities. As I will illustrate in Chap. 6, there are 
a number of therapeutic modalities that offer ways to apply these ideas in 
practice.
The notion of the intersubjective third seeks to name what is psychi-
cally created between therapist and client when two subjectivities success-
fully see each other’s personhood. The idea of the intersubjective third 
aims to theorize what is created between the therapist and each client in 
a way that acknowledges the unique quality of the relationship. The third 
is excessive to the people involved, because it literally exceeds them. It can 
be thought of as an unconscious creation between them (Gerson, 2004). 
Jessica Benjamin (2004, p. 7) has defined the intersubjective third, most 
broadly, as “anything one holds in mind that creates another point of 
reference outside the dyad.” The third is necessary for each member to get 
outside of herself, to enable what Benjamin calls mutual recognition 
between two subjects to happen. Benjamin (2004) describes the third as 
a fundamental relational principle, which, if surrendered to by the thera-
pist, will enable both therapist and client to move “beyond doer and done 
to,” into a place of reciprocity which undoes the oppressive subject/object 
dynamic of traditional psychoanalysis, and of a Western world built on 
binary thinking.
The third, as an external point of reference outside of the dyad, can 
encompass a range of forces or ideas, such as the cultural third (Gerson, 
2004). Alternatively, the idea of the social third names the imbrications 
of interpsychic and intrapsychic and cultural forces (Benjamin, 2011; 
Sehrbrock, 2020), what Sehrbrock (2020, p. 291) calls the presence of 
“ghosts of collective and systemic agents” in the therapeutic encounter:
[S]ocial thirdness presents a lens that illuminates the socio-political strata 
of experiences. It crystallizes social meaning that preserves distinctness 
without collapsing into polarities, extremes, binaries, concretizations of 
complexity, control, omnipotence, “us versus them,” power struggles, 
splitting, and the phobic hatreds like transphobia, cisgenderism, and 
lookism, for example. In the context of a therapeutic encounter, social 
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thirdness is both a lens through which clinicians view and understand the 
therapeutic process and a position from which clinicians engage with their 
patients. Social thirdness goes beyond the bounds of dyadic intersubjectivity, 
focusing on the felt experience of the moment in relation to society and the 
social unconscious… [T]he social third is like the epigenetic influence of 
the environment’s insignia on the expression of the gene. (Sehrbrock, 2020, 
pp. 291–292)
The field of intersubjectivity recognizes that the self needs its other in 
relations of intimacy, not domination (Benjamin, 1988; Glaveanu, 2019).
Benjamin’s (2004) notion of recognition articulates the necessity of 
having a space beyond the binary. In her formulation, it is the collapse 
into complementarity (that binary energy) that causes dependency to 
become coercive: When two subjects, relating in a binary way, lose sight 
of the independent subjectivity of the other, and someone is reduced to a 
relational object. The binary relation is a relation of power, based on a 
lack of recognition which causes objectification and contempt 
(McWilliams, 2020).
In addition to an intersubjective approach, other branches of psychol-
ogy have also been critical of the mainstream model of human subjectiv-
ity as properly independent, intrapsychically constituted, teleologically 
directed and self-controlled. In the twentieth century, the field paid ever 
more attention to social context, and to the imbrication of context with 
the individual (Gough, 2017; Laubscher, 2015; Teo, 2005). Since the 
second half of the twentieth century, some academic psychologists and 
psychotherapists have been concerned with hermeneutics, with the ideas 
of linguistic and social construction, and with the centrality of relational-
ity to human being and to therapy. This is sometimes called the postmod-
ern turn (Anderson, 1997; Anderson, 2007; Teo, 2005). Critical 
psychology has long been engaged with debates about the nature of self-
hood, and aware of the embodied and material constitutive practices in 
which the psy disciplines have been implicated (Hook, 2007; 
Papadopoulos, 2008; Rose, 1998).
Here are a few more examples that are by no means exhaustive of the 
work done in this area: From a hermeneutic perspective, Cushman (2019, 
p.  9), citing himself from 1990, argues for the historically specific, 
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culturally influenced and political content of any model of the self, in 
opposition to mainstream psychology’s ahistorical individualistic self: 
“there is no universal, transhistorical self, only local selves; no universal 
theory about the self, only local theories.” Cushman (2019) insists that 
psychology is a cultural artifact, its version of the self contingent on its 
own history and place. Furthermore, he argues that the modern self is 
empty, a result of the policies and politics of the twentieth century, and, 
crucially, of the liberal individualism that has shaped them. The twenty- 
first century self, he goes on to suggest, is neoliberally fractured and 
performative. These ideas are taken up in Chaps. 2 and 5.
Brooke (2015, p. 23), from a human science approach, advocates for a 
vision of the psychological subject as social: “a human science psychology 
cannot begin with a notion of the self that is taken for granted and self- 
originating.” Instead, he offers a model of the human subject as embed-
ded in and formed from language, community, history and an embodied 
identity.
Slaney (2019) suggests theoretical psychology borrows the idea of 
intersectionality from critical race and feminist theories in order to 
articulate its plurality. She wants a framework that emphasizes critical 
inquiry and critical praxis, that is aware of power relations, privilege and 
oppression, and the imperatives for social justice. Such a discipline would 
by definition be pluralistic, collaborative and interdisciplinary. 
McCormick-Huhn et al. (2019) provide an example of what a feminist, 
intersectional, mainstream psychological practice might look like.
In its turn, cultural psychology has been defined as “an interdisciplin-
ary human science” which recognizes the co-constituted relationship 
between people and between people and their contexts (Shweder, 1990). 
However, cultural psychology, like certain branches of feminist psychol-
ogy, and like multicultural or cross-cultural psychologies, has been criti-
cized for not challenging the Western methodological, empiricist 
foundations of psychology, which do not acknowledge the material rela-
tions of power out of which they emerge and which they perpetuate 
(Richards, 2012; Teo, 2005). Both transnational and postcolonial and 
now decolonial psychologies are aware of psychology’s responsibility in 
perpetuating raced relations of power that are also geographical and eco-
nomic (Boonzaier & van Niekerk, 2019; Collins et al., 2019; Duran & 
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Duran, 1995; Held, 2020; Melluish, 2014; Miller & Miller, 2020; 
Richards, 2012; Teo, 2005).
Narrative Therapy and other postmodern modalities (Anderson, 1997; 
Freedman & Combs, 1996; Papadopoulos, 2008; Teo, 2005) have taught 
psychotherapists to think about the meanings made of and by clients, and 
have enabled us to learn about the harm done by oppressive systems and 
the discourses they perpetuate. But almost by definition, we still work with 
the ideas about the client-as-subject which Rose (1998) points out the psy 
disciplines have helped create: that they are in search of more authentic 
personhood, more accurate meanings, greater authenticity. And that they 
are free to do so, indeed, compelled to do so: it is a sign of their healthy 
leanings, their personal responsibility and their move toward being better.
So while a critical eye on psychology’s meanings and practices has been 
a part of the discipline, this has not tended to substantially impact the 
common-sense authority of the psychologized subject, the modern liberal 
subject of the therapy room and of popular discourses of choice. Fine’s 
(2014) critique of social psychology’s engagement with gender difference, 
including how these often problematic experiments are disseminated in 
the popular press, gives one example of this. As psychology became 
disciplinized in the nineteenth century, it participated in alliances with 
other scientific regimes to establish ways of measuring, knowing, 
validating, testing and normalizing. What emerges from Rose’s (1998, 
p. 60, 62–65) account of this process is just how woven into modern 
everyday thought, common sense reality, the subject of psychology is, as 
a result of this historical process:
To educate a child, to reform a delinquent, to cure a hysteric, to raise a baby, 
to administer an army, to run a factory—it is not so much that these activi-
ties entail the utilization of psychological theories and techniques than that 
there is a constitutive relation between the character of what will count as 
an adequate psychological theory or argument and the processes by which 
a kind of psychological visibility may be accorded to these domains…. 
[R]eality becomes ordered according to a psychological taxonomy…
Rose (1998) denotes this a “techne” that uses a way of thinking about 
political power, the creation of authority and authorities, and an ethical 
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requirement to self-knowledge and self-improvement that shapes who we 
think we are and what we think we should be doing with our lives.
And in 2020, Severson and Goodman were still asserting that Western 
psychology is failing to locate the human being in context, because of a 
philosophical focus on the individual and an attempt to mimic the 
natural sciences (as though these disciplines were not, themselves, 
saturated with human culture, see Rippon, 2019; Schiebinger, 2004). 
Severson & Goodman (2020, p.  2) decry the “catastrophic failure to 
think about human beings as fundamentally social, relational, ethical, 
historical creatures.” They critique the development of a scientific 
rationalism, a belief in the constructs of objective truth, rationality, 
individualism, as wholly inadequate to account for the intergenerational 
transmission of trauma, suffering and injustice. They insist, “to be human 
is first to be embedded in society, to exist in porous and complex social 
and ethical relationships” (ibid). What is remarkable about this statement 
is not its refusal of traditional psychology’s “scientific” stance, and its 
concomitant focus on the individual, the histories of which we have been 
exploring at length. What is remarkable is that it is asserted in 2020 as a 
revolutionary statement, as part of a project of leveraging psychology for 
social justice. Despite decades of theory, in other words, the liberal subject 
of objective experience and scientific inquiry is still very much the center 
of psychological meaning.
Thus psychology can be said to be a technique of subjectification still. 
It is a way of thinking about what it means to be human that creates 
systems of power, through defining normalcy and deviance (Hook, 2007; 
Rose, 1998; Sugarman, 2019). It has helped to create an idea of human 
subjectivity that is self-enclosed and individualized, with the freedom of 
choice to decide who to be and how to be better. This subject is by 
definition liberal, and a democratic citizen of the West. The implications 
of these positionalities will be explored in more detail in Chap. 2, and 
linked to processes of racialization and gendering in Chaps. 3 and 4, 
respectively. The latest iteration, post-internet, is the topic of Chap. 5.
Psychology has enormous constitutive power to underwrite a version 
of reality that entrenches binary thinking, a subject who is based on its 
other in a culture where institutions shape access to both resources and 
meanings, and to who can be considered a viable subject or correctly 
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human. What is at stake when we ask psychology to change, to put into 
practice—in the psychotherapy room, in the pages of newspapers and 
magazines, as well as in the classroom and academy—the insights that 
critical psychology has taken from the humanities, is the enablement of 
new ways of understanding how we might be subjects in relation to each 
other. In such a world, there is no need to account for a gay gene or the 
etiology of transness in in-utero hormone exposure. There is no need to 
invest in the artificial construction of different human races. The logic 
that underpins structural inequality is revealed as a regime of truth, a 
construct to enable material gain for the “normal” or normative. And, 
equally important to my argument, it also means that those who have 
been constructed as the constitutive other, those whose lives and psyches 
have been used to enable dominant alliances of the norm, are also obliged 
to find additional forms of activism. It is not enough to demand or even 
achieve access to the master’s tools. And advocating for revolution, for a 
complete change, a wiping clean of the slate, is impossible, as the idea of 
the complicit subject suggests—we are never free to escape where we 
came from, the terms of how we were made. Social justice change has to 
be able to hold the complexity of the human, which is not and has never 
been, binary.
 Conclusion
Over two decades ago, as we have seen, Rose (1998) argued that the con-
cept and the ethics of the idea of the modern individual, free to choose 
his fate, was a discursive construction linked both to the emergence of 
liberal democracies and to the psy disciplines. He traced the genealogy of 
this regime of the self, using, as this language suggests, Foucaultian ideas 
and other theories concerned with deconstruction, discourse and 
destabilization of the apparently natural and common-sensical. His 
project was taken up by Hook (2007, p.  8), who also uses Foucault’s 
(1977) idea of disciplinarity to argue that what he calls “a psychological 
individuality” is central to the emergence of modern ideas, including 
political systems. This work emerged from the feminist-informed, 
queering turn in the humanities of the 1980s and 1990s, as is evident in 
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Rose’s (1998, pp. 3–10) account of the academic trajectory underpinning 
his essays. Despite the intervening decades, psychotherapeutic practice 
(and many of the institutions that teach and accredit it) has not 
significantly metabolized the interdisciplinary ideas articulated in 1998 
for the discipline of psychology by Rose. Indeed, in 2017, Teo was arguing 
for the need to include the thinking developed in humanities-based 
subjects into psychology, and again, in 2019. If Rose’s (1998, pp. 1–2) 
objective was to “question some of our contemporary certainties about 
the kinds of people we take ourselves to be, to help develop ways in which 
we might begin to think ourselves otherwise,” then my purpose in this 
book is to argue that this work, so old school by now in the humanities, 
still needs to be applied to psychotherapeutic practice.
The modern version of the self has been invented through a historical 
process. It is a macrostructural process, not an individual one. This his-
torical process has everything to do with systems of power and exploita-
tion. These include the economic changes of the industrial revolution and 
the neoliberal structures that have emerged from the globalization enabled 
by colonialism, to access to political power and the institutions that 
enable this access. The mapping of this process is the topic of Chap. 2. 
And at the same time, all this actual work in the world would not be pos-
sible without symbolic structures, without language and the stories it tells 
us about who is human, who is deserving, who is deviant and so on.
Being human means being complicit. In the systems that shape us all, 
and that privilege some of us over others. In the language that speaks us 
into being, the ways we learn to say “I” and “you” and “us” and “them.” In 
the histories that predate us and that set the terms for the world we inherit. 
In the culture that tells us who we each should be according to the bodies 
we each have, how we should behave, what we should value and how we 
should express those values, that behavior, our selves. In the families into 
which we are born, which hone and focalize the systems, the language, the 
history and the culture that authorize and shape what it means to be a 
family, and how a family should function. To be human is to be both-and, 
not either/or. We can never escape the specifics between us, or the impact 
of embodiment, and the only way we can be better is to nevertheless allow 
for a disembodied shared humanness that makes us all possible, and that 
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2
Well-Intentioned White People 
and Other Problems with Liberalism
Chapter 1 located the notion of the complicit subject within the psycho-
logical humanities and the subject of psychology. It argued that the 
Western notion of human being, which informs the subject of psychol-
ogy, is based on a binary structure that reflects and reproduces oppressive 
power dynamics. This binary relationship encodes and enables psychic 
and systemic power relations (since the two are complicit in each other). 
The power dynamics enabled by binary logic work through refusing the 
complicit nature of human being in favor of a relationship between self 
and other that needs, among other things, a liberal subject formation.
A liberal subject is one who requires sameness in his relationships, who 
cannot truly tolerate difference. He is born from the Enlightenment’s 
valorization of the rational, self-enclosed individual, a mind who can and 
should know and control himself—and thus, a subject fundamentally 
alienated from the capacity to handle encounters with the otherness that 
is central to what it means to be human. He grew in the soil of capitalism, 
and the gender and race binaries from which it profited. He eventually 
fragmented under neoliberalism, as the pressures of capitalism in a glo-
balized economy reached ever further into systems and their subjects.
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This chapter provides more detail about the subject of liberalism and 
its relationship to relations of power. It tracks the move from liberalism 
to neoliberalism as political, economic and cultural structures of power 
that have affected the nature of the Western (and Westernized) subject of 
psychology. It also summarizes the argument that the psy disciplines, and 
therefore the subject of psychology, are fundamentally implicated in 
techniques of liberal subjectification. As a consequence, the model of 
human being on which psychotherapy is built is limited by this history 
and its effects. Thinking complicitously opens clinicians up to the full 
potential of intersubjective co-creation with clients, a point which will be 
fully explored in the final chapter. This entails a commitment to move 
away from liberal individualism and its ideas about autonomy. It also 
entails an awareness of the effects of neoliberalism on twenty-first century 
subjects, which is explored in more detail in Chap. 5.
 Liberalism
Before coronavirus, before the racial justice protests sparked by the lynch-
ing of George Floyd, before the ugly contentions of the 2020 presidential 
elections, but right in the middle of the maelstrom of Trumpism, I 
became a U.S. citizen. My citizenship ceremony took place during the 
government shutdown at the beginning of 2019, which was caused by a 
battle over the symbol of a pointless, expensive, destructive wall on the 
southern American border. Outside the Orpheum Theatre in Oakland, 
landfill in the shape of little plastic American flags made in China were 
being sold by a range of people, all of whom were not white. Inside the 
Orpheum, the very nice staff from the Department of Homeland Security, 
San Francisco branch, went out of their way to let us know that the 
majority of the 1000 or so people qualifying for citizenship that day were 
from Mexico (and then China, and then India). They told us that we 
were the best of America, and most welcome here. Their political subver-
sion in the context of the Trumpocalypse was clear, and I appreciated it.
They also got a choir of nice elderly people to sing us, “This Land Is 
Your Land,” among other examples of musical Americana. Apparently 
being inducted into Americanness means being invited to collude with 
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historical amnesia about whose land, exactly, we are on. They showed us 
a carefully curated slide show of images of immigrants of many ethnici-
ties and colors coming to America over the years. They told us immi-
grants built America, again indulging in national amnesia. I felt deeply 
uncomfortable participating in the celebration of nationalism with these 
necessary omissions. I also felt the privilege of being granted citizenship 
at a time when some families were being torn apart for trying to get in to 
this country. I felt very appreciative of being in a country which allowed 
government representatives to speak out against the government, and 
appreciative of how they asserted that America is the people in it, not the 
people in charge. This whole ambivalent event says something, I think, 
about the liberalism that has built this country and allowed it to continue 
selling parts of itself for celebrating, while pretending other parts do 
not exist.
The whitewashed American fantasy is that anyone can achieve any-
thing here, in this land of opportunity, if he just works hard enough. 
Each person, this fantasy goes, is free to do his best, and entitled by god, 
law and ethics to the right to be his individual self, make his individual 
decisions and own his individual stuff. The messy American truth is 
much murkier, since not everyone has equal access to the opportunities 
to get ahead. It is also complicated by the larger human and ecological 
truth that we do not, in fact, each stand alone, that we are implicated in 
each other’s choices whether we like it or not. The exalted ideal of the 
individual and his rights—the liberal subject, entitled to his land, his 
guns, his family, his freedom—is not a god-given truth but a construct 
formed at the cost of a host of others. It also fundamentally disallows the 
concept of human complicity. Despite even its best intentions, this fierce 
liberal individualism is profoundly responsible for helping to structure a 
deeply unequal society, a way of thinking about human being that is 
inimical to human being (see Davis, 2020). It is part and parcel of sys-
tems of oppression, even as it also is deeply committed to discourses of 
truth, freedom and human happiness.
Liberalism began as both a political and an economic philosophy. It 
has come to encode the politics of socioeconomic policy as morality. As a 
political system of thought, it originated in Europe, possibly as far back 
as the Magna Carta in the thirteenth century, which attempted to limit 
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the monarch’s divine right over the individual liberties of the landed gen-
try. It has thus always been classed. It has come, broadly, to stand for 
individual rights to, among other things, free will to choose, bodily 
autonomy and land ownership, none of which can actually be asserted by 
most individuals in most of the world. Despite what it thinks of itself, 
there are very real limits to liberalism’s claims to universality, to its belief 
that it encodes values of general human dignity, truth and justice.
Guyatt (2016) has argued that from America’s inception, well- 
intentioned white people recognized that America’s founding principle—
all men are created equal—was incompatible with genocide and slavery. 
But they could not accept the differences represented by Native Americans 
and Africans as equal to their own culture and values. In perhaps the 
most pernicious blind spot of Western culture, one which arguably builds 
on a philosophical inability to come to reasonable terms with sexual dif-
ference, these early liberal white Americans recognized the humanity of 
their others but not their innate equality. That could only come if and 
when They became more like Us. This is the problem with liberalism. Its 
message is ultimately about the centrality of the whiteness, maleness and 
classness that birthed it. It looks at others and measures their worth in 
their willingness to become like itself. It is also terribly, terribly well- 
intentioned, since it is so obviously the best of what it means to be human 
that wanting to assimilate others into itself is only a gift, a measure of its 
generosity. It is a benign Borg. It is bewildered by opposition or resent-
ment from those it wants to help.
It also normalizes the idea that selfhood and ownership are co- 
constituting. Liberalism, in its insistence on the rights of the individual, 
encodes capitalist assumptions about the relationship between property 
and personhood. Part of being a person is the right to own stuff. This 
inevitably translates into maneuvers for economic and social power, to 
which other meanings of humanity become subject.
My first understanding of liberalism is through a South African lens. 
The terms of the debate are different there (see Distiller, 2005). There was 
a Liberal Party for a while, but it died in the face of apartheid (Rich, 
1997). Stephen Bantu Biko (1978), a visionary writer and anti-apartheid 
activist beaten to death by the police in 1977, made it impossible for any 
progressive South African to be proud of the epithet. A white liberal, 
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according to Biko, was someone who spoke for black people, who did not 
recognize their agency. White liberals were (are) products and beneficia-
ries of racism who were (are) unable to see their own location in the sys-
tem and how their well-intentioned actions perpetuate injustice, 
specifically, for Biko, racial injustice.
Post apartheid, liberalism and liberal values continued to be highly 
contested and racialized (Husemeyer, 1997; Johnson & Welsh, 1998). 
This is unsurprising, given the class and race tensions the ideology carries 
in postcolonial times. Liberal ideals fed colonial discourse, in part by 
circulating a veneer of morality which stitched individual rights (in for-
mations which benefitted colonizers, like the right to own property, with-
out the acknowledgment of the ownership rights of the people who had 
been there first) to democracy and its institutions. In so doing, it bestowed 
the state with commitments to dignity and freedom that were, in reality, 
extremely partial (Mehta, 1999).
As Brown (1995, p. 17) points out, the modern Western state is depen-
dent upon liberalism to authorize its apparently “self-generating” func-
tions: “social repairs, economic problem solving, and the management of 
a mass population.” Liberal ideals helped to create the idea of the modern 
nation state, whose job it is to manage and protect the rights of the appar-
ently free individual members of said nation. But the state, and the liberal 
ideas it relies upon and helps to produce, creates the individuals it goes 
on to protect. And this state, these individuals and the rights to which 
they are entitled by the law created by the state in the name of its indi-
viduals, these things have a very specific history. Perry (2018) has tracked 
the mutual development of modern patriarchy in the Enlightenment via 
slavery, colonialism and specific uses of juridical power. This emerging 
law conflated manhood (meaning legally endorsed, raced, personhood) 
and the right to property, to create subjects and objects of government.
Perry (2018) shows how economic liberalism, which she tracks to the 
early expansion of European Empire at the start of the Enlightenment, 
and which was enriched by the early slave trade, was also a political and a 
philosophical system. The entire enterprise was enabled by a use of the 
law to grant ownership rights to those considered people. Thus, economic 
liberalism is inextricable from “specifically, the doctrine of personhood 
[which] entails a system whereby the subject before the state or the law 
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was made into either a patriarch, his liege (woman), or someone outside 
legal recognition, whether slaves or… ‘savages’ but whom we can also 
term ‘nonpersons’ in the juridical sense” (Perry, 2018, p. 21). She shows 
how the legal personhood granted the gendered, raced, classed liberal 
subject of emerging modernity was based on the exclusion of those not 
afforded the legal recognition of their personhood. The right to self- 
determination, legally and physically, continues to rely on having access 
to legally recognized personhood and what Perry calls “political 
recognition.”
Rose (1998) has further detailed how individuality and govern-
mentability go together in modern democracy. He adds Foucault’s (1977, 
1978) insight that the creation of normativity was a crucial part of this 
process. He details the role of the psy disciplines in creating this norma-
tive individuality, which supplements Perry’s (2018) explication of the 
ways that ideas of legal personhood and the patriarchal order it helped 
establish extended from the public to the private sphere. Before the 
advent of the psy disciplines, Perry (2018) shows, liberalism was estab-
lishing practices of surveillance that penetrated intimate relations and 
assigned people (and nonpeople) their proper places in the system. In 
turn, Rose (1998) shows how normative and individualizing technolo-
gies of democracy and the emerging discipline of psychology worked 
together as the Enlightenment continued and into the twentieth century, 
as we will see in more detail below.
As we will see, too, in its current incarnation, neoliberalism, the imbri-
cation of liberal individualism and capitalism within neocolonial global-
ization, has specific effects on structures and subjectivities. Liberal 
subjects, formed through the Law and the law—that is, through both 
symbolic exercises of power and actual juridical decrees and acts—are 
part of and parceled with modern race and racism, modern gender bina-
ries, modern democracies, industrial and surveillance capitalism, and the 
idea of the entitled, enabled individual all these constructs need to do 
their work of domination. These ideas are illustrated in the chapters 
that follow.
Williams (1991) writes lyrically about the modern implications of the 
marriage of liberalism and capitalism in the American legal system. She 
says that individual rights, that concept so dear to America’s sense of itself 
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and the freedoms on which its righteousness depends, were codified by 
the law to be available only to those who could afford them. Notions of 
privacy, of intimacy, and the human connection upon which both rely, 
she shows, have been corrupted by the power of the marketplace to com-
modify human value. Perry’s (2018) exposition of the initial legal con-
struction of American personhood as dependent on commodities and 
commodity values, as well as on gender and race, provides the historical 
and ideological underpinning for the sociolegal dynamics, Williams 
(1991) identifies.
Williams (1991) writes about the valuation of property as something 
concrete that can be held to legal standards in contract law, standards 
which can in theory also protect people. Instead, she says (Williams, 
1991), value has come to accrue to the curated meaning of a thing, the 
associations and desires conjured up by an advertising industry that 
evades legal accountability by relying on the creation of ephemera and 
selling the idea it associates with the thing instead of the thing itself.
This language was not available to Williams, but she is talking about 
the brand. When “masque becomes the basis of our bargains,” she says 
(Williams, 1991, pp. 40–41),
[W]e will create new standards of irrelevance in our lives, reordering social 
relations in favor of the luxurious—and since few of us can afford real 
luxury, blind greed becomes the necessary companion… Money reflects 
law and law reflects money, unattached to notions of humanity.
This is also, not coincidentally, an accurate description of how slavery 
worked. And slavery is surely the institution which most exposes the 
investments and limits of a system of thought that wants to declare itself 
for universal human dignity and rights, thus authorizing its own good-
ness, while also encoding the right to individual profit as part of what it 
entitles itself to (see Kendi, 2016). The silently raced component of mod-
ern liberalism, and its tendency to not know this, is reflected here.
Williams (1991, pp. 71–71) also writes about liberal good intention. 
She describes a group of white real-estate developers who are considering 
entering a church in Harlem during an Easter Sunday service to observe 
the “show” during a walking tour:
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I wondered what would happen if a group of blue-jeaned blacks were to 
walk uninvited into a synagogue on Passover…—just to peer, not to pray… 
Yet the aspect of disrespect, intrusion, seemed irrelevant to this well- 
educated, affable group of people. They deflected my observation with 
comments like… “There’s no harm intended.” As well-intentioned as they 
were, I was left with the impression that no one existed for them who could 
not be governed by their intentions.
She adds (Williams, 1991, p. 72), “To live so completely impervious 
to one’s own impact on others is a fragile privilege”—and indeed, fragility 
is the right frame. It partly explains the defensiveness of well-intentioned 
white people, in DiAngelo’s (2018) term, white fragility. When one’s 
sense of self is based on one’s unconscious superiority over the other, 
wrapped up in one’s sense of oneself as therefore obviously a good person, 
what is at stake when one’s intentions are challenged is one’s moral good-
ness. The benefit, the profit accrued from such a positionality of well- 
intentioned selfhood, for whom the world’s goods and meanings are 
assumed to rightfully exist, is both material and emotional. Both are dif-
ficult to give up.
One result is that structures and systems—the law is one of them—
which convey rights on the basis of who can be admitted to the realm of 
the human (Perry, 2018), continue to mete out standards of inclusion 
through respectability and recognizability (Butler, 2003). This conflicts 
with any true accommodation of difference, externally, in terms of social 
structures, and internally, in terms of psychic relations. Liberalism, 
despite its stated best intentions to accommodate everyone, encodes nor-
mativity. It cannot see equally valuable shared humanity across 
difference.
 A Note on the Idea of the Universally Human
If there is one thing my career as a professor of Shakespeare studies taught 
me, it was to be wary of claims to universal humanity. Shakespeare’s texts 
continue to be sold as valuable because of their “universal themes.” The 
very specific material history behind the selection of Shakespeare as the 
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embodiment of the best of humanity is necessarily excluded from this 
messaging. There is concerted colonial education policy, linked to a polit-
ical agenda of “civilization” and cultural conquest, behind the insistence 
that England’s writer has this kind of moral authority over us all. All good 
literature, arguably, will make use of universal human themes. But it 
speaks to structural politics that Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart is 
made to be an African author speaking to local conditions, for example, 
where Shakespeare’s work, equally embedded in  local events, becomes 
“universal” (Distiller, 2004; Dollimore & Sinfield, 1985; Hawkes, 1992; 
Holderness, 1988).
The branding of Shakespeare also has an editorial history which is 
implicated, as all human systems of meaning-making must be, in cultural 
politics. Just one example is the ways the same-sex eroticism of the son-
nets was rewritten by editors, or explained away, while their vicious 
misogyny was endorsed (Booth, 2000; Duncan Jones, 1997; Fineman, 
1986; Halpern, 2002). There is a vast and fascinating academic literature 
on all these topics: on the construction of Shakespeare’s universality via 
British class and colonial policies; on the editorial history of the works, 
which helped to invent the idea of the individual genius author out of 
local writing practices that were much more collaborative and porous; on 
editorial interpretations and how they built the content for the idea of 
the universally human; and about how all this played itself out in educa-
tion systems across the globe during and after high colonialism (e.g., 
Bristol, 1990; Cloud, 1991; De Grazia, 1991; Distiller, 2009; Erickson, 
1991; Howard & O’Conner, 1987; Joughin, 1997; Loomba, 2002; 
Marcus, 1996; Taylor, 1989). The political nature of any claim to univer-
sality is inescapable to a student of these fields.
And yet the European liberalism that emerged in the Enlightenment 
believed itself to stand for the best in all of us, with the quiet arrogance 
of a certain kind of white supremacist Christianity. I have often won-
dered if it is connected to the Ancient Greeks’ arrogance: their designa-
tion for their outsiders, “barbarians,” meant those who did not have 
language, and therefore culture, because they did not speak Greek (see 
Mannarini & Salvatore, 2020 for a discussion of the entanglement of 
citizenship and otherness). This assumption of one’s own centrality seems 
to have carried over into many other aspects of the West’s sense of itself, 
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and been a very valuable tool in justifying the work of colonialism. In the 
world that colonialism made, a certain use of the language of universal 
human rights has been deployed by neoliberalism to further entrench 
global economic systemic inequality (Harvey, 2007).
The idea of some universal humanity that we all share, in other words, 
has all too often been a tool of power and exploitation. The key question, 
in the face of the very many differences in cultures that a melting pot 
theory tends to want to not just wish away, but homogenize into the 
dominant norm, is: who decides? Whose terms for the apparently univer-
sal get to define the idea of the human?
As a result of having been a scholar of English Literature in a postcol-
ony like South Africa, I remain profoundly skeptical of any claims to 
universality. At the same time, I am arguing for a way to conceptualize 
something we humans all share, something I am calling complicity. This 
is my attempt to articulate how, being made in systems of power, as we all 
are, and having very different and unequal lives as a result, as we do, we 
nevertheless share a human connectedness. This argument is not the same 
as a statement of support for a universal humanism.
To be human means to be limited and shaped by the world we have no 
choice but to enter, the world that makes us. Freud (1973) conceptual-
ized this in terms of the Oedipus complex, where every child must sub-
mit to an absolute authority and agree to have his or her (those were his 
gender options) desire directed by what is socially acceptable. This is 
another way to theorize the operation of normativity in Western 
modernity.
After Freud’s Oedipus, being a person means having to live with 
deferred desire. Freud’s Oedipus assumes that each subject requires the 
mother-as-object from which to be forced to separate; the other who can 
never be had but who is necessary to the self ’s self-constitution. This is 
one way to authorize a self/other relation. It depends on treating the 
(m)other as object (Benjamin, 1988). The child’s desire, in this model, is 
to possess her (Freud understood heterosex to be intrinsically about vio-
lent male domination and possession of women, see Distiller, 2011; 
Freud, 1950; Freud, 1946). But the child’s desire is blocked because only 
the father may have her, in a psychic universalization and justification of 
what is actually a specific value system: monogamous, heterosexual, 
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Judeo-Christian marriage. In this system, human relations are linked to 
ownership of property, of mothers as property, of children as property 
and as the conduits of property through inheritance.
The ownership of women’s bodies and therefore of female sexuality is a 
lynchpin of this system (Rubin, 1975; Saini, 2017; Schiebinger, 2004). 
Because the system is a system of domination in and through which a 
child of the West must find their subjectivity, the child must learn to 
accept the loss of the mother who belongs to another, who is the father’s. 
This psychic loss is enforced through the threat of violence, according to 
Freud: the threat of castration. In Freud’s world view, the threat of castra-
tion is embodied in the female. She is the sign, for the boy, of what can 
happen if you do not obey. For the girl, her body, which lacks the signifier 
of personhood, is something she must come to terms with in order to 
accept her proper place (Distiller, 2011). While this is not an accurate 
description of what it invariably is or should meant to be human, to 
come into subjectivity, it is an excellent description of the gendered rules 
of our culture, of the patriarchal, capitalist, colonizing Western world 
Freud assumed was the whole world.
Freud (1950) told us it was human nature to dominate. He said chil-
dren want to possess their mothers, and that it is only by submitting to 
the father’s prior claim that they could learn their appropriate place. He 
said ownership is a foundational element of subjectivity. He told us not 
only that hierarchy is natural and inevitable, but also that structural 
power was appropriately male and heterosexual, and implicitly classed 
and raced through his deployment, throughout his writing, of the figures 
of “primitives” and the “lower classes” as developmentally akin to chil-
dren and women. Here is one of the places we see claims to universal 
meanings reveal their structural embeddedness. So while one answer to 
the question of why this culture has tended to make the sense it has of 
difference is, “human nature,” I want to continually challenge the politics 
of that claim. If there is a meaning to “human nature,” it is that we are 
complicit in each other, in all the struggles and power grabs and attempts 
to cope in this world we have made for ourselves and for each other.
Freud’s binary model of subjectivity, which sees the subject as consti-
tuted by its difference from the (m)other, enables a liberal politics. This is 
a politics which facilitated the ideology of imperialism and the practices 
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of colonialism, which is built on misogyny and sexism, and which con-
tinues to facilitate the violence, hypocrisies and smugness of white 
supremacism. It is born from and perpetuates the logic of capitalism as 
survival of the fittest.
There are other options. Dean (2001) suggests that, instead of devel-
oping a theory of the subject based on the self ’s relation to its other, 
which is a theory which relies on the binary structuring of difference 
(and, I add, therefore domination) as its starting point, we should start 
with an acknowledgment of the way otherness structures our internal 
relations. To see the self as emerging from the self/other relation is to see 
it as dependent on its difference from an/other in order to know (or con-
struct) itself. But if I see my own internal unknowability, signified by the 
unconscious, as the condition of my selfhood, then I am in the realm of 
my own otherness. I also cannot claim to ever know myself, and therefore 
to be unitary, and must give up all certainties based on this illusory 
knowledge.
This undermines the authority of the liberal individualistic self. It has 
a fundamentally different logic to the system of othering on which our 
current world order depends. This dependence is psychological, eco-
nomic, political and social. If we recognize that we are always other to 
ourselves, that the “self ” on which the self/other formulation depends is 
in fact inevitably alienated from itself, we approach a different ethics, 
Dean (2001) suggests. This way of thinking about otherness—as within 
the self—also exposes the binary as a construct. Dean’s ethics of self- 
otherness entails granting recognition to the other despite not being able 
to see what is familiar and knowable in him, her or them (see Glaveanu, 
2019). A liberal morality, on the other hand, demands intelligibility 
before it will confer humanity. It is thus a coercive, normative politics 
which reproduces its own terms even as it thinks it is making space for 
an other.
Dean’s is a Lacanian perspective which describes human subjectivity as 
always already split from itself as a condition of its being (directed away 
from its desire as it is by the Law of the Father; think of Freud’s Oedipus). 
Freud, of course, is the one whose theorizing of the unconscious makes 
Lacan’s split subject possible. In Freud’s own terms, we are all constituted 
from a loss we cannot know: the loss, in Freud’s terms, of the mother we 
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are never allowed to have because she belongs to the Father. But Freud’s 
terms want to convey security through conveying power. Instead, we 
could consider the ways we are other to ourselves and see what it takes to 
tolerate the uncertainty this knowledge brings. It is worth noting that a 
model of psychology as a science, which tests theories based on measur-
able outcomes to arrive at objective facts, cannot tolerate this kind of 
radical uncertainty of meaning.
Making room for what we do not know, for the idea that we might be 
constituted by things we cannot ever really understand, means we also 
have to let go of the reflexive defense to find certainty by hardening our 
identities. The retreat into self-certainty (ego, if you like) always comes, 
Freud’s formulation suggests, at the cost of another’s subjectivity. It 
requires the other as object. (The tragedy of identity politics is that, in 
making space for the other to take back her personhood, to speak in her 
own voice and to object to her objectification, it has ended up reproduc-
ing the system that it wishes to change. If the position of other becomes 
a place of certainty, it becomes an identity that requires an oppressor. I 
say more about this in Chap. 6.)
Glaveanu (2019, p. 454) suggests we start with our own otherness in 
order to prevent an appropriation of the other in the desire to render her 
into a “self-like structure”:
Starting from the other means recognizing that we are born into a world of 
others… and that we, ourselves, are other to them. “Being other” is a pri-
mary type of human experience with extremely important developmental 
consequences, particularly if one resists the temptation to destroy the 
other… or internalize it.
This is a second way to approach otherness in a nonhierarchical man-
ner. We are not only other to ourselves, as Freud’s unconscious could have 
fully taught him if he had not been making meaning from within a binary 
structure. We are also always others’ others. We are complicit in each 
other’s psychic otherness that helps constitute the self, as well as in the 
material structures and histories that shape subjectivities, and in the dis-
courses that reflect and reproduce these structures and the subjectivities 
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they need. If there is anything universally human, it is this always socially, 
historically and culturally shaped fact.
Blatant racism, sexism, homo- or trans-phobia and classism are not 
pretending to inclusivity. These isms are clear about their use of the oth-
ers they create to shore up their sense of selves. Liberalism’s good inten-
tions, its denial of the ways it uses the current system to reinscribe itself 
as the central subject, is what makes it such a frustrating ideology for its 
progressive opponents. In the effects of its intentions, liberalism is also 
alike to the notion of human being endorsed by psychology (see 
Sugarman, 2019).
 The Liberal Subject of Psychology
Rose (1998) argues that Western societies have been freed from religious 
and political authority only to be enslaved by a liberal individualism 
enabled by the psy sciences. He (Rose, 1998) details how the techniques 
of subjectification enabled by the psy disciplines are central to modern 
subjectivity. Drawing on Foucault (1991), Rose (1998) insists that the 
modern liberal democratic state cannot be understood as a political for-
mation outside of the regimes of truth about the human subject as citizen 
that the psy disciplines were central in helping to create. His explanation 
underscores Brown’s (1995), above:
The disciplinization of psychology is constitutively bound to a fundamen-
tal transformation that has occurred in the rationalities and technologies of 
political power since the last decades of the nineteenth century, in which 
the responsibility of rulers has come to be posed in terms of securing the 
welfare and normality, physical and mental, of citizens, and of shaping and 
regulating the ways in which they conduct their ‘private’ existence—as 
workers, citizens, fathers, mothers—such that they enact their privacy and 
freedom according to these norms of maximized normality. The field of 
power that is codified as the state is intelligible only when located in this 
wider matrix of projects, programs, and strategies for the conduct of con-
duct, elaborated and enacted by a whole diversity of authorities shaping 
and contesting the very boundaries of the political. (Rose, 1998, p. 46)
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What Rose (1998) adds to Brown’s (1995) formulation is the role of 
the psy disciplines as technologies of liberal subjectification in the service 
of the democratic state. This is what he means when he says, “A psy ontol-
ogy has come to inhabit us” (Rose, 1998, p. 190. See also Hook 2007).
Foucault (1977) argued something similar when he suggested the pan-
opticon as a metaphor for how a modern regime of power moved from 
the external imposition of violence as a form of control on the body of 
the one who transgressed against the ruler, to an internalized, individual-
ized mode of self-control. Modern individuals are formed by self-policing 
through discourses of normality and deviance that become about who we 
are as people, what Foucault (2010, p. 145) calls, “the stifling anguish of 
responsibility… the seals of conscience.” This creates an interiority that is 
made of the psychologized aspect of “self/realization” (Rose, 1998, 
p. 190), which in turn brings the imperative to freedom: of choice, of 
political system, of personhood. We liberal Western subjects internalize 
the rules for who and how to be, and the process of psychotherapy, while 
it can help to identify and restructure some of these internalized narra-
tives of selfhood, also participates in reiterating the technologies of self- 
understanding which reproduce the creation of the free, autonomous 
subject who consents to her own subjectification (Butler, 1997).
As we saw in Chap. 1, the subject of psychology is, first and foremost, 
individualistic. As we have seen in this chapter, this individualism cannot 
be separated out from Western political structures. Rose (1998) details 
how, with the help of individual and social psychology, individualism 
becomes a regulatory device in tandem with the development of modern 
democratic ideals. Democracy entails commitment to notions of “liberty, 
equality, and legitimate power” (Rose, 1998, p.  118), in other words, 
which ensure that a citizenry is ruled by people to whom it conceded 
control of its own free will. The unified self, while it presents itself as 
obvious and natural, is instead a socially inscribed production, a con-
struction in time and space and power relations, including economic 
relations (see Papadopoulos, 2008). I have been suggesting it is depen-
dent on a binary relation of being with otherness which is not only a false 
message about human being, but one that is responsible for perpetuating 
systemic oppression.
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Rose (1998) shows how technologies like the scientific definitions and 
explorations of attitudes, the poll and public opinion were invented in 
America and enlisted as scientific endorsements of government. Government, 
in this formulation, is not in fact freely chosen by the people, but is a mode 
of control that develops from feudal rulers into modern democracies. 
Following Foucault, from the eighteenth century control of a population 
entailed, “not just control of a territory and its subjects, but the calculated 
administration of the life of the population, of each and of all” (Rose, 1998, 
p.  119). This requires knowing your subjects, who they are and what 
they want.
It also, as Rose (1998) goes on to show, enables the development of the 
realization that, just as attitudes can be polled, so they can be affected and 
changed by communication techniques and the manipulation of mes-
sages. This was one locus of Trump’s control: the understanding that 
twenty-first century democratic America, as the culmination of these 
related technologies of individualization, public opinion and govern-
mentability through discourses of liberty, freedom and choice, runs on 
the logic not of “the objective characteristics of the situation, but the 
subjective relation of the individual to his or her situation” (Rose, 1998, 
p. 130). It is not the facts or the alternative facts that matter, but how a 
political leader can leverage people’s attitudes to the facts.
Talking about liberalism in this way becomes “a series of reflections on 
government that stress[…] its limits” (Rose, 1998, p. 69). In order for a 
liberal government to know how much governing of its free citizens is the 
right amount of intervention into and structuring of private lives, Rose 
(1998) says, it needed to know its citizens. The psy disciplines were a way 
to know people so as to know how to govern them (see Foucault, 1978; 
Foucault, 2010). And as we have seen, this required individualizing 
human being.
In contradistinction to the production of the liberal, modern, indi-
vidual self, who knows itself through its responsibility to govern itself 
according to rules of putative normality, a theory of the subject as com-
plicit suggests that it is never free to be only itself. Such a model undoes 
the liberal subject at the heart of Western modernity, the center of an 
invisibly raced, classed and gendered reality.
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These modern inventions also rely on binary thinking. 
Governmentability relies on the construction of norms. These norms, as 
we have seen, were produced in tandem with—indeed, helped to pro-
duce—the individual liberal subject, free to choose, and apparently there-
fore self-governing. The requirement for norms against which to measure 
individual persons required the invention of deviance (Foucault, 1977; 
Foucault, 1978). The regulatory power of the mythical norm (Lorde, 
2007) specifically produces an otherness designed to be exploited. 
Political, psychic and material gains are all wrapped up in, and reliant on, 
each other, and in a binary system.
 From Liberalism to Neoliberalism
The taken-for-granted notions which underpin the American dream not 
only help deny the reality of structural oppression that has in fact built 
this country. They also have helped, in this great American age where 
everything, including human connection, is for sale, to commodify iden-
tity. This will be discussed in more detail in Chap. 5. In part to pave the 
way for that discussion, I will now turn to the characteristics of the eco-
nomic, political and psychic order enabled by the world set in place by 
Enlightenment-formed liberalism: neoliberalism.
Sugarman (2020) points out that the neoliberal turn of the late twen-
tieth century exacerbated the blind spots of liberalism: by emphasizing 
the fantasy of free choice while removing governmental responsibility for 
the social and economic structuring of life, neoliberalism puts the indi-
vidual even more at risk of being responsible for his own failure, with 
specific consequences for the psychologization of the subject (see also 
Melluish, 2014).
Neoliberalism intensifies the atomizing individualism of liberalism, 
and its relationship to commerce as a naturalized aspect of personhood. 
It elevates further the celebration of and commitment to freedom of 
choice, as a personal and an economic imperative. Free market econom-
ics and the subject free to choose its participation in this market, together 
with the advances in technology that lead to social media, created a way 
to brand identity as and for profit, as we will see in Chap. 5.
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As a political response and an economic system, neoliberalism began 
in earnest in the 1980s. Neoliberalism is an economic response to a polit-
ical understanding of human nature and society. It emerged in reaction 
to the idea of the social welfare state, and to economic stagnation and 
political threats to liberalism in the 1970s. It took the terms of liberal 
individualism—that people should be free to make what choices they 
want—and applied it to institutional frameworks and the market econ-
omy. It sought to remove any constraints that the “embedded liberalism” 
of the postwar world order built into social, political or economic struc-
tures (Harvey, 2007, p. 11; see Chap. 2). It set in place policies intended 
to deregulate global industry, support a free market economy, encourage 
competition through privatization, enable flexibility through short-term 
contracts and worker mobility (and disposability), and discourage the 
role of government in corporate structures. The market, not the state, 
should set the terms, neoliberalism says; this will ensure the greatest free-
dom of choice (Harvey, 2007; Melluish, 2014).
Neoliberalism has been remarkably successful at reshaping social con-
tracts and at reaching into private spheres with the logic of the market. It 
has reformulated institutions, “divisions of labor, social relations, welfare 
provisions…, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attach-
ments to the land and habits of thought” (Harvey, 2007, p. 3). Along 
with technological advances, it has intensified, commodified and made 
ever more literal the use of information about people to help construct 
subjectivities (see Zuboff, 2019). It has also thus had the consequence of 
“reformulating personhood, psychological life, moral and ethical respon-
sibility, and what it means to have a selfhood and an identity” (Sugarman, 
2020, p. 74). As the state recedes, “Social control is primarily performed 
through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individ-
ual experience: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your 
living room” (Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 153; see Davies, 2016). When one 
of the architects of neoliberalism, Margaret Thatcher, declared that soci-
ety was to be replaced by individual men and women, she said, “Economics 
are the method… but the object is to change the soul” (qtd. in Harvey, 
2007, p. 23).
Zuboff (2019) argues that this is exactly what has happened. Zuboff 
(2019) says that neoliberalism broke the social contract liberalism made 
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with capitalism. While the postindustrialized Western individual was 
promised mass-produced access to a goods-based life by what she calls the 
first modernity, neoliberalism fragmented and atomized connections 
between people and their institutions, by its hyperindividualizing of 
commodified desire. The individual of the second modernity is the owner 
of an iPod, programming their ever-changing unique playlist, rather than 
the purchaser of a mass-produced CD, released by a music industry that 
tells us what we like. This second modernity, working together with neo-
liberalism’s dehumanizing “economic violence” (Zuboff, 2019, p.  37), 
enabled the advent of what she calls surveillance capitalism, where con-
sumer behavior is, first, mined for its commercial value. When the tech-
nologies that enable this process are left unchecked, behavior is then 
manufactured and produced. The industrial revolution that created mod-
ern capitalism and its liberal individual entitled to the things capitalism 
makes has almost cost us our planet, she says. And, she warns, the surveil-
lance capitalism produced by neoliberalism is on the brink of costing us 
our humanity, as our souls are ever more curated by technology:
Surveillance capitalism operates through unprecedented asymmetries in 
knowledge and the power that accrues to knowledge. Surveillance capital-
ists know everything about us, whereas their operations are designed to be 
unknowable to us. They accumulate vast domains of new knowledge from 
us, but not for us. They predict our futures for the sake of others’ gains, not 
ours… surveillance capitalism is a rogue force driven by novel economic 
imperatives that disregard social norms and nullify the elemental rights 
associated with the individual autonomy that are essential to the very pos-
sibility of a democratic society. (Zuboff, 2019, p. 11)
For Zuboff, modernity’s necessary creation of liberal individuality, and 
the democratic state that needs it, is threatened by neoliberalism’s enabling 
of surveillance capitalism. The characteristics of liberalism, especially its 
moral character, remain for Zuboff the markers of something admirable, 
necessary and good.
Liberalism created “self-regulating individuals” who, under neoliberal-
ism, have become “networked actors who actively forge the structures 
necessary” for their atomized modes of regulation (Papadopoulos, 2008, 
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p.  153). Liberalism taught us to be individuals with rights that were 
implicitly linked to ownership, to accumulation, and therefore, I am 
arguing, in contradistinction to Zuboff’s characterization of liberalism, to 
the exploitation of others. While it may think itself noble, liberalism’s 
intentions do not excuse its impacts. It taught us to take responsibility for 
ourselves in order to forge compliance with a norm that was used to gov-
ern us all. Neoliberalism lifted these values out of the remit of the state 
and gave them to the deregulated market economy. The result, along with 
a vastly increased wealth gap, was, “The Commodification of Everything” 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 165).
One consequence has been the experience, at the level of the individ-
ual, of the need to be adaptable and superficial (Cushman, 2019). The 
self is under immense pressure to constantly consider and reinvent itself 
in order to stay economically and, for certain classes of Western subjects, 
socially relevant.
At the same time, neoliberalism intensifies liberalism’s problems with 
otherness. Sugarman (2020) argues that neoliberalism as an ideology of 
freedom and profiteering discourages the ethical recognition of otherness 
and difference, and as such is a further technology of ever more toxic, 
ever more intense individuality. The neoliberal subject, then, is no more 
able to come to terms with complicity. This is despite its location in net-
works of connection that are ever more global, and ever more globalized, 
in world where people and places are, in Melluish’s (2014) rephrasing of 
Giddens (1991), intensely connected, and affect each other across large 
spatial distances. We will return to this in more detail in Chap. 5.
 Complicit Intersubjectivity
What does a theory of complicity bring to the historical, economic and 
ethicopolitical processes that have helped to shape the subject of psychol-
ogy and that psychology has helped to shape? What does it mean to reject 
the liberal individual in favor of a complicit subject in the therapeutic 
encounter? The next three chapters will provide details, by exploring both 
theoretical and practical implications for thinking in a nonbinary way, 
along specific axes of difference (race, gender and generation). And 
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psychotherapy already has a modality that seeks to think about the non-
binary therapeutic use of difference. Other approaches, which may not 
use these same terms, nevertheless provide ways of practicing that fit 
within them, as will be explored in Chap. 6.
Intersubjectivity is a therapeutic approach which understands that 
binary thinking, based on a way of relating that requires the other to be 
constituting object for the subject, cannot enable mutual human recogni-
tion or connection. Instead, it seeks to name a third, which breaks the 
binary, and where two subjects can meet as subjects, not pressurizing the 
other subject into object status. In its classical psychoanalytic defini-
tion, it is:
[A] field theory or systems theory… [that] seeks to comprehend psycho-
logical phenomena… as forming at the interface of reciprocally interacting 
subjectivities… It is not the isolated individual mind,… but the larger 
system created by the mutual interplay between the subjective worlds of 
patient and analyst… that constitutes the proper domain of… inquiry. 
(Atwood & Stolorow, 1993, p. 178)
The suggestion that the analyst is not in objective control of the inter-
action, is actively participating in what is being made with a client and is 
fully implicated in all her personhood was unsettling at first to estab-
lished analytic orthodoxy. There were objections that the approach invited 
“structureless chaos,” “the surrendering of one’s personal reality” and 
“anarchy in the analytic relationship” (Stolorow et al., 1994, pp. 203–208). 
The challenge to liberal individualism and the illusion of mastery it pro-
vides was clearly threatening to the analytical version of the traditional 
subject of psychology.
The notion of the third undermines the security of the liberal subject, 
because it requires it to stop using the other’s difference to constitute 
itself. Thinking in terms of the intersubjective third requires a movement 
into a mutually constituted space where meaning is made in the complex 
interplay between subjects. This also means by definition that the con-
texts and systems each subject brings as part of itself must be included as 
well. If we add a complicit understanding of human being to this 
approach, we have the potential to meet each other in full recognition of 
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our co-constituting influence on each other, structurally (politically, cul-
turally), and interpsychically. We become ourselves because of each other, 
and it is only in this space that meaning is made, any meaning, but also 
including therapeutic meaning.
This is what is at stake when we think complicitously as therapists: We 
are undoing the notion of the individual human we are trying to help. In 
the process, we also undo our own scientifically-endorsed authority, 
because this authority is created by and based on the liberal version of the 
subject it helps to produce. This version of the psy disciplines (authorita-
tive, objective) is a version of the subject that denies complicity. It wants 
control, boundedness, for the other to be rendered knowable for the sake 
of the self. As such, it participates in overpowering discursive and mate-
rial systems of power and inequality, creating, policing and punishing 
deviance, constructing diagnoses that it passes off as absolute truth in 
tandem with medical and pharmaceutical industries who go on to profit, 
underwriting ideas about norms of race, gender and sexuality that have 
reinforced intersecting oppressions. This is not to suggest that there is no 
value in seeking patterns or generalizations for diagnostic purpose, or 
that medication is a conspiracy. But it is to reject the often absolute and 
objectifying claims made in the name of diagnosis and pharmaceuticals, 
and to insist that these apparently objectively scientific tools have cultural 
histories and political implications (some examples include the develop-
ment of the paraphilias, see Adriaens & Adriaens & De Block, 2013; or 
the understanding and treatment of autism, see Silberman, 2015: gender 
dysphoria will be addressed in Chap. 4). The complicit therapist’s job 
becomes a question of how to hold containing authority in a nonbinary 
interpersonal mode.
The achievement of an intersubjective space that is complicit is no 
simple matter. Complicity suggests shared humanity, and shared respon-
sibility. But equality between participants in an intersubjective therapeu-
tic encounter cannot be wished into being. Indeed, if the therapist cannot 
acknowledge her structural privilege—according to her social markers, if 
relevant, and according to her role—then she will fail to know her own 
complicity in the systems in which both she and her client are subjected. 
This, too, is taken up in Chap. 6. Knowing, itself, is no easy matter, and 
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nor is naming what we might be able to know. Language itself comes 
burdened with complicity.
In her famous essay of postcolonial theory, “Can the subaltern speak?”, 
Spivak (1988) argued that some of the great poststructuralist theoreti-
cians of the academy (Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault, and Guattari) were 
guilty of effacing their own social, economic and intellectual power in the 
process of speaking for and about those who did not have the power to 
represent themselves, either politically or in the languages of, and cultures 
formulated by, neocolonial institutions. She said that in the context of 
concrete power relations, the oppressed (subaltern) subject has no way to 
speak for herself; the available language cannot be hers. In the context of 
a binary structure, the subaltern cannot speak in the language given to 
her by a regulatory system that seeks to both define and control her, as 
its other.
As I have been suggesting in this chapter, this power dynamic is denied 
by the very liberalism that constitutes the modern subject, in its inevita-
bly binary formation. And the economic, political, cultural and ideologi-
cal workings of colonialism are at the start and the center of Western 
liberal ideals, and underlie the twenty-first century globalized and neolib-
eral world. While I have also been suggesting that the notion of human 
being as complicit renders all language problematic if what we want is 
authentic self-representation (there can be no such thing), Spivak’s point 
reminds us of the necessary both-and of human being in the world today. 
It is necessary to acknowledge real systems of privilege and inequality that 
structure people’s daily lives as well as their senses of self. And in order to 
move beyond a social system which uses binary thinking, self/other 
modes, subject/object power dynamics, enabled by a social symbolic 
which does the same, we would do well to acknowledge that what makes 
us all human is our embedded complicity in each other. Postcolonial 
theory’s examinations of cultural hybridities and creolizations help to 
make this point, that human being is responsive and adaptive and absorp-
tive, even in the face of destructive and oppressive forces (Bhabha, 1994; 
Distiller, 2005).
Those of us who benefit from privilege, bearing in mind intersectional 
complexity, are also wounded, if differently, when our constitutive others 
are hurt so that we may feel whole. For example, there are several 
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consequences for white people of living in an oppressive structure even as 
we benefit from it. Alexander (2012) and Wise (2012) both show how 
racist impulses in working-class whites served to break possible class alli-
ances and enable the development of economic and social structures that 
hurt some whites, too. While she wants to make visible the unearned 
benefits of being in the center of power, MacIntosh (2008) also wants to 
make the point that “privilege” as a noun for something that confers 
assets and power at the expense of others is a misnomer. To have this kind 
of “privilege” is to be morally and psychologically weakened by the 
unearned advantages we accrue simply by being born. DiAngelo (2018) 
addresses this white fragility directly, explaining the ways in which white-
ness is invisible to most white people, and the consequences of white 
people’s inability to talk about race and the racism in which we white 
people are all complicit. Humanity suffers when binary thinking is 
allowed to define our scope of possibilities, an idea which will be expanded 
upon in more detail in Chap. 4. Allowing this, that human being con-
nects us all, allows us also to share something, even with those whose 
subjectivity has been rendered other by the systems we share—including 
therapy.
Swartz (2013) has written about the intersubjective field between 
white therapist and clients of color in postapartheid South Africa. She 
says that in the context of historical and ongoing inequality, where racial 
difference is painful to acknowledge because of all it means in the dyad, 
naming becomes a very powerful tool:
The challenge is to make a co-constructed intersubjective space, an analytic 
space in which naming is an occasion for curiosity, and where difference in 
identity is used not as a final recognition, but as a signal to go beyond—
towards a shared humanity. Naming will be a shared, not a unilateral, activ-
ity. (Swartz, 2013, p. 20)
This reaching toward mutuality through speaking together, specifically 
in the recognition of unequal power, counteracts Spivak’s subaltern’s 
unspeakable position. It is a reaching toward complicity in human being, 
where our names for each other become conversations, not labels. In the 
therapeutic encounter, it is the therapist’s responsibility to establish the 
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possibility for this space. This is the art of psychotherapy, which cannot 
be manualized or scientifically measured.
In her case examples, Swartz (2013) spends most time interrogating 
her own internal fractures and fears as the only way in to engaging with 
her clients, to take responsibility for the ways in which they could too 
easily become her constituting other. This work can only occur with the 
therapist knowing her place in the system, in the encounter, and when 
privilege has been acknowledged.
Sehrbrock (2020), using intersubjective vocabulary, describes social 
thirdness, the space made of the collective and the cultural as well as the 
interpsychic. He describes what happens when what he calls prejudice 
causes collapse of the social third into the binary: two subjects locked in 
their own positionality with regard to each other, unable to see the other’s 
point of view. For Sehrbrock, too, in order for the therapist to allow the 
social third in the intersubjective space, she must be able to tolerate 
knowledge of her own privilege.
I am aware of how easily this kind of work can recenter whiteness, and 
other forms of privilege, in the therapeutic encounter. I am also aware of 
how easily discourses of universal humanity reinscribe the dominant par-
adigm as the standard for that humanity. However, by locating this work 
within the intersubjective field, specifically in the analytic third space, 
Swartz (2013, p.  28) is hoping to use her awareness of her privilege, 
together with her own intersectionalities, to create a space of true recog-
nition: “Intersubjective theory foregrounds mutual recognition and sur-
vival of difference and, paradoxically, in this is contained the possibility 
of negotiation beyond the dynamic of domination.” If we are thinking 
complicitously, then the survival of difference is more than resisting a 
dynamic of domination. Difference becomes part of what we share, and 
the dynamics of domination become a simplified and simplistic reduc-
tion of what is possible between us.
Sehrbrock’s (2020) examples of working with the social third in ther-
apy are about gender, sexuality, homophobia and misogyny. Swartz’s 
example (Swartz, 2013) is about race. In the next two chapters, I will 
explore in more detail what a complicit approach—a nonbinary vision, 
which enables a vision of shared human being—does to race, gender and 
sexuality as markers of identity, as constructs and as perpetuators of 
oppression in modern liberal structures which construct and value 
2 Well-Intentioned White People and Other Problems… 
68
individualism, commodity value and neoliberal performances of person-
hood. Chapter 5 picks up this last point and focuses on some of the 
consequences of a subjectivity reliant on social media for younger clients 
of Western psychotherapy.
Spivak denotes the ability of those in power to define the social/eco-
nomic/racialized other as epistemic violence. This is the violence made 
possible by ways of knowing that construct the meanings they go on to 
find. When a 17-year-old boy can be murdered for walking down the 
street with a bag of Skittles because of what he is presumed to mean, and 
when this presumption is endorsed by the jury that found his killer inno-
cent, the epistemic violence at work in American constructions of race 
and gender is clear to see. In the next chapter, I take seriously the epis-
temic violence of raced identities in America, while also exploring what a 
model of complicity has to offer for a way forward.
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Racism is a system whose function is to confer privilege. That privilege 
has two main components, economic and psychic. Racism as a system is 
fundamentally reliant on binary thinking in order to build the symbolic 
meanings on which its material practices are erected. Historically and 
philosophically, racism is an implicit part of the well-intentioned liberal-
ism which has crafted the individualized subject of Western psychology. 
As Perry (2018) has shown, the processes of the Enlightenment, together 
with the genocide and slavery that accompanied the colonialism which 
made modernity, needed a category of nonpersons in order to authorize 
and enrich the gendered and classed person who was a product of these 
historical forces. These processes of person production were as much eco-
nomic and legal as they were psychological, showing once more the 
imbrication of all these forces.
Racism, of course, makes use of the construct of race to authorize 
itself. There is no scientific validity to the construct of race. There is only 
one, human race, although there are geographically regional genetic vari-
ants of humans. All the scientific and psychological work on race and 
putative racial differences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was 
research done on “something which was not there” (Richards, 2012, p. 19; 
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see Posel, 2001; Richeson & Sommers, 2016). Or, as Oluo (2019, 
pp. 11–12) puts it, race is “a lie told to justify a crime” (see also Kendi, 
2016). The historical shaping of the idea of race helps to reveal it as a 
human political event, shaped by economic relations of power, colonial 
dynamics, law and citizenship rights, and so on. This will be explored in 
more detail below. The biological underpinnings of race thinking has 
shifted in the later twentieth and the twenty-first centuries to become 
more complexly cultural (Fernando, 2017), but the attachment to the 
idea of fundamental, defining differences, always constructed by hierar-
chical assumptions, remains in place and remains available to perpetuate 
oppressions.
Like gender difference, racial difference is embedded in and produced 
by human culture. Race and gender cannot really be understood in isola-
tion from each other, as their meanings inform and rely on each other. 
Nor can class, location, ethnicity, ablebodiedness or religion be taken out 
of the meanings made of bodies that are raced and gendered in systems of 
modernity. Each identity category co-creates the others. Each has an 
interrelated material history that tends to pass itself off as natural and 
inevitable. And racial difference has been a specific focus of psychology, 
most problematically in its early contributions to scientific racism and 
eugenicist practices. In the late twentieth and in the twenty-first centu-
ries, other psychologies have evolved with commitments to social justice 
and decolonial practices, which seek to counter the ways notions of racial 
difference have informed the work of early mainstream psychology, 
including in its early social and cultural variations. This later work is 
made possible because of the contributions of people other to psycholo-
gy’s developmentally white, Western, male and middle-class beginnings.
In this chapter, I offer a framework for understanding race and racism 
in the America I found when I arrived here as an immigrant a decade ago. 
Because I am a white South African who grew up under apartheid, the 
relations of racism between whites and Black people of African descent 
were most in focus for me. I have come to learn of the other flavors of 
racist oppression in which America specializes, against Latinx people, 
against indigenous Americans and against Asian Americans. The intersec-
tion of my theory of complicity and the complexities of racialized experi-
ences is illustrated in this chapter via my engagement, as a white South 
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African immigrant to America, with the film Black Panther. For this rea-
son, this chapter will focus on the racism built by and from American 
slavery. I acknowledge that racisms extend and multiply, and have differ-
ent historical trajectories and investments (Richards, 2012). My argu-
ment here, about how racial difference functions, can be applied to all 
symbolic uses of binary thinking imposed on human bodies.
Below, I offer more detail for a structural definition of racism, in order 
to continue to illustrate the connections between modernity, binary 
thinking and systems of oppression. I hope to show we can acknowledge 
the historical and ongoing operations of oppression, which work through 
creating binary differences, and nuance the ongoing subject positions 
such oppression produces. By now, in a world made impossibly compli-
cated by the hybridizing, fracturing and commodifying realities produced 
by neocolonialism and neoliberalism, we need to recognize the extreme 
systemic inequalities within which the postmodern world resides, and 
also acknowledge that human being is not binary. We need to be able to 
think complicitously.
 Race
The invention of modern notions of race and the racial difference it pro-
duces is rooted in historical practices of modernization, emerging capital-
ism and liberal individuality. It begins with slavery and proceeds through 
colonialism (Fernando, 2017; Kendi, 2016; Perry, 2018; Richards, 2012). 
Colonialism was not just a military enterprise. It was cultural and psy-
chological too (Fanon, 2005; Wa Thiong’o, 1986; Wa Thiong’o, 1993), 
which postcolonial, liberation and decolonial psychologies continue to 
address (Adams et al., 2017; Fernández & Gutierrez, 2020; Hook, 2012; 
Maldonado-Torres, 2017; Mignolo, 2011; Miller & Miller, 2020).
As we saw in the last chapter, Perry (2018) shows how enslaved and 
colonized people were made to be the constituting others for emerging 
liberal capitalist modernity. Indigenous and enslaved people were legally 
and culturally conferred with nonpersonhood in order to help define the 
modern liberal subject. She also argues that public violence was enacted 
on the body of the racialized other long after Foucault (1977) denoted 
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the end of public violence as a means of sovereign social control for white 
citizens. These very specifically racialized “mechanisms of domination” 
(Perry, 2018, p. 35) are part of what we are seeing in the ongoing violence 
publicly enacted by the state against Black and brown bodies on the 
streets of America today. This suggests the structural need modern 
American democracy has for the dehumanization of its constitutive oth-
ers, and helps explain the apparent intractability of race as a necessary 
construct within a system built on the binary of self and other.
Teo (2005) adds to this historical picture the role of science as a system 
of classification, also developed through the Enlightenment and nine-
teenth century colonialism. The emerging discipline’s obsession with 
grouping and measuring,
[W]as consequently applied to human populations… From a sociohistori-
cal standpoint, the concept of “race” allowed for the justification of colo-
nialism, domination, and slavery, because non-European groups (and 
certain European populations) were not just constructed as different, but 
also as inferior. (Teo 2005, pp. 155–6)
Here again are the invested hierarchical aspects that binary thinking 
brings to human differences, many of which are written on the body, for 
the purposes of psychic and economic gain.
Thus, as Perry (2018, p. 21) also shows, there have always been con-
nections between abjected racialized bodies and bodies gendered female 
(see also Haraway, 1989; Richards, 2012):
The position of the nonperson is a fundamental supplementation of the 
idea of gender as produced by disciplinary power (essentialized concepts 
and rules for men and women) and the naturalization of binary gender 
categories that were, and continue to be, applied to citizenries.
The idea of racial difference requires binary gender difference as a con-
ceptual underpinning. It is built on it and cannot be understood separate 
from it. Both make use of the body, and of regimes of inclusion and 
exclusion, normality and deviance, acceptability, policing and power (see 
Hook, 2012). By the same logic, sexuality and definitions of 
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ablebodiedness are equally relevant to the construction of race (Cruz, 
2016; McRuer, 2006; Stephens & Boonzaier, 2020).
Since all of these identities are cultural constructs made from embod-
ied differences, Rose (1998, p. 184) argues that the body is in fact “a 
body-regime” constructed by the linkages of “surfaces, forces, and ener-
gies.” The body is not an absolute truth underlying experience, but a 
contingent effect of the experience we are allowed to have. The body is a 
“relationship.” This is another view of human being as complicit: Our 
very bodies are formed in relation to each other and to the systems that 
make us as individuals and groups, and which we, in turn, continue to 
make, albeit differentially (this argument implicitly draws on Butler, 
1999 too, and is applied to therapeutic modalities in Chap. 6).
Our raced bodies exist in relation to each other in an additional and 
very specific way. The centuries of horror inflicted on bodies and subjec-
tivities raced not-white by Western culture have enabled the whiteness 
assembled on the bodies and in the behaviors of people invisibly raced 
white. The raced self/other relation on which the dominant modern 
mode of human subjectivity depends may be a construct, but it is a con-
struct with devastating embodied force (see Hook, 2012; Salter & 
Haugen, 2017).
To view a complicit way forward is to challenge the thinking on which 
white supremacy depends. And by white supremacy, I mean to invoke 
not only blatant white violence against racialized others, but the well- 
intentioned liberalism charted in the previous chapter, which enacts its 
own pernicious forms of epistemic and material violences on raced bod-
ies. To continue to advocate for a complicit model for human being is not 
to attempt to deny the damage racism has done and continues to do, on 
subjectivities and bodies that may be co-constructed, but whose oppres-
sion and suffering are no less real for all that. Because of the ongoing 
effects of modern racism, it is sometimes necessary to talk of race as 
though it were real, in order to reach a point of being able to insist that it 
is not, while holding on to subjects and bodies formed by racial differ-
ence and respecting their experiences as such.
I acknowledge what race has been and continues to be in this country: 
one of the largest, most important, most profitable building blocks of 
America. After the initial colonization and the genocide of Native 
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Americans it perpetrated, this country was built through slavery. This 
historical fact continues to affect everyone, and in specific ways, indige-
nous peoples and Black Americans. Jung (2015) understands racism as 
operating on a civic level, to define who may be part of the nation and its 
resources, and who should be excluded and exploited for the furtherance 
of those resources and those who benefit from them. This argument cor-
relates with Perry’s (2018) explication of the development of the American 
subject via colonialism and slavery. And George (2020) says that since 
America’s very sense of its civilization is grounded in slavery, instead of 
civilization functioning to restrict instinctual aggression, as Freud sug-
gested, in America’s case, it facilitated it. The impulses that drove slavery 
are not past, “but a savagery essential to the modern” (George, 2020, 
p. 110).
The slave is used by the master, George (2020) shows, to make up for 
the master’s subjective Lacanian lack. The slave is the jouissance of a 
modernity founded on racism and capitalism, and their unholy union. 
“Being was actively siphoned from the person of the slave in order to… 
grant the master access to whiteness as a master signifier of being” 
(George, 2020, p. 115). Being, here, indicates Lacan’s formulation for the 
place of the subject (George, 2020, p. 111). George (2020) shows how 
the white American subject’s sense of self was built on, at the expense of, 
the slave, providing a psychological correlative to Perry’s (2018) legal and 
cultural history. This Lacanian symbolic structuring underpins American 
society, “founded… upon a brutal expression of base instincts that then 
root white identity in its signal notions of freedom and independence” 
(George, 2020, p.  117). One consequence is the importance of racial 
identity for African Americans, George (2020) says, which came to func-
tion as a place in which Black people could find their denied selves, in 
part through community. A result has been the development of a strategy 
“to fight racism with race” (ibid, p. 124).
To talk about this is to engage another complexity of the topic. We need 
to insist on the material and psychic consequences of this very specific his-
tory while remaining cognizant of one of its tropes, the “damaged negro” 
stereotype (for more on the history of this stereotype, see Richards, 2012, 
p.  172; Fernando, 2017, pp.  65–69; Griffith, 1977). Often well-inten-
tioned white psychologists and sociologists, offering liberal accounts of the 
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effects of oppression, created a version of Black family values and concomi-
tant inner Black life and personality that offered new ways to reduce and 
stereotype Black people. Instead of nineteenth century biology-based 
arguments, the mid-twentieth century offered “cultural” reasons for Black 
inferiority (e.g., see the discussions about The Mark of Oppression by 
Kardiner and Ovesey [1951], or Moynihan’s [1965] The Negro Family: The 
case for national action in Fernando, 2017 and Richards, 2012).
Psychology’s twentieth century concern with the effects of racism 
tended to reinscribe the notion of the damaged oppressed Black person 
bearing the pathologizing “mark of oppression”: culturally deprived, with 
low self-esteem, a destroyed and/or debased family structure, and no 
internal psychic resources to help himself, albeit through no fault of his 
own. Well-intentioned white psychologists helped underwrite this stereo-
type: “With friends like this …” (Richards, 2012, p. 281). In America, 
Black psychologists have refuted this stereotype for as long as they have 
existed, since the 1930s (Guthrie 2004; Richards, 2012, chapter 11).
This is a complicated topic for a well-intentioned white woman to 
broach, as illustrated by Oluo’s (2019, chapter 3) painfully funny account 
of her discussion about race with her white mother. I wish to properly 
acknowledge the complex process of surviving and speaking back to 
dehumanizing violence that is both actual and symbolic, without pre-
senting victimhood as a constituting element of Black subjectivity under 
white supremacy, or reductively stereotyping Black people because we 
have a racist history of stereotyping Black people.
Binkley (2020) helps to theorize this problem by suggesting the raced 
subject is read through the double vision of generalized abnormalities 
assigned to a racialized type. Even with the mid-twentieth century shift 
of focus in psychology away from racial inferiority and toward racial 
oppression as a shaping factor on raced subjectivities, “the same assump-
tions concerning the radical alterity of the emotional and psychological 
lives of racial minorities remained intact,” but this time cast as a cultural 
problem, not a biological truth (Binkley, 2020, p. 98). Racial categories 
are reorganized, but not fundamentally changed or addressed. Binkley 
(2020, p. 99) addresses the stereotype of Black emotionality, and espe-
cially Black rage, through this lens, which encompasses the racist idea of 
the “damaged negro.” In current liberal psychologized contexts, Binkley 
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(2020) says, the frightening specter of this angry, “damaged negro” is 
contained through white listening, a process whereby “the normal had to 
co-emotionalize with and listen to the abnormal… [which] served the 
ends of both criminalization and critique” (Binkley, 2020, pg. 100).
Binkley (2020) suggests also that, via the imperatives of neoliberalism, 
listening for the purposes of containment has become a corporate strat-
egy for managing race. Binkley (2020) discusses the limits this model 
places on white empathy: whites must listen, but can never truly know 
the Black rage they must witness, and if they claim they can, they are 
revealing their failure of understanding, their as-yet-unredeemed racism. 
Hidden Black rage,
[B]ecomes precisely the second body it seeks to dispel… This is a second 
body whose eruptions bring powers of illumination that disrupt but also 
silently restore that other second body that is necessary for the racial con-
tract to remain in place: the second body that constitutes whiteness itself. 
(Binkley, 2020, p. 104)
This is why, he says, institutionalized discussions about race largely fail 
to disrupt the status quo. He suggests that engaging with race through 
the emotions race gives us, each in our raced position, reinscribes race. 
Binary logic at work.
Binkley’s (2020) attempts to account for the ongoing intractability of 
racist othering in well-intentioned spaces speak to the mess we are in. 
Many writers (e.g., Oluo, 2019) address how hard it is to talk about race 
in America today. DiAngelo (2018) engages in detail with the aspects of 
whiteness that defend against real conversations about the centrality of 
white privilege to structural racism, and the psychological fragility that is 
the consequence of inheriting a self made out of unearned privilege (see 
MacIntosh, 2008).
DiAngelo’s book received national attention after the racial justice pro-
tests of 2020, following the police murder of George Floyd. A conse-
quence has been a backlash against her attempts to hold white people 
accountable for the workings of white supremacy. One pertinent objec-
tion is similar to the problem we have tracked above, that her focus on 
the power of whiteness to perpetuate structural oppression demeans and 
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disempowers Black people (McWhorter, 2020). Another is that she gen-
eralizes about white people (The Conversation, 2020). Trying to advocate 
for current accountability from white people (all white people, because 
the political, economic, educational, legal, psychological and cultural sys-
tems that have been built do create a starting point where personhood is 
assumed to be linked to whiteness, among other markers of human 
being), and acknowledge that oppression shapes lives, while also arguing 
that to be human is to be more than all these things, is a difficult business. 
Perhaps more than any other current issue, race makes clear the compli-
cated inheritances of binary thinking woven into material practices.
In addition to the work of enslaved people themselves and those that 
came after, like W.E. du Bois, James Baldwin, Maya Angelou or Audre 
Lorde, there is a highly contemporary American literature that celebrates 
survival and documents the ongoing consequences of systemic racism for 
Black people, and for the society that continues to marginalize them. 
Here are a few examples: DeGruy (2005) offers an account of the effects 
of slavery on African American identities, providing psychological expla-
nations for cultural adaptions. She offers the concept of Post-Traumatic 
Slave Syndrome to destigmatize survival responses to being Black in 
America. Boyd-Franklin (2006) writes about the psychology of Black 
families with a sensitive and nonhomogenizing lens. Brewster and 
Stephenson (2013) write about families, the education system and self-
hood. Williams (2001) and Alexander (2011) penned stunning indict-
ments on the legal system. Hardy (2006, 2008) has written and talked 
about racism in family therapy and as a developmental trauma. Tatum’s 
(1997) “Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?” and 
Other Conversations About Race remains a beautifully written and com-
pelling account of the mechanisms and costs of racism. Adichie (2013) 
dealt with it through fiction. In the last few years, Coates (2015), Kendi 
(2016), Morris (2016), Dyson (2017), Menakem (2017), Cooper (2018) 
and Bryant (2020) have all spoken urgently about the ongoing experi-
ences of black Americans, counting the ongoing costs of racism, empha-
sizing strength and resilience, and insisting on the structural elements of 
racism in America.
3 Wakanda Forever 
82
 Racism
Racism is not best defined as a psychological quality held by individuals. 
Psychological explanations miss the larger point of how and why racism 
operates. Racist structures do not only enable individuals to believe hate-
ful things or behave hatefully. They also allow certain groups to act on 
this hatred, in ways that substantially and structurally affect others. Racist 
structures allow some to accrue privileges of all sorts, psychological and 
material, over others, by taking things away, psychological and material, 
from those others. Racist structures then justify and perpetuate that sys-
tem of privilege. So while it may also be a personal attitude, racism oper-
ates and perpetuates structurally. As beneficiaries of the system, white 
people are implicated in racist oppression, whether we like it or not, and 
whether we think we mean it or not.
It is often said that the human brain cannot help but rely on group 
differences to make snap judgments (Hewstone et al., 2002; Richeson & 
Sommers, 2016; Rippon, 2019). The arguments are not only neurobio-
logical. A recent psychoanalytic article on otherness, for example, begins 
with the assertion, “There is an emotional/cultural need to define oneself 
in relation to otherness, manifesting clearly in racial, ethnic, national, 
religious, sexual, and gender identities” (Molofsky, 2019, p. 49. See also 
McWilliams 2020). And a recent social psychology-informed article, 
which explores the role of otherness to the idea of the citizen, suggests 
that human beings have always needed enemies in order to be able to 
define their friends (Mannarini & Salvatore, 2020). The authors also 
make the point that neoliberal fragmentation has resulted in more intense 
cleaving to local and national identities that are therefore more reactive 
and more insular.
Current conditions may well have exacerbated binary thinking. But if 
it is inevitable that human beings will use groupthink to develop identi-
ties in a way that makes binary othering necessary, then we are very close 
to legitimizing racism. It is more historically and psychologically accurate 
to trace the ways that racial difference has been constructed and imposed 
on bodies, and to name the purpose of these activities: profit. Cushman 
(2019, pp. 41–43) also makes the point, following W.E.B. Dubois, that 
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if we legitimize racism with a psychologized endorsement that humans 
neurobiologically cannot help but use binary thinking, then we miss the 
material, economic benefits to institutionalized oppression. Racism, a 
system which privileges some at the expense of others, is not an inevitable 
part of human nature. It is highly specific, invested, historical event. 
Binary thinking obscures this fact. It also, not coincidentally, thereby 
naturalizes the systems of thought that underpin colonially formed, 
capitalist- saturated modernity, with all its rules about who deserves to be 
on top and why: Darwinism, patriarchy, Freud’s idea that it is human 
nature to dominate, and that domination is properly male and so on. 
Thinking of humans as complicit in the systems that structure us and 
which we, in turn, participate in and may sometimes alter accordingly, 
allows us a much more realistic and complex entry into how and why we 
oppress each other, how systems convince people to participate and col-
laborate, sometimes even in the process of resisting, and what the conse-
quences are for human being in these systems, albeit with different people 
paying different prices.
Hook (2012, p. 4) offers the notion of the “psychopolitical” to fully 
account for the interactions of psychology and the complex interacting 
contextual forces which help to shape the psyche, and which are in turn 
shaped by psychological needs and pressures. In other words, to talk 
about racism we need more than a psychological vocabulary. We need to 
be able to combine insights about psyches with knowledge about systems 
of power, about historical forces and the events they shape, with under-
standings that are material as well as existential. We need, in other words, 
a psychology informed by knowledge from the humanities as well as the 
social sciences, because we need to be able to see how discourses shape 
what is humanly possible. Only then can we properly account for the 
historically specific, psychically invested, inscriptions of raced differences 
(and the gendered, classed, abled or disabled, sexually normal or perverse 
meanings they accompany) on human bodies and being.
Making sense of difference is a part of human being. But Western 
modernity’s specific tactics are embedded in relations of power: eco-
nomic, legal, nationalist, embodied, gendered and raced. They also make 
use of a morality of the good and the normal (which are sexually inflected); 
this is part of liberalism’s inheritance. Binkley (2020, p. 96) suggests, via 
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Foucault’s ideas of normalization and the medicalization of the abnor-
mal, that racism involves “a reading through” of the subjectivity of the 
raced other, to find the abnormality of the raced subject. He points out 
how scientific racism, which helped invent modern racial difference, used 
the idea of deviation from the implicitly white, European norm to clas-
sify racial others as inferior (see Teo 2005). Thus, again, racial difference 
has played a central role in the construction of modern relations of power, 
and racism is a product of the evolution of Western norms of personhood.
Hook (2007) explores how the processes of modern subjectification 
both and he and Rose (1998) detail can help us think about racism and 
racialized subjectivity. He (Hook 2007, p.  217) suggests we need to 
acknowledge that the processes of racialization which produce race and 
endorse racism demonstrate “affected subjectivity,” that is, “a level of pen-
etration and consolidation within subjects that is reducible neither to the 
terms of psychological explanation, nor to sociological critiques of deter-
mining social structures.” Racism and the processes of racing it relies 
upon cannot be reduced to politics or economics or psychological gain. It 
saturates the structures into which we are born and which therefore shape 
us. It affects subjects on all complicit levels, interpersonally and intraper-
sonally. And it also requires access to the self/other binary in order to 
make its own hateful sense of things. If we are to dismantle racism and 
the structures that enable it, we have to be able to both acknowledge the 
profoundly personal implications of raced identity and ask for a new 
model which would undo the binary structure on which raced identity 
depends. Race structures this world, and is therefore central to human 
subjectivity and experience. It is also an artificial construct. In a real sense, 
it does not exist. As we have seen, it was brought into apparent being by 
systems of modernity, of which the psy disciplines are part.
 Race and Racism in and Through Psychology
If the psy disciplines have been central to the emergence of modern, lib-
eral democratic, states and subjects (and states of subjectivity), then they 
have also been central to the emergence of modern race and racism. Ideas 
about what constituted scientific method and proof, and the questions 
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asked about human being via these formats, linked the emerging psy 
disciplines to emerging processes of racialization. Historically specific 
Western notions of scientific truth, liberal individuality, democratic gov-
ernance and racial (and gender and sexual) difference are complicit in 
each other.
Evolutionary theory, which was a foundational colonial ideology, 
helped shaped the way psychology was used as it emerged as a discipline 
in the late nineteenth century. This impacted how apparent biological 
differences were used to construct differences in human being in order to 
create cultural, intellectual, moral and spiritual hierarchies. “The ‘biolo-
gisation’ of human diversity was thus consolidated; not only physical 
appearance but also temperament and culture reflected a people’s innate 
evolutionary status” (Richards, 2012, p. 15). We have already explored 
the role of psychology in developing methods for producing individuality 
and the means for assessing these; Richards (2012, p. 22) makes the point 
that since psychometrics were developed in the service of eugenics, as a 
way to measure differences that were sought in order to be hierarchically 
ranked, “[s]tudying race differences is thus but an extension of the study 
of individual differences.”
It is thus no surprise that psychology played a central role in the devel-
opment of modern scientific racism. As is well-documented, psychology 
was enthusiastically involved in the development of theories of eugenics 
and of IQ testing which “proved” racial differences and white, European 
racial superiority (Fernando, 2017; Guthrie, 2004; Richards, 2012; Teo, 
2005). And psychology’s initial framing of empirical differences as bio-
logical set up the long-standing and extremely damaging “problematiza-
tion” of Black people, in Teo’s (2005, p. 173) term, in ways specific to 
how Blackness was raced (see Kendi, 2016; similar processes happened 
with other racialized groups). The effects on the practice of the psy disci-
plines have been recently charted in a series of essays published in response 
to the American cultural moment of 2019. This work explores the prob-
lems of well-intentioned whiteness, of structural racism and of the his-
tory of psychology in helping to shape these forces (Williams et al., 2019).
Richards (2012) says that psychology, as a discipline that emerged 
from America and Europe, could not not be racist and Western-centric 
(see also Fernando, 2017). He also suggests that there exists alongside the 
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racism in psychology a “constant cycle” (Richards, 2012, p. 348) of anti-
racist intention that often fell short, being of its time and of its discipline. 
He asks that psychology’s self-reflexive engagements with its constituting 
racist energies be acknowledged, along with the tools the discipline has 
developed to combat racism. For example, he argues that the process of 
engaging with the racism of the Race Psychology of the early twentieth 
century (see Fernando, 2017) helped make white psychologists aware of 
racism, and helped make racism a topic outside of psychology. To this we 
must insist that while we might be able to trace in psychology an aca-
demic trajectory from finding and ranking racial differences, to a concern 
with why people are racist and the effects of racism on people of color, the 
shortfalls cannot be overlooked in the name of good intentions. As a 
discourse born of white, European, male power and initially very com-
mitted to finding the scientific evidence for the rightness of that power, 
traditional psychology struggled, and arguably still struggles, to exceed its 
constitutive underpinnings. It has often ended up in the camp of well- 
intentioned whiteness that cannot see its own privilege and therefore per-
petuates the structures of oppression it simultaneously disavows (Dovodio 
& Casados, 2019; Richards, 2012; Salter & Haugen, 2017).
Since the 1960s, psychology’s constitutive others (Black people and 
people of color, the colonized, women, the neurodiverse, sex and gender 
perverts) have begun to speak back en mass, and from within. There are 
those newer psychological fields concerned with social, geographical, 
racial, economic and gender justice and their intersections, as more psy-
chologists and psychologies from other places and othered identities have 
begun to establish voices in the field (e.g., Boonzaier & van Niekerk, 
2019; Collins et  al., 2019; Ebersohn, 2019; Montero, 2017; Salter & 
Haugen, 2017; Smith et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2019). More complex 
and important questions have become possible. Still in 2020, Bhatia 
(p. 263) was asserting that while we may acknowledge that, “Whiteness 
and white identity have played a dominant role in producing normative 
psychological knowledge in the U.S,” the psy disciplines still do not 
acknowledge “the explicit ways in whiteness as privilege, power, norm, 
and an oppressive force acts as a dominant cultural norm and shapes the 




In part because of the ongoing unacknowledged operations of struc-
tural racism, “Unfortunately mainstream psychiatry and psychology have 
so far failed on the whole to fully take on board the insights offered by the 
progressive thinking that flooded the British and American scene at the 
end of the twentieth century” (Fernando, 2017, p. 85). Fernando (2017) 
details the regressive shift back toward racism in West in the twenty-first 
century. He attributes this to an inattention to structural matters in the 
previous century, as well as to racism’s ability to shapeshift. He also spe-
cifically traces the rise of Islamophobia as a new incarnation of racism in 
America and Britain. He concludes that the psy disciplines may be too 
implicated in racist thinking and racist structures to be able to offer anti-
racist solutions in their current forms. And from a decolonial point of 
view, Miller and Miller (2020, p. 382) argue that psychology cannot be 
decolonized within the structures that exist, because the psy disciplines, 
colonialism, modernity, the state and individualism are all constitutive 
elements of the modern subject: “decolonization will take the end of the 
world, and… decolonization is the end of the world as we know it” 
because, “The very way in which we go about ‘knowing’ itself is entangled 
in colonial/modern ways of thinking that cannot but reproduce the vio-
lences at the core of their construction.”
From this perspective, psychology’s subaltern, by definition, still can-
not speak. We need to approach the issue rather from a complicitous 
perspective than a binary one. Psychology, like English literature, can and 
has been changed in the hands of those whose enforced otherness helped 
to make both disciplines what they are. But a binary model, which locks 
in place oppressors and oppressed, cannot deliver any of us out of the 
self/other mode of being and knowing. This is another way the humani-
ties, through postcolonial and cultural studies, can offer productive 
frames to psychological theories. But it does require relinquishing an 
exclusive commitment to scientific method, which cannot accommodate 
the philosophical complexity or the conceptual fluidity of complicity. We 
cannot operationalize or statistically demonstrate the complexities of 
mimicry and hybridity, the inevitably complicit agency of talking back in 
what started out as the master’s language, of knowing and acting on what 
cannot be seen by systems of power. Nevertheless, all these ways of human 
being exist.
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I learned from studying postcolonial and neocolonial uses of and 
responses to Shakespeare, as an icon of universal humanity and cultural 
genius, that oppressed groups metabolize epistemic abuses and, even as 
they are changed by them, change them in turn. Oppressive forces 
destroy, but oppressed people also reclaim them, make them exceed their 
original intentions (Distiller, 2012a). People find all kinds of ways to 
fight back, ways that are also always complicit, as in the Hollywoodization 
and commodification of “Africa” in Black Panther that is also an act of 
highly overdue recognition and valuation by the systems that make us all.
 Complicities: Black Panther
People of color continue to suffer from systemic oppression, and African 
Americans carry specific historical burdens in America today regardless of 
class affiliation. Black Americans cannot be sure of being safe as they walk 
down the street, or listen to music as they fill their cars with gas, or pray 
in their churches, or speak on their cellphones in their families’ yards, or 
sleep in their own beds in their own apartments, free from a race-based 
denial of their very right to exist in their own country. Their citizenship 
rights are not assured in a place whose definition of human being began 
in racialized binary thinking. Perry (2018) has pointed out how the legal 
definition of Western personhood developed out of the deployment of 
the category of nonperson assigned to the slave, and Alexander (2011) 
has detailed the legacies of this system for Black and brown people in 
America today (see Williams, 1991). As I have been arguing, the implica-
tions run deep: into Western modes of individuality, linked to state and 
institutional belonging and the legal systems that allow or disable these; 
into capitalist imperatives to value and devaluation, of owning and own-
ership that confer human being and withhold human being; and in the 
complex constitutive connections between and among these systems. 
This legacy for Americans of African descent is what the 2018 Marvel 
superhero film Black Panther is speaking back to.
For those who have had no contact with popular culture in the last 
three years, here is a very brief summary of some key plot points: T’Challa 
(Chadwick Boseman) is the prince of the fictional African nation 
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Wakanda, which has kept itself and its technological sophistication hid-
den from the world, pretending to be the expected African “third world 
country.” T’Challa becomes the king and superhero Black Panther when 
his father, T’Chaka (John Kani), the king and the previous Black Panther, 
is killed. His antagonist in the film is an American special ops soldier 
nicknamed Killmonger (Michael B. Jordan), who is also his cousin, aban-
doned in Oakland as a child by T’Chaka. With the exception of a white 
CIA officer (Martin Freeman) who helps them, the other main characters 
are all powerful Black women, among them Shuri (Letitia Wright), 
T’Challa’s genius sister, and Nakia (Lupita Nyong’o), his activist lover, 
who is a Wakandan spy in the outside world. In some really critical ways, 
Black Panther is a representational revolution, centering Black people as 
actors, characters, producers and makers of mainstream media. It depicts 
an Africanness that is deliberately created in opposition to the debased or 
demeaned version of neocolonial Africa which passes for Western knowl-
edge of the continent, its people and its diaspora.
In 2014, Gay complained about the reductive and stereotyped depic-
tions of Black experience in American movies. She asked for a cinema 
that went beyond the struggle narrative, that stopped fetishizing the bro-
ken Black body and reiterating Black victimhood as the only kind of 
subjectivity available to Black people in mainstream culture. With Black 
Panther, released four years later, I wager she got her wish. Directed by 
Ryan Coogler, released by Disney in February 2018, the movie was a 
revelation to the box office: a movie by and about Black people that made 
a whole lot of money. According to the Brookings Institute, Black Panther 
made $427 million, placing it second only to The Avengers in terms of 
profits, and second only to Star Wars: The Force Awakens for opening 
profits (Sims, 2018; Sow & Sy, 2018).
This was more than a commercial moment though, it was a moment 
of empowerment and visibility for Black people wherever Hollywood 
movies are sold:
The importance of seeing black people for the first time depicted in a major 
movie as kings, queens, inventors, and diplomats, rather than slaves, thugs, 
dealers and thieves, has given the movie a real-world political engagement 
not seen in other superhero films. The journalist Shaun King even went as 
3 Wakanda Forever 
90
far as to argue that it is a cultural phenomenon equal in importance to Dr. 
King’s “I Have a Dream” speech and Rosa Parks refusing to give up her bus 
seat. (Faramelli, 2019, n.p.; see Faithful, 2018)
Offering a regal Black superhero to the world, Black Panther did some-
thing important for American culture and the subjects who inhabit it 
(González-Velázquez et al., 2020). As part of its centering of Black peo-
ple, the film was as bold as it could be in addressing race and racism, 
given its conditions of production. It offered mainstream audiences a 
serious, unapologetic engagement with Black rage and Black power. It is 
remarkable that this conversation was even allowed to happen in a Disney 
blockbuster.
The film’s exploration of possible responses to Western epistemologies 
of race and the centuries of colonialism thereby enabled focuses on Black 
experience and references African philosophies. Its central commitment 
is to exploring the politics of racial liberation (Newkirk, 2018; Orr, 
2018). Faramelli (2019) sees Black Panther as resolving the dialectic it 
presents between different kinds of revolutionary theory, isolationism 
(“black sovereignty,” represented by T’Challa) versus a radical engaged 
“black solidarity” (represented by Killmonger). It offers, he says, the 
option of a Sojan Thirdspace via the character of Nakia, not coinciden-
tally a woman in a patriarchal culture (Wakanda is an absolute monarchy, 
with patriarchal lineage).
The Thirdspace is a hybrid space of dialogue and negotiation, not 
unlike the intersubjective third. For Faramelli (2019), this results in the 
film’s embrace of a responsible, international form of Pan-Africanism, a 
rejection of Wakanda’s traditional exceptionalism and an equal rejection 
of the cultural nationalism enabled by an essentializing, and therefore 
Manichean, negritude which “only reinforces the hegemony of colonial 
power.” This last is evidenced in Killmonger’s desire to create and rule a 
new world empire, won and held through military might.
Instead, T’Challa uses Wakanda’s resources to begin a process of global 
outreach, starting in Oakland—implicitly a location which invokes the 
racialized struggles of African Americans, the birthplace of the real-life 
Black Panthers and the site of Killmonger’s childhood trauma and radi-
calization. For Faramelli (2019), Black Panther rejects a business-as-usual 
 N. Distiller
91
liberalism for a new kind of radical engagement, led by Black women, as 
T’Challa decrees that Shuri and Nakia will run the Wakandan 
International Outreach Center. He concludes, “This Thirdspace position 
has the potential to create new spaces and transform the Oakland hous-
ing project where T’Chaka kills Killmonger’s father into a space of 
liberation.”
Not everyone loved, or agreed on, the film’s message. Its heteronorma-
tivity has been critiqued (Meyer, 2020), as has its centering of African 
American needs to the exclusion of transnational and Islamic Africans 
(Alaoui & Abdi, 2020). It has been faulted for its reiteration of African 
royalty as the model for African subjectivity, an objection made against 
other African American engagements with the continent (Rickford, 
2020; Semphere, 2020). Zizek (2018), in his review of the film, calls it an 
“empty vessel containing antagonistic elements.” He notes that the film’s 
enthusiastic reception spanned the political spectrum. Black power advo-
cates loved it, as did liberals who liked the “education and aid, not strug-
gle” conclusion to the film’s exploration of options for racial justice. And 
right-wing commentators found in the nationalist refrain “Wakanda 
Forever” a version of Trump’s isolationist “America First” (see Faramelli, 
2019; Varda & Hahner, 2020).
There has been criticism from African writers of the film’s valorization 
of an idealized Africa at the expense of engaging with the continent. 
While it offers “a rich embodiment of African culture,… [Black Panther] 
is surprisingly removed from the reality of today’s African social issues 
and its politics” (Garside, 2018, p.  109; see Faramelli, 2019; Zizek, 
2018). The film’s use of other African countries as foils to Wakanda has 
been criticized as Western stereotyping, and its solution to the question 
of Wakanda’s responsibility to Black people has been found to be, vari-
ously, and relatedly, neoliberal and Western development-oriented 
(Hanchey, 2020; Johnson & Hoerl, 2020; Varda & Hahner, 2020). Varda 
and Hahner (2020) argue that representational diversity alone is not 
enough to guarantee revolutionary representation, and Johnson and 
Hoerl (2020) accuse the film of maintaining whiteness despite its center-
ing of Black bodies.
Despite also not being convinced that the ending was not endorsing a 
form of repurposed Western aid, albeit more community-minded and 
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African-led (see Hanchey, 2020), I was profoundly moved by this film, 
and I felt profoundly ambivalent about my affective reaction to it. It is 
precisely an instantiation of complicity when I do not have language that 
is able to convey the full range and responsibility of what I mean: every 
time I see this film I am moved to tears by the vision of an independent, 
proud, empowered African nation that is greater than the West (and I 
know the problem with white women’s tears, DiAngelo, 2018, and I am 
a white woman and I am also a colonially produced kind of African white 
woman); I ache for an Africa that has not been brutalized by colonialism 
and I know that to reduce the entire continent to a Western developmen-
tal discourse of abjection is not an accurate description of Africa or 
Africanness, and certainly does not see the humanity of Africans; as a 
white South African, my right to access Africanness is forever mediated 
by the racialized structures erected in my favor and from which I benefit-
ted. But all this is who and what I am. As a white South African, I am the 
product and the beneficiary of colonialism and apartheid. And as a white, 
middle-class citizen of the global South, I sit at an angle at the table of 
neoliberalism and neocolonial cultural imperialism. As someone now liv-
ing in America, I have all the privileges of American whiteness, and also 
stumble as an older immigrant through a place that does not value my 
origins, my experience or my age.
O’Loughlin (2020, p. 357) uses postcolonial notions of mourning to 
theorize the cost of the mimicry at work in trying, as in Irish immigrant, 
to be white in America. She invokes her “own autobiography, in which 
the acquisition of Whiteness is confounded by my origins in a colonized 
nation” to “suggest[…] that the encounter with the discourse of American 
Whiteness is troubled for those, like me, who, while we may pass as 
White—something Asian Americans and other persons of color cannot 
do—still experience a… splitting.”
As a white South African, my whiteness is not partial, as O’Loughlin’s 
Irishness renders her in a British context. Nevertheless, Black Panther 
confronted me head-on with the complicitous contradictions that make 
me. I too, experience a splitting. The difficulty speaking authentically 
from these multiple, fractured, contradictory positionalities is not only 
about my own struggle with my Good White Personhood. It is not only 
about my awareness of what it means to have grown up under apartheid 
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and benefitted from it. It is also at least in part about the way identity 
functions in America as I have found it today. It seems to me that one of 
the rules of identity politics is that you cannot speak except of what you 
know from your own embodied experience, and only to others who are 
exactly like you. So where does this leave me? What am I authorized to 
speak about here?
Black Panther is a discussion between African Americans and conti-
nental black Africans. As Rickford (2020, n.p.) puts it, “African American 
imaginings of Africa often intermingle with…. intimate hopes and desires 
for Black life in the United States… [F]or African Americans,… Africa 
remains an abiding source of inspiration and identity.” He writes of
[A] venerable African American tradition of crafting images of Africa that 
are designed to redeem the entire Black world… a retort to the contemptu-
ous West and its condescending discourses of African danger, disease and 
degeneration… those tattered, colonialist tropes.
I felt a little like an eavesdropper, watching this movie, even as I also 
reveled in its reclamation of Africa from the typical, abjected Western 
depictions of the continent and its peoples, and as I felt myself a white 
African watching mainstream America claim a version of Africa as though 
it has just realized the continent has something to offer. I felt my frac-
tures, my foldedness, my complicities.
The African aesthetic of Black Panther (see Faramelli, 2019), and some 
of its landscape, is deeply familiar to me, is in my bones and is embodied 
in me in complicated processes of subjectification and racialized domina-
tion. Some of it was filmed in my homeland. The cadence of the English 
of many of the African characters is one of the textures of my life. Some 
of the characters spoke isiXhosa, the hearing of which, in my current 
location, made me insider (South African) and outsider (white South 
African) and another kind of outsider (white person in America). I know 
also that it is my class-race-educational privilege that allows me to be a 
global citizen, to be in America legally, to afford the film. I also know that 
it is no uncomplicated feat for a white South African to claim a love of 
Africa and a relation to Africans, let alone a familiarity with a land and 
with people the exploitation of whom funded and nursed my very being. 
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My childhood was structured by the incredibly complex and contradic-
tory experiences of being surrounded, and care for, by Black women and 
men who were denied access to their own children and families so they 
could serve mine. The relationships were relationships of power that I 
could experience as relationships of connection. And yet they were also 
relationships of connection, however mediated and compromised. This 
cracked and damaged social, emotional, cultural reality is my South 
African version of the neocolonial world. It’s fucked up, and it’s also real 
and true. It is partial and compromised, and it is all I have. In Black 
Panther, I recognize South African cadences and artwork and languages 
and landscapes in ways that most Americans will not. And that is as much 
mine as the privilege and violence and horror that is my white Africanness. 
This is my embodied complicity.
As a student of early modern English literature, I had the chance to 
experience being treated as a subject of the colony, as an always inferior 
wannabe by the center of this particular power when I was a graduate 
student at Oxford University. One result of that experience was to shape 
my initial academic career around the question of colonial cultural poli-
tics, and of who might make what use of the cultural capital that is 
“Shakespeare.” Since my field included South Africans and Shakespeare, 
I had repeated occasion to view, teach and write about the work of John 
Kani. His remarkable, revolutionary portrayal of Othello in apartheid 
South Africa, which I saw as a high school student at the time, is a key 
text for postcolonial Shakespearians (see Distiller, 2012b). The last pro-
duction I saw before leaving South Africa starred the elder Kani as Caliban 
and his son, Atandwa, as a breathtaking Ariel, in The Tempest. Seeing 
them both in Black Panther (Atandwa Kani plays a younger version of 
King T’Chaka) felt personal to me. I feel proud of Atandwa Kani, as 
though he were my son’s friend. I feel like I am watching a kinsman age 
when I feel grief at how old John Kani is looking. The passing of his years 
feels linked to the passing of mine, because of what we share in being 
South African as we share Shakespeare. There is a complicity at work 
here, which is comprised not only of the connections across colonialism 
and Englishness, but also by the fractures of South Africa’s settler colo-
nialism and apartheid histories. Kani and I are both of that web, and it 
connects us in powerful—power-full—ways. I know that my whiteness 
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gave me a totally different experience of being South African to Kani’s, 
and one that I had at the expense of Kani and his children. The challenge 
of speaking about any of this, here in America, is the challenge to navi-
gate not only my history and the legacy of my late twentieth century 
(settler colonial, neocolonial) whiteness, but also the challenge of finding 
a speaking position within American identity politics in the present.
Black Panther’s conversation with the aspects of Africa it uses to help 
set its scene is also a conversation about America’s position in global net-
works of power. A constructed “Africa” is given valence, authority, legiti-
macy, as well as recognition, when it is valued by Hollywood in this way. 
This is both a victory and a collusion in, or co-option by, a system of valu-
ation where worth is bestowed by a specific kind of circulation in a spe-
cific kind of public sphere, and authorized by commercial success. Thanks 
to Black Panther, “Africa” is now a successful brand. Here, too, is 
complicity.
Black Panther is overdue, and necessary, in the context of the ongoing 
devaluation of Africa and Black Africans, continental or diasporic. It is an 
important cultural corrective for America specifically and for the coloniz-
ing West. And it also indicates America’s complicity in discourses of race 
and power transnationally. America’s capitalist neocolonial power is part 
of what authorizes and conveys value on the version of Africanness that 
Black Panther so lovingly depicts. As I sit at the intersections of so many 
of these positions, as I try to hold my various complicities, I feel these 
splits as the only place any of us have from which to start trying to con-
nect with each other.
In his beautiful exegesis of decoloniality, Mignolo (2011, p. 280) writes,
[F]or a white European body to think decolonially means to give; to give 
in a parallel way to the way a body of colour formed in colonial histories 
has to give if that body wants to inhabit postmodern and poststructural-
ist theories.
Mignolo has already explained why Western epistemologies cannot 
ever see the humanity of the West’s others, and how the imbrications of 
colonialism and slavery with methods and institutions of knowledge cre-
ation mean that a new, delinked, decolonial way forward is the only 
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option for what he calls Third World people. It is not what is enunciated 
that matters, he says, it is the always political fact of the enunciation that 
creates possibilities in the world. In this context, the white European 
body has to give up its liberal individuality, its good intention. It has to 
be willing to be changed, if it wants to enter the third space, beyond the 
either/ors of Western modernity, made possible by decoloniality. But 
what of the body that is not either white European or marked as colored 
by modernity? What of the white body born, because of modernity’s sys-
tems of oppression, in the so-called Third World, into positions of power 
locally and of partial otherness globally? The complicities embodied thus, 
as I have been suggesting, need their own enunciative acts.
Humans unspeakably exceed the structural positions allocated to them 
by history, by systems of power, by tradition and by white supremacy and 
patriarchy. This place beyond language where something crucially human 
happens is detailed in Chap. 6. As much as we are trapped and deter-
mined by the structures in which we find ourselves, our capacity for com-
plicity allows for sometimes unexpected, perhaps always partial, 
possibilities to find ourselves in new, unexpected, Thirdspace, intersub-
jective, terms. This is not to deny the brutalities of history, and it is to 
recognize the agency of those who survive it every day. It is also an attempt 
to understand the complicated, complicit work of racial justice that is 
done by Black Panther which is also the work of capitalism, and of 
American cultural colonialism, in the context of the possibilities and lim-
its of identity politics.
A week after the movie’s box-office-smashing opening, The Brookings 
Institute published, “Lessons from Marvel’s Black Panther: Natural 
resource management and increased openness in Africa” (Sow & Sy, 
2018). The article draws lessons for “Africa,” imagined as a singular place, 
from the movie, for example:
[W]hile oil and diamonds are not as versatile as vibranium [Wakanda’s 
alien super-metal that is the source of its power] and cannot be used indi-
vidually to promote the technological advancement of resource-rich 
African countries, there exists a space for the revenues they generate to be 




This rather slick correlation, between the power that the fictional 
vibranium conveyed on the fictional Wakanda and the power of oil and 
diamonds to bring money and technology to Africa, overlooks the brutal 
history of Western exploitation of African resources. The article notes 
that some countries in Africa, unlike Wakanda, tend to export their 
riches, and blames this process for “misaligned exchange rates, the decline 
of non-resource sectors, political authoritarianism, conflict, and eco-
nomic inequality” (Sow & Sy, 2018, n.p.). This is a gross oversimplifica-
tion, to say the least.
Oil and diamonds—and ivory, and gold, resources plundered from 
The Congo and from South Africa, to name two specific additional 
examples—have not been underutilized by Africans because they did not 
think of developing those resources. They do not need the (American cre-
ated) example of vibranium to remind them of what they might do by 
helping them to imagine the possibilities. And this easy vision of rein-
vested African resources pays no attention to neoliberal global economic 
systems which actively disempower Africa, or to the local and continental 
political aftermaths of colonialism.
The article concludes by hoping for more positive depictions of Africa 
in the movies (presumably American, since there is a thriving industry in 
Nigeria and a growing industry in South Africa). It calls into being 
through the existence of a fictional place the possibility that Africa’s 
potential might be more fully respected and realized in the real world:
[F]ictional Wakanda provides an image of the prosperity and technological 
advancement, which awaits properly managed resource-rich countries. The 
subsequent technological proliferation and increase in global trade will 
hopefully be featured in the Black Panther sequel. (Sow & Sy, 2018)
The representational power in imagining a different world, and thereby 
a different world order, does matter, as we have seen. But this cannot 
stand in for responsible mapping of why Wakanda is a fiction and not a 
reality. And feeling good about what we see on a Hollywood screen is not 
the same thing as actually engaging with what needs to change if we do 
want to see a more globally empowered African continent.
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Furthermore, a year later, Brookings returned to Black Panther in their 
“Africa in Focus” section in February of 2019, in an article entitled, 
“From Wakanda to reality: Building mutual prosperity between African- 
Americans and Africa” (Signé & Thomas-Greenfield, 2019). The authors 
called hopefully for the possibility of cultural heritage tourism for African 
Americans, which it contrasts to the holiday tourism for whites that it 
says comprises the bulk of the industry in Africa today. African Americans, 
say the authors, “may” be more interested in reconnecting with “Africa” 
than in “riding camels in the Sahara” like white tourists do. They suggest 
African American visitors use National Geographic to select places to 
visit (where, presumably, they will not see pictures of camels in the 
Sahara). The possibility of these new kinds of tourists opens up new com-
mercial pathways, they suggest, and is a way for African Americans to 
“invest” in Africa’s growth (Signé & Thomas-Greenfield, 2019, n.p.).
“[D]uring the hype of ‘Black Panther,’” the authors recount, “we both 
were giving talks on how to unlock Africa’s potential.” They continue:
Many of… the African-American professionals, community, and business 
leaders… asked us how they could help make Africa as successful as the 
imaginary Wakanda. In other words, where are the opportunities to 
develop mutually beneficial relations between Africa, African Americans, 
and the United States?
I value and respect the connections being made between Black Africans 
in different places across the globe. But I cannot help but notice the nor-
malization of a Western, American model of economics that has every-
thing to do with Black Panther, the brand. The authors are entrepreneurially 
riding the wave of possibility opened up for their careers by the movie’s 
success; they are accurately noticing the ways global power relations cur-
rently work as they also seek to help empower “Africa.” This empower-
ment, as I have been suggesting, is needed across spheres, from the 
material to the discursive. And yet the overarching value system that is 
accepted and continued by this entire exchange, by this conflation of the 
fictional and the real, by the assumption that a comic book can uplift the 
reductively constructed place “Africa,” simplified into an idea by the 
(important) work of identity, all of this takes for granted and perpetuates 
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American cultural dynamics that are very much part of the problem. 
Here is another example of complicity made visible by Black Panther. The 
cultural imperialism does not cancel out the representational empower-
ment. The connections between continental and diasporic Africans are 
not invalidated by the complex economic power dynamics at play. The 
yearning for African upliftment is not less important because there is also 
some Western-centric economic thinking at play here. It all works 
together to articulate some of the complexities and complicities of being 
human and being raced and being placed in this global time.
In this context, Newkirk’s (2018) comments and question seem pre-
scient, and to be speaking about complicity:
But the film will likely garner much of its earnings and generate much of 
its cachet from members of a mobile black middle class, centered largely in 
America, that have carved out some political and media prominence, both 
individually and as a group. Those viewers have rightly applauded the film 
for its incredible gains in representation, and will perhaps use it as a rally-
ing cry for increasing diversity, often among their own ranks as a class. But 
Killmonger’s question seems as pointed through the fourth wall toward 
them as it is to Wakanda: What will they do with the power they do have 
to make the world livable for those without it?
The question of how structurally oppressed groups of people have 
power differentially in relation to each other is a central one for the next 
chapter, which examines the dynamic between feminism, queer theory 
and transgender rights. In this example, too, I hope to show how binary 
thinking cannot serve and to suggest ways of working with psychother-
apy clients who want or need to talk about their gender that opens up 
models of human being for us all.
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4
Thought Bodies: Gender, Sex, 
Sexualities
[B]odies are always ‘thought bodies’ or ‘bodies-thought’—and perhaps one day 
we will look back on the ‘sex-thought-body’ that has so exercised our own cen-
tury, our own repetitive and wearying anxiety about our sexual bodies, our 
commitments to the difference of gender that marks us so indelibly… with a 
certain wry amusement. (Rose, 1998, p. 183)
This chapter offers an exploration of the limits of binary thinking, and 
the multiple kinds of damage it causes. It offers three illustrations of com-
plicitous situations that complicate a view of gender, sex and sexuality as 
understandable through binary thinking. Each illustration offered here 
has been rendered additionally difficult and painful by categorical think-
ing, the kind of thinking that the scientific method often depends upon 
and that the psy disciplines often perpetuate.
Thinking complicitously means getting outside of binary structures to 
conceptualize subjectivity as implicated in, not bounded from, otherness. It 
also means acknowledging we are implicated in the systems of power and 
meaning that make use of otherness. If race, as we have seen, is one con-
structed place where fixed identities emerge in response to histories of oppres-
sion authorized by binary thinking (which also means by ways of thinking 
that assert hierarchies of value for material profit), then gender is another.
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One of the urgent border wars being fought in the West at the moment 
is the struggle for transgender and nonbinary human being. As with the 
development and pathologization of racialized differences, psychology 
has had a central role to play in establishing meanings for and treatments 
of transgender and nonbinary people, as it has for sexual queers and for 
femininity and femaleness, all related (but not coterminous) histories of 
constructed meanings which gave rise to real, lived identities and material 
conditions of being. The first illustration provided here is an exploration 
of how transgender human being has been thought about in Western 
systems, including both the scientific and medical establishments, and 
feminist and queer theories.
I use the term “transgender” to refer to all people who occupy a gender 
identity different to the one assigned to them at birth, from within a 
binary system, on the basis of their perceived anatomy. Transgender peo-
ple may or may not require hormonal or surgical gender affirmation. 
Some transgender people may occupy standard or standardized gender 
locations for “male” or “female.” Some may identify as trans men or trans 
women, and some may identify as women or men who happen also have 
a transgender trajectory.
I use the term “non-binary” specifically to indicate those people whose 
gender identities cannot be accommodated within the gender binary. 
Sometimes nonbinary people need to enact a nonbinary embodiment 
with the help of medical interventions. Some nonbinary people will also 
be transgender. There are many other terms for noncisgender identities, 
and the list changes as the culture makes room and new iterations emerge. 
For the purposes of brevity, I include identities such as genderqueer or 
agender within the rubric of nonbinary. All of these markers are gender 
markers, and do not denote anything about sexuality or sexual orienta-
tion. Some transgender and/or nonbinary people will also be queer, 
which in this context means members of the LGBQ+ sexuality umbrella.
In the second illustration explored here, I move from gender to sexual-
ity, and some of the structuring dynamics of normative heterosexuality. 
Another urgent conflict, sometimes conceptualized as equivalent to war 
(Faludi, 2006; Herman, 1997; Ward, 2020), is the struggle for sexual 
agency experienced by girls and women—in the terms of this discussion, 
this usually means those assigned female at birth (AFAB), although it can 
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and should include those who are otherwise female or feminized—in this 
patriarchal culture.
Finally, I look at what emerges when genders and sexualities in another 
place have to make sense of themselves within neocolonial conditions. By 
examining the transnational complexities of Western LGBTQ ideas and 
identities in South Africa, I offer a third illustration of complicitous 
thinking about both gender and sexuality, as they can be taken together.
The topics of gender and sexuality offer a crucial opportunity for prac-
titioners of the psy disciplines to see what theories developed in the 
humanities can offer us. Psychology has been implicated in the assertion 
of binary thinking, in the reinscription of science and biology as tech-
nologies for proving gender in always already gendered cultures in the 
name of objective truth. It has helped develop and perpetuate notions of 
sexual normativity (Drescher, 2015a) that are also, inevitably, deeply 
raced and classed (Carter, 2007). It is high time for the psy disciplines to 
think differently about gender, sex and sexuality, and to stop perpetuat-
ing norms as natural.
This chapter offers what I hope are useful, currently relevant insights 
into discussions that are at least as old as feminism itself, about the rela-
tionship between sex and gender, and about at least some aspects of nor-
mative (hetero)sexuality. In the evolving realms of transgender mental 
health, of sexuality studies and of decolonial imperatives within a trans-
national frame, these discussions are both urgent and in flux, the more we 
listen and learn.
All three of the examples presented here illustrate a problem with lan-
guage. Each of the areas of human being explored in this chapter (trans-
gender being; heteronormative female being; transnational queer being) 
demonstrates that language has shaping power, and that language gives or 
disables agency. If you do not have the words to describe an experience, 
it cannot be recognized by others, and it is much harder to make sense of 
it for yourself. If you do know your own meaning, but your words are 
dismissed or derided, your experience cannot be acknowledged or 
addressed. Each of the examples under discussion here tracks a struggle to 
find the words to articulate versions of human being that are othered 
within current systems of power. This is evidence of the importance of 
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language as a human system, and of the symbolic as providing primary 
access to human subjectivity and processes of subjectification.
Starting with a brief overview of the evolution of gender within 
Western culture, this chapter offers comprehensive illustration of the 
constructed nature of apparently natural meanings, and how binary 
thinking shapes difference. In this way, it extends the arguments of the 
previous chapter, that apparently common sensical categories are histori-
cal formations, informed by the psy disciplines, among other disciplinary 
matrixes. We need to bring this thinking to our psychotherapeutic prac-
tice, in order to hold space in a way that can manage the complicities that 
are always at play within a client’s sense of self, and between therapist and 
client. The question of practice is the main topic of the last chapter. Let 
us begin by reviewing what is perhaps the most powerful binary structure 
underlying Western culture.
 Binary Gender
In practice, gender is complicated and personal, informed by each per-
son’s cultural and family dynamics as well as by their intimate experiences 
of themselves, both before and after language has had a go at shaping 
them. For example, Harris (2009) writes powerfully, from within a rela-
tional psychoanalytic frame, about gender’s fundamental complexity, 
which is denied and reduced by a binary logic. She shows that gender is 
material, relational, actively assembled and contextual. It is made up of 
developmental events that may or may not directly relate to gender and/
or sexuality. It is both personal and collective; “It is as though gender 
were often the point of maximal psychic vulnerability, a flash point for 
the construction and maintenance of subjectivity” (Harris, 2009, p. 175). 
This is indeed a psychoanalytic understanding, which sees gender iden-
tity, achieved through sexuality, as instantiating the child’s move into per-
sonhood via an encounter with the family, representing social rules, 
through the Oedipal process. Implicitly, therefore, gender is a key place 
where inherited social meanings enter subjectification.
Doan (2010) explores how, in addition to carrying interpersonal social 
meanings, gender is an interaction between a person and the kind of 
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space that person moves through. Other people’s presence in space helps 
bring different expectations and behaviors depending on the place that is 
shared. This is a visual, embodied geography of complicity to add to 
Harris’s psychoanalytic one. If there is a place where the personal, the 
social, the historical, the embodied and the familial obviously combine to 
construct complicity—the place, the subject and their context cannot be 
delineated from each other—it is gender. This is so, even as gender often 
feels like the most personal of places, where we find our inner selves: 
complicity at work, making the subject.
As we will see, Western culture, assisted mightily by scientific thinking 
which wants categories, has a deep investment in denying the complicit 
content of gender. Patriarchy needs a gender binary. As discussed in 
Chap. 1, binary thinking enables a dynamics of psychic and mate-
rial power.
Binary gender is also a Western attempt to make sense of sexual differ-
ence under patriarchy. This use of sexual difference has been theorized, by 
psychoanalytically informed thinkers, as productive of misogyny and sex-
ism (Benjamin, 1988; De Lauretis, 1987; Dean & Lane, 2001; Rose, 
1986), as well as heteronormative heterosexuality (Butler, 1999). While 
this process has historical nuance (Perry, 2018), there is a larger theoreti-
cal point to be made here about some of the formative energies of the 
culture as a whole (see Gilmore, 2001).
Ward (2020) and Carter (2007) add the important point that the het-
eronormative gender binary, as it developed in America, is also raced. As 
I suggested in the previous chapter, this is inevitable, since gender and 
race co-constitute, as feminists of color have always said. Modern 
American heterosexuality was formed in and shaped by the early twenti-
eth century (Katz, 2007). Eugenicist practices fundamentally informed 
the development of discourses of healthy heterosexuality, as circulated by 
the psy disciplines as well as medical and sexological interventions. 
Whiteness became the implicit human norm in part through these pro-
cesses (Carter, 2007; Ward, 2020). Camminga (2019), too, shows con-
nections between eugenics, sexology, racism and binary heteronormativity 
in early twentieth century South Africa, a site of interest to the eugenics 
movement in the North because of its highly racialized colonial dynamics.
There is a long genesis to binary gender logic in Western cultural and 
political systems, where people, in the first place white people, born with 
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penises, have unmediated access to subjectivity, and everyone else has 
additional work to do. This assumption is Freud’s starting point, as we 
saw in Chap. 2. Freud articulated overtly, in a discourse that became psy-
chology, what up till then Western culture had taken for granted.
We can start tracking this with the first scientist of Western culture, 
Aristotle. Biologically, AFAB women cannot do what men do, produce 
semen, and this, for Aristotle—and especially for the early modern era 
which “rediscovered” him—was evidence that they were incompletely 
human, “nothing else but an error or aberration of nature… yea the first 
monster in nature,” as a 1615 summary of his position put it (Aughterson, 
1998, p. 464; see Schiebinger, 1989). Nature therefore endorsed women’s 
inferior social position in ancient Greek culture. Aristotle helped lay the 
groundwork for the idea that biology is destiny. Even apologists of 
Aristotle’s views on women concede he takes for granted that men and 
women have different, complementary, biologically endorsed roles to 
play in society. Of course, this means women are not cut out for civic life, 
but are designed by nature to have, raise and stay with children as their 
raison d’etre (Dobbs, 1996). There are several familiar patriarchal assump-
tions at play here, which structure gender difference along the lines of 
different innate essences. These naturally give rise to different, comple-
mentary abilities: public and private capacities; intellect or mind versus 
body; or as Aristotle put it, form (the male) versus matter (the female).
These assumptions and structuring principles built on themselves (see 
Coole, 1988; Gilmore, 2001). The Greeks knew women were inferior to 
men, not able to think clearly or execute good judgment. In line with 
this, the sin of Eve came to contaminate women’s meaning in medieval 
and early modern culture (see Distiller, 2008). The cultural story is that 
women cannot be trusted because they are penetratable (symbolically, by 
the snake’s words, a sign of their constitutional and co-constituting phys-
ical, intellectual and moral weakness; women are, as the early modern 
period put it over and over, “leaky vessels”). Their bodies are the sign of 
their inferiority. Their bodies are also the source of their power over men. 
They can and, so goes the common cultural narrative, do use their bodies 
to tempt men, as Eve convinced Adam to fall. This suspicion of female 
sexuality remains powerfully present in the treatment rape survivors con-
tinue to receive today. Women are made responsible for eliciting men’s 
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desire, and ruthlessly punished for being desirable (see Gilmore, 2001; 
Ward, 2020). There is a logic of domination in this understanding of 
heteronormative desire (see Distiller, 2011). Binary thinking structures 
this dynamic, where the difference and otherness signified by the wom-
an’s body are simultaneously attractive, threatening and debased. This 
terrible, destructive difference must be controlled, or the gendered sub-
jectivity which depends on keeping it out risks dissolution.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe, there were vigor-
ous debates over the nature of women, which tried to determine their 
proper social place (Beecher, 2005; Laqueur, 1992). Much of the debate 
concerned policing what they could wear, where they could occupy space 
and with whom. It was important to know what kept women’s bodies in 
their proper place, since there was much cultural anxiety about loss of 
social distinction if women were allowed to dress like men, or vice versa 
(Levine, 1994; Orgel, 1996). There were, in fact, stories circulating at the 
time about women behaving inappropriately and thus turning into men 
(Laqueur, 1992). The control of women’s bodies, then as now, was implic-
itly linked to the control of their public speech (Boose, 1991; Distiller, 
2008; Jones, 1986; Vickers, 1981; Wall, 1993). It would make a fascinat-
ing project to compare the cultural texts that responded to Queen 
Elizabeth I, who, at the point of emergence of early modernity, brilliantly 
navigated the impossible contradiction of occupying a position of male 
authority with her female body, with the treatment of Hillary Clinton in 
the 2016 elections, as postmodernity seems poised to fracture under the 
representational pressures of social media (see Berry, 1989; Marotti, 
1982; Solnit, 2018).
With the Enlightenment and the development of modern science, 
including psychology, came the cultural and economic idea of the indi-
vidual as we now know him, as we have seen. In this time, drawing on 
colonial racism as well as centuries of sexism, Linnaeus developed his 
taxonomy of all things. He chose the term homo sapiens (meaning “man 
of wisdom”) to emphasize the ways in which men are different to pri-
mates. He chose the term mammals, referring to the body part shared by 
only the females of all the species he was connecting, to denote what 
joined humans to animals (Schiebinger, 2004). The old binary meanings 
continued to influence new discourses, including Darwin’s (see Saini, 
4 Thought Bodies: Gender, Sex, Sexualities 
114
2017), where female bodies continued to be tied to lower, earthy, realms; 
to the apparent imperatives of (hetero)sexuality and their consequences 
(rape, pregnancy); to an emerging concept of “nature”; and to the reduced 
capacity for intellect and therefore personhood that started with the 
Ancient Greeks (see Schiebinger, 1989). French writer Gustave Le Bon, 
interested in both psychology and anthropology, opined in 1879:
[Women’s] inferiority is so obvious that no one can contest it for a moment; 
only its degree is worth discussion. All psychologists who have studied the 
intelligence of women, as well as poets and novelists, recognize today that 
they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution and that they 
are closer to children and savages than to an adult, civilized man. They 
excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence of thought and logic, and incapac-
ity to reason. Without doubt there exist some very distinguished women, 
very superior to the average man, but they are as exceptional as the birth of 
any monstrosity as, for example, of a gorilla with two heads; consequently, 
we may neglect them entirely. (Qtd. Fisher 2011, p. 10)
Articulating for the first time the language of the unconscious of 
Western culture, Freud (1973) also said biology should be destiny, and 
since women self-evidently had nothing where the signifier of subjectivity 
should be, they needed to come to terms with their proper receptive place 
in the world, for the sake of the reproductive security of the race. Freud 
heteronormatively assumed that babies can only be made by heterosexu-
als in monogamous pairings (see Distiller, 2011), and require the unpaid 
labor of female bodies to survive, as a consequence of natural imperatives. 
Any other configuration, because to the Victorian mind unnatural, 
threatens proper human development, which finds its best expression in 
the creation of more monogamous heterosexual pairings. This assump-
tion has structured the discipline of psychology and most of its offshoots 
until recently, and still exists as a powerful cultural norm. In this version 
of proper gender, linked to sex and sexuality, people assigned female at 
birth and who remain so are required to internalize and embody specific 
qualities and meanings. As always, race layers onto these pressures, add-
ing meanings and rules (Cooper, 2018; Cruz, 2016; Perry, 2018; Ward, 




Binary gender is a core structural component of the self/other power 
dynamic that informs Western modernity and which enabled the colo-
nial enterprises that gave us our twenty-first century global systems. It 
unconsciously drives much of what dominant institutions assume to be 
true about nature, about gender roles, about sexuality and about how 
they each inform the other.
 Transgender Complicities
Despite the shaping assumptions of Western science, dominant culture 
and heteronormativity that gender is essentially binary in structure, gen-
der is in fact made of a complicit structure. It is not, in lived reality, 
formed out of complementarity, where your gender is kept in place 
because it is not like the “other” gender. The very instability of this appar-
ently natural and obvious relation gives it the lie; there are too many 
instances in history and in science of additional options for gender to be 
based in binary logic, or to be based on binary sex (Fausto-Sterling, 
1993). Gender is complex, intertwined with heteronormative systems of 
oppression, as well as with histories of resistance and whatever personal 
assertions take shape in the contexts available to any given subject. There 
is not one original source of gender. Gender is put together by subjects of 
culture, language, history and family, and by the mediated sense we each 
make of biology, of how our bodies feel to us through the network of 
options made available to each of us by the worlds of possibilities and of 
limits we inherit.
Then there is the matter of how gender, after it is internally felt, is 
expressed, and what the relationship is between the two. Queer theory 
was partially built on the argument that the iterative social performance 
of gender helps to create the way it feels to be gendered (Butler, 1999). 
The implications are not only for the social meanings of gender or the 
subjective interpretations of gendered selfhood. Butler also famously 
asserted that gender is a performance which effects help to ensure that sex 
is always already gendered, and not the other way around (see also Butler, 
1993); binary sex is not the bedrock of gender, but a consequence of it. 
The apparently unidirectional causal relationship between sex—genitals, 
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hormones, chromosomes—and the social identities “male” and “female” 
is thereby broken. Gender and sex both exist through the doing of the 
socially sanctioned rules of gender which go on, as feminist historians of 
science and feminist scientists continue to show, to inform and shape our 
“scientific” understandings of sex and gender, and the biological mean-
ings we make of sexual difference (e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Fausto- 
Sterling, 2000; Fine, 2014; Fisher, 2011; Haraway, 1989; Rippon, 2019; 
Saini, 2017; Schiebinger, 2004).
This gets complicated when we apply the queer and feminist thinking 
that opens up binary gender assumptions to the lives and self-narratives 
of some transgender people. As Prosser (1998, p. 43) puts it in his bril-
liant interrogation of the relationship between feminist and queer theo-
ries and transgender lives (he is writing in the period where transsexual 
and transgender were still sometimes being used interchangeably, and 
before nonbinary was a publicly recognized identity),
The transsexual doesn’t necessarily look differently gendered but by defini-
tion feels differently gendered from her or his birth-assigned sex. In both its 
medical and its autobiographical versions, the transsexual narrative depends 
upon an initial crediting of this feeling as generative ground. It demands 
some recognition of the category of corporeal interiority (internal bodily 
sensations) and of its distinctiveness from that which can be seen (external 
surface): the difference between gender identity and sex that serves as the 
logic of transsexuality.
Many of us experience what it means to be a cisgender woman or man 
as natural, but queer theory teaches that that feeling is created through 
our participation in the repeated signals and signs that society provides us 
as the correct ways to be (also raced, classed, ablebodied or disabled) 
women or men. For many transgender people, and certainly for the med-
ical and psychological discourses that authorize their being, the natural 
imperative comes directly from the body, and is at odds with the social 
rules being imposed on the body. As Prosser (1998, p. 67) shows, “trans-
sexual autobiography challenge’s theory’s cynicism over identity’s embodi-
ment” (see also Califa, 1997; Serano, 2016).
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It is my assertion that the fact of transgender human being is perhaps 
the best case study we have so far in the complicit nature of gender. The 
embodiment of identity cannot be separated into constructed or per-
formed gender, and sexed objective truth. The theoretical conundrum 
only arises if we remain committed to the binary formulation, where sex 
and gender are either/ors of each other, as has informed the debate about 
gender theory and transgender personhood. Each construct (sex, gender) 
draws on inherited systems of meaning and structures of expression to 
establish their intelligibility to themselves and each other. They inform 
each other. Each will have a personal meaning for each subject, whose 
pure epistemology we can never recover from the tangle of complicities 
that make us all. Thus trans does not need to remain in binary relation to 
cis. Following on from this, if we (the cisgender establishment) can accept 
trans personhood as within the realm of the human, we do not need to 
account for it. We can accept it, and learn from it.
I say this without wanting to reproduce the objectifying and instru-
mentalizing of trans personhood that has been committed by queer the-
ory (see Prosser, 1998; Pyne, 2016). Transgender people are not theories 
or ideas, and their lives are often made much more difficult by the posi-
tions of otherness they are often forced to occupy (Grant et al., 2011). 
Transgender people are also not a coherent or homogenous group. There 
are as many different possibilities for transgender personhood as there are 
transgender people, even before intersectionality is added to the account. 
In theory, this is true for cisgender people too, if we can get beyond the 
strictures of the binary that wants to structure both our gender identities 
and our sexualities (Butler, 1999; Garber, 2005).
The theoretical conundrum that transgender personhood apparently 
presents to the queer and feminist theories that both enabled and used 
versions of transgender emergence is one example of complicity at work: 
sex versus gender is a binary construct, even as the psychic investments in 
asserting the truth of sex over gender were crucial for the emergence of 
transgender human being.
The structuring principle available for transgender emergence, which 
sets the terms for transgender human being to become intelligible, is 
another example of complicity. This latter set of terms, and the options 
they enabled for speaking transgender human being, is implicated in the 
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psy technologies, as well as in sexology, endocrinology and surgery. Below, 
I will address these complicities in more detail.
First, there is a political point to be made. Sadly, the invocation of 
feminism in the context of a discussion about transgender personhood 
requires contextualization, given the deployment of putatively feminist 
arguments that are transphobic (starting, perhaps, with Raymond, 1979). 
Some people who call themselves feminist, relying on essentialized defini-
tions of femaleness, would deny transgender people, especially trans 
women, the right to assume their correct gender. Building on a second 
wave logic which looked to reclaim the debased meaning of femaleness 
that was a result of the marriage of biology and gendered destiny, for 
these thinkers, being born and raised in a body with a vagina is the bot-
tom line—and only legitimate—experience of femaleness. This reductive 
approach to the complex relations between the social rules for gender, 
embodiment, and victimhood or suffering overlooks the true gift of femi-
nism: that none of us need be bound by a constructed relationship 
between gender and sex which strives to limit who we can be or how we 
can feel about our bodies.
Perry (2018) argues that the limitations of modern feminism are a 
result of the political processes of the twentieth century. These processes 
brought feminism into the mainstream, and thereby also into liberalism, 
whose politics of representation limited what was possible. Neoliberalism’s 
fracturing of the social contract worked together with liberal commit-
ments to affirmative action, so that as the twentieth century proceeded, 
“Rather than sharing prosperity, prosperity was made more competitive, 
exclusive, and slightly more diverse” (Perry, 2018, p. 91). The result, she 
says, is that in asking for a seat at the table, feminism had to align with 
the definitions of personhood that were available. The underlying neces-
sary existence of the nonperson, discussed in the previous chapter, what 
Perry (2018, p. 93) calls the “monstrosity,” was overlooked by these femi-
nist strategies of inclusion. This was “a product of how we arrived at the 
institutional spaces where we have the conversation” (Perry, 2018, p. 93). 
In other words, participation requires complicity.
An investment in suffering—a way to find profit in one’s sense of 
self—as the authorizing maneuver for access to both political and moral 
identity is one result of the neoliberal processes Perry (2018) tracks and 
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discusses (see also brown 2020). This will be explored in more detail in 
the following two chapters, but it is worth noting here, as we explore why 
some people who know what gendered oppression is might seek to 
oppress other genders in turn.
Perry (2018) is theorizing how only certain categories of human being 
have been accommodated by mainstream feminism, that is, feminism 
that has achieved institutional recognition. Her larger project is to show 
how the legal category of human being in the West was historically con-
stituted from practices which needed nonpersons as the constitutive 
other. To expand the terms of Perry’s (2018) theory, trans and nonbinary 
persons are the unacknowledged nonpeople underpinning binary gen-
der’s rules for human being. “To embrace the monstrosity is to wrestle 
with the world from the status of the outside” (Perry, 2018, p. 97), as 
feminists of color did by “centering the position of the woman who 
existed outside personhood and theorizing from there” (ibid., p. 91). If 
there is one lesson to be learned from this, surely it is that our feminist 
work begins and ends with all those placed outside of the world. 
Apartheid, as a specific instantiation of white supremacy, imposed a racial 
hierarchy on people of color as a way to divide and conquer. This encour-
aged collaboration with the system. People who call themselves feminists 
but refuse transgender people’s human being seem to me to be collaborat-
ing with the patriarchy that oppresses them, when they want to construct 
a hierarchy of access based on arguments about who has the right kind of 
bodies to deserve activist attention. There is more than enough patriar-
chally induced suffering to go round. Transgender justice is not a threat 
to cis women. It is the path to our liberation.
And, as we have started to see, just like trans-excluding “feminists,” 
transgender being has typically been expressed through language that ties 
gender to the body. There has historically been an institutional invest-
ment in essentializing transgender experiences, reinscribing a narrative of 
wrong-body-based subjectivity that renders the trans person in need of 
binary-based medical transition to correct the biological error.
The coercive practices of the medical and psy disciplines that have con-
structed transgender people so as to interact with them have been well- 
documented. In the early days of transsexual emergence in the 1950s, 
heteronormative and binary gendered performances were mandatory for 
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those transgender people who needed to seek access to transition-related 
interventions (Bettcher, 2014; Califa, 1997; Denny, 2004; Pyne, 2016; 
Stryker, 2008; Tosh, 2016). Namaste (2000) has detailed how this his-
tory skews access to any evidence-based theories of trans “authenticity”: 
Studies that inform diagnostic categories and best practices have tradi-
tionally been formulated from work done in gender clinics where trans 
people have been coerced into performing heteronormative binary gen-
der before being allowed access to treatment.
This situation helped to create a cisnormatively-mediated discourse 
through which transgender subjectivity continues to be viewed (O’Shea, 
2020; Spade, 2003). Since the 1990s, the experiences, languages and sub-
jectivities of transgender, nonbinary and other differently gendered peo-
ple have vastly expanded (Valentine, 2007). But there largely remains a 
nonnegotiable focus on the body that is an important element of being 
transgender (Bettcher, 2014; Langer, 2019; 2013; Pyne, 2016; 
Saketopoulou, 2014; Serano, 2016). Trans people continue to have to 
assert their knowledge that they exist in their own bodies.
It would be arrogant and dismissive of much carefully argued and 
important work to suggest that such narratives, of being in the wrong 
body, or of transgender being emerging from uncontestable body-based 
feelings and knowledge, were merely manipulation, at best, or false con-
sciousness, at worst. Many transgender writers invoke this discourse to 
authorize themselves. Autobiographical writing (see, e.g., Califa, 1997; 
Feinberg, 1993; Prosser, 1998; Serano, 2016) and qualitative studies of 
the last two decades (see Levitt & Ippolito, 2014) comprehensively docu-
ment experiences of initial estrangement from self because of a core, but 
initially unexpressable, sense of one’s gender identity, which can be exac-
erbated by negative responses to one’s gender presentation. Wilkinson 
(2015) describes a process where personal, body-based truth intersects 
with social expectation and public treatment to create a necessary gender 
transition process. Thinking complicitously allows us to believe transgen-
der speakers: they may be using what tools are available to them, socially 
and intrapsychically. But since we all do this, as a function of being 
human, and since we no longer assume binary thinking is necessary, we 
require no evidence from transgender people regarding the legitimacy of 
their existence, either in theory or in biology.
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This helps resolve the tension between queer theory and autobiograph-
ical felt truth. Kaufmann (qtd. in Pyne, 2016, p. 55) recounts,
Jessie, a self-identified male-to-female transsexual, was dismayed after read-
ing a completed study in which I examined the narrative construction of 
her gender. Wiping tears from her eyes, she said, “You have taken away the 
identity I have worked all my life to build”… [M]y desire was to decon-
struct gender, not erase her identity… How did I make such a mess?
Or, as Buckner (2016, p.76) shows, “While a social constructionist 
framework is empowering, it can also foster contempt, resentment, and 
critique of transgender embodiments that rely on essentialist, binary 
models of gender expression.” One of Buckner’s therapist respon-
dents said,
Sometimes I get a little judgy when I hear people just, trans people, just stuck 
in that binary, you know? “I have to be a woman”, you know? “I was born a 
man but I’ve always felt like a woman and I’ve got to be a woman and I’m 
going to be a woman”… and sometimes I get judgy and I think, why can’t you 
just be you? … Like why couldn’t this person just be genderqueer? Or gender- 
fluid? Or gender-something? Why did they have to be a woman?” (Buckner, 
2016, p. 76)
This clearly denies the transgender client’s experience of herself, and 
refuses her right and ability to articulate her gender and her body’s rela-
tionship to it. And at the same time, there is a problematic history to the 
use of biology in the psychological understanding and treatment of trans 
people, where transgender identity has to come from a biological source.
Seeking to understand the etiology of transgender identity, in order to 
account for it, in a move which assumes it needs to be accounted for (to 
be legitimized? To be normalized? To be prevented?), there has been work 
on in-utero hormone exposure or prenatal gender developmental path-
ways which might have caused a transgender identity (e.g., the plenary 
lecture given at the WPATH conference by Dr. Karissa Sanbonmatsu, on 
November 7, 2020, titled, “Understanding gender identity: From DNA 
to the brain”; Zhou et al., 2007; Erickson-Schroth, 2013). Here, we once 
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more see science believing it has answers to questions that are more cor-
rectly, more complexly, more complicitously, cultural—which is to say, 
both and always already constructed and biological, since our human 
experience of the biological must always be mediated, especially in a 
realm as fundamentally made of human being as gender. Thinking com-
plicitously allows it all to be true: that many transgender people have a 
body-based truth which no-one, especially not an institutional gate-
keeper, has the right to contest; and that transgender people, like all other 
people, can only put narrative constructions together from the symbolic 
histories available even as many of them also alter the available symbolic 
language as they use it, creating something new that is also real and legiti-
mate (in a process akin to postcolonial processes of hybridity, and maybe 
even mimicry, theorized by Bhabha, 1994; see Distiller, 2012 for a cul-
tural example of these ideas in practice).
And it is clear that transgender and nonbinary people have had to fight 
for symbolic space within the languages and the institutions that make us 
human. Writing about searching for space and speech as a differently 
gendered human within the confines of a scientifically-structured disci-
pline (speech pathology), Azul (2018, p. 121) asks,
How to emerge from a condition of not-being-able-to-speak-and-not- 
being- heard-with-what-one-has-to-say if the nature of one’s voice-lessness 
cannot be explored with the methods of knowledge production in which 
one has been trained and if the promises of one’s coming to voice cannot 
be accommodated within the constraints of the worldview according to 
which one has been raised?
Azul (2018, p.  122) critiques speech pathology definitions because 
they locate the problem in the speaker:
This is a form of voice-lessness… that does not appear in speech-language 
pathology dictionaries and text-books because its cause cannot be attrib-
uted to a malfunction of the speaker’s psyche or their vocal folds… In fact, 
it appears unrelated to the voice producer as they are commonly under-
stood, namely, as an entity from which that which we call “voice” emerges. 
Rather, this condition of voice-lessness seems to be imposed by the phonees, 
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those who/which are exposed to vocal productions that have originated 
from elsewhere. Such phonee-imposed voice-lessness is characterized by 
the phonees’ inability or refusal to acknowledge the presence and relevance 
of an utterance, by the phonees’ lack of capacity or willingness to make 
sense of vibrations that have reached their senses.
Azul’s (2018) notion of vocal productions that have originated from 
elsewhere which partially constitute the experience of nonbinary person-
hood through their refusal to allow it, to hear it speak its truth, is a per-
fect example of the foldedness, the outside-insideness of the subject of 
complicity (see Chap. 1). It also speaks to systems of oppression which 
plague the subject seeking to make language for itself or to assert its exis-
tence. The binary structures at work here cannot accommodate a nonbi-
nary human speaking. And yet that human exists, and is speaking.
Azul (2018, p. 122) concludes, “research approaches are needed that 
seek to attend to the complexities of the participants’ sociocultural posi-
tionings and to their preferences regarding how they wish to be perceived 
and addressed by others in encounters.” The assertion here, in keeping 
with respecting the individual truth of gender’s relation to the body, is 
that the gender outlaw (Bornstein, 1995; McKenzie, 2010) be allowed to 
vocalize/authorize/author themself, using and in so doing altering the 
available discourse. Azul (2018) offers an account of their own journey. 
They recount the damaging long-term psychic consequences of working 
in a scientific field which operated by categorizing bodies and their voices 
according to binary gender norms as part of its recognition of healthy 
human being. One of their points is the limitations of binary thinking. 
Another is that scientific or standard academic language cannot ade-
quately account for this experience, this kind of knowledge. The call for 
a new model is clear.
In a special issue of the Journal of Gay & Lesbian Psychotherapy, Denny 
(2004) worried about some of the negative consequences of rejecting the 
binary gender model intrinsic to the old medical model of transsexuality. 
He wondered if protection against discrimination and hate crimes would 
be extended to a nonspecific, “ambiguous or alternating” group, and 
about additional possible legal losses that would follow from depatholo-
gizing transgender identity (Denny, 2004, p. 32). In our identity-focused, 
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liberal rights-based system, you have to be part of a recognizable group in 
order to be entitled to protections. There is also the risk that medical 
treatment will not be authorized if someone is not conceptualized as sick 
(Ettner, 2007).
Indeed, “[M]ost of the successful legal claims for trans equality have 
come through strategic use of the medical model of transsexuality” 
(Spade, 2003, p. 30; Spade demonstrates the disciplinary and formative 
relationship between medical systems, the law and gender intelligibility). 
Legal protections require not only assertions of group identity, but an 
alliance with the psy and medical disciplines that render transgender 
being intelligible and acceptable within the terms of a cisnormative 
symbolic.
In the psy disciplines, transgender personhood is indicated currently 
by the diagnosis of gender dysphoria. This controversial diagnosis has a 
telling history. It emerged from the perversions, later paraphilias and the 
struggle to remove homosexuality from the DSM (Bryant, 2006; Butler, 
2004; De Bloch & Adriaens, 2013; Drescher, 2015a; Drescher, 2015b; 
Lev, 2006; Wiggins, 2020). In other words, gender dysphoria has evolved 
through the long, convoluted history of the medical and psychological 
establishments’ attempts to classify and pathologize gender and sexual 
deviations from the binary hetero norm. In the past few decades, activism 
from transgender and nonbinary people, clinicians and clients (Markman, 
2011; Spade, 2003), has resulted in some changes for the better. In 2022, 
the World Health Organization’s manual, the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD) 11, will do away with its previous diagnosis of “trans-
sexualism” and instead have “gender incongruence,” which is a sexual 
health and not a mental health diagnosis (Atienza-Macías, 2020). This is 
progress. However, the requirement for transgender and other gender 
diverse people to have a diagnosis before being legible to the system and 
able to access interventions if they are needed remains problematic.
In line with an increasing call to have cisgender people step away from 
the policing of trans lives, Wiggins (2020) suggests that the medicaliza-
tion of transgender distress be turned on the largely, and historically, cis-
gender clinicians who wield it. The investment in categorizing trans 
suffering (as gender dysphoria) as the new diagnostic replacement for the 
older frame of perversion is itself a perversion: a sign of cis disavowal of 
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the anxiety caused by an encounter with gender difference. Because “the 
more a gender is assumed to be static, ciscentric, and knowable, as is 
encouraged in most Western medical, colonial contexts, the more fore-
boding would be a confrontation with its variance” (Wiggins, 2020, 
p. 66). In truth, the “traumatizing reality” is that “gender is uncertain, its 
affects and genealogies are unclear” (ibid, p. 69). This is a beautiful exten-
sion of the old feminist investigations into sexual difference as a consti-
tuting problem for patriarchy’s symbolic work. It is also a logical extension 
of the queer deconstruction of the body as the underlying source of gen-
der, where gender becomes sex. Gender difference, instead of sexual dif-
ference, becomes the destabilizing force that binary thinking needs to 
control. If we allow transgender experience into the realm of the human, 
the body is always real, even as it is also malleable and constructed. Sex is 
available to be a felt truth and a construct reliant on gender at the same 
time, because this is what human being is. This is complicity in action. 
Or, as Buckner (2016, p.53) puts it, the “stark divide” between transgen-
der narratives of essential biological truth and queer theories of gender as 
socially constructed and reified through doing, “implodes in practical 
application.”
Wiggins (2020, p. 69) suggests that the psy disciplines’ manifestation 
of perversion is the fetished object of the DSM, the diagnostic manual 
whose evolution of definition for transgender being controls access to 
medical interventions and also grants cultural meaning to transgender 
being. Pace Freud, Wiggins argues,
A perverse defense uses the fetish object to purchase certainty and control 
in the face of variability and lack. And although this object may allow for 
the fantasy of knowing, it does so at the expense of possibility and of a 
receptiveness to difference.
This is a turning back on the psychological establishment of the frame 
used to understand, assess and approach transgender people. Wiggins 
(2020) suggests that perversion can be used as a structure of thought, 
freed from Freud’s Oedipal, biology-based and culturally specific mean-
ings. By this argument, the clinical requirement of transgender distress is 
the perverse fetish at the heart of Western and psychological culture.
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This is not to deny the burden borne by transgender communities, and 
especially by poor trans women of color: “That we live and die unliveable 
lives is not an academic abstraction but the brute reality of an often trans- 
phobic contemporary society” (O’Shea, 2020, p. 2). But it is to challenge 
the fact of transgender life as the source of the suffering, and to place it 
instead on transphobia. Such a move, taken to its full potential, would 
obviate the need for a diagnosis for transgender experience. If transgen-
der humanity were accepted as such, without othering from a cisgender 
norm, the rigidity of binary gender and the connections to sex under-
neath, it would be broken once and for all. Sex could be gender without 
bodies being rendered irrelevant. A new culture would be possible. This 
is not an attempt to symbolically use the fact of transgender personhood 
to argue for a queering of the gender binary. It is an attempt to take seri-
ously the lived realities of transgender people, to accept that embodied 
subjectivity is a right belonging to all humans regardless of the source, 
since embodied subjectivity is the complicit heart of our complicit being 
(and the key to therapy, as explored in Chap. 6). It is to argue that trans 
exclusion from the realm of the healthily human is a result of binary gen-
der rules.
So what should cisgender clinicians do? The gender affirmative model 
(Hidalgo et al., 2013; Keo-Meier & Ehrensaft, 2018) has developed in 
response to the medicalization and pathologization of transgender peo-
ple. It marked what Pyne (2014, p. 1) calls “a paradigm shift: from disor-
der to diversity, from treatment to affirmation, from pathology to pride, 
from cure to community.” As Denny (2004, p. 34) says,
There is a world of difference when both the therapist and the patient 
believe the patient to be mentally ill and in crisis, and when both the thera-
pist and the client believe the client to be healthy and self-actualized and 
contemplating a life-altering decision [such as transition].
In addition, the purpose of therapy is no longer assumed to be to con-
sider transition, or only one form of transition. The gender affirmative 
approach normalizes gender fluidity as an aspect of human diversity, and 
places any pathology on the culture’s response to the trans person. It 
defines gender as being the result of a complex interweaving between 
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biology and socialization, and one that has a culturally specific compo-
nent as well (Hidalgo et al., 2013).
As Lev (2004, p. 4) puts it, “clinicians need to ask what it means to be 
a healthy, functioning gender-variant person within an immutable, dual- 
gendered world.” It means, in part, owning the almost inevitable misat-
tunement that will follow, as cisgender clinicians have to explore their 
own formation within symbolic systems that did not consider trans 
humanity as a norm, or at all. It means knowing that biology is not des-
tiny and gender is culture, and that the person you are sitting with may 
have an embodied, unarguably physical experience, empirical and not 
discursive, which needs to be believed. We have to hold that gender is a 
construct, a highly invested, artificial projection onto, or use of, the dif-
ference that exists in kinds of bodies on the human spectrum. Certainly, 
the fiction that gender, and the sex on which it is supposedly based, can 
only be an either/or is not even scientifically true. And in the structures 
of the world, which enable human being, there are many transgender 
people who experience their gendered selves as unarguably embodied, 
sometimes “across” binary gender. It really does not matter why, unless 
we need to find reasons to underwrite transgender humanity instead of 
just accepting it.
A theory of complicity allows for all the both-ands at play here. Gender 
identity and gender experience are highly personal and also totally medi-
ated, including through medical and psychological discourses that seek 
transgender causality in the body. Theories of core gender are located 
within scientific and clinical models that legitimate transgender person-
hood through biological arguments. Deconstructive theories want to free 
gender from biology, in the first place for the emancipation of people 
born with vaginas and usually also uteruses in a culture that has always 
wanted to control and delimit them accordingly.
 Heterosexual Consent
The question of whether women can truly consent to sex with men within 
a patriarchal world order is not a new one in feminist theory (Brownmiller, 
2007; MacKinnon, 1989; Rich, 1980). In this section, I want to revisit 
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the question of how the binary positions made possible by heteronorma-
tive heterosexuality continue to structure subjectivities within, and shape 
the institution of, heterosexual intimacy. Thinking complicitously in this 
situation complicates binary notions of victimhood, while allowing us to 
continue to insist on structural oppression and the harm it causes.
Since we all breathe in the smog of socialization (Tatum, 1997), people 
gendered female are formed in specific ways, to greater or lesser degrees and 
by resistance as well as acceptance, by the rules connecting bodies, genders 
and sexualities. Active female desire, independent female agency and asser-
tive female speech (Distiller, 2008; Distiller, 2011) remain problematic for 
this culture and not uncomplicated for feminized people to access (Faludi, 
2006; Levy, 2006). This can be particularly acute in those moments where 
the rules of gender intersect with deeply individualized meanings and expe-
riences in the realm of sexuality. If, as Mitchell (1982, p. 2) asserts in her 
introduction to Lacan’s Feminine Sexuality, “a person is formed through 
their sexuality,” then AFAB subjectivity cannot help but be fundamentally 
implicated in the misogyny of heteronormative heterosexuality.
We inhabit a rape culture (Brownmiller, 2007; Gavey, 2019; Gay, 2018; 
Gqola, 2015; Solnit, 2014), and all women and feminized people have to 
survive this. Rape culture says that girls and women exist in order to be 
heterosexual sexual objects, and that heterosexual men are entitled to act 
on their desire for these objects when and as they like. It is a norm of con-
duct (Young & Hegarty, 2019). Some AFAB and other females learn ways 
to find some profit in it, to get by or make the best of it. Some inevitably 
collude (see Faludi, 2006; Levy, 2006). 
In The tragedy of heterosexuality, Ward (2020, p. 151) explores the impli-
cations for heterosexuality of the research findings, some of which are dis-
cussed below, of the fact that,
[U]nwanted sex inside heterosexual relationships is so common and nor-
malized that it is a core part of the scaffolding of rape culture; there’s a thin 
line between unwanted sex (the kind that many women have with hus-
bands and boyfriends all the time) and sexual assault.
Sexual violence has, as far as we know in this culture, always been a com-
mon experience of AFAB sexuality, and from there, all female sexuality. 
Ward (2020, p. 27) writes about what she calls the “misogyny paradox”: 
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that men’s heterosexual desire for women, the apparent fact that boys and 
men must love, need and want women, takes shape in a straight culture 
that also encourages them to hate, demean, hurt and control women (see 
Gilmore, 2001).
Consent was in the news a lot when, in 2017, the MeToo movement 
achieved international prominence after having been in circulation since 
2006 in the work of African American feminist Tarana Burke (see Mendes 
et  al., 2018; Rodino-Colocino, 2018). The recent public discussions 
about sexual harassment in the workplace, and sexual assault more 
broadly, mark an important cultural moment—yes, it happens! It hap-
pens a lot! No, women don’t like it!—even as the predictable backlash 
kicked in almost as soon as the conversation began—not all men! But 
some women abuse their sexual power! (see Peleg-Koriat & Klar- 
Chalamish, 2020). The popular cultural conversation falters in its lack of 
focus on structural issues and its emphasis on individual intent. In a simi-
lar way to the good white/bad white binary that DiAngelo (2018) points 
out prevents any real discussion of the structural workings of white 
supremacy, the assumption is that only bad men commit only egregious 
acts of sexual harassment and violation. The focus is on individual inten-
tion rather than the culture that authorizes the treatment of females as 
objects for heteronormative male gratification. This greatly reduces the 
change that can come out of a mainstream conversation in American 
society about what it is like to navigate the public realm in a female or 
feminized body (see Rodino-Colocino, 2018). But the workings of rape 
culture do not stay only in the public realm, and its consequences are not 
only patently, violently egregious. In ways specific to their experiences 
and expectations of sexuality and sexual intimacy, heterosexual women 
often internalize the limiting of their agency that is part and parcel of 
their cultural objectification.
Ward’s (2020) book dedication is, “For straight women. May you find 
a way to have your sexual needs met without suffering so much.” She 
points out, by exploring straight culture, that the apparent benefits and 
promises of heterosexuality in a heteronormative world—that it is better 
to be straight, and it will make you happier than being a marginalized 
queer—is not at all true, especially once intersectionality is considered. 
“Perhaps most urgently,” she (Ward, 2020, p. 3) writes,
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[A]n important indicator of the relatively negligible value of heterosexual-
ity for many women is the fact that their sexual relationships with men 
have been maintained by force, both through cultural propaganda…. and 
more directly through sexual assault, incest, compulsory marriage, eco-
nomic dependence, control of children, and domestic violence.
These forces are a direct result of the cultural objectification of women 
which relies on a model of gender as binary, complementary and hierar-
chical. This symbolic economy underlies systems, institutions and struc-
tures which oppress females and feminized people. Ward (2020) shows 
that in its current form, heterosexuality is misogynistic and coercive of 
straight women, that heterosexuality is, in fact, “a patriarchal institution” 
(Ward, 2020, p. 16; see Butler, 1999; Katz, 2007; Rich, 1980). Binary 
logic is how it works. Documenting in detail the ways that many straight 
men seem to disrespect and dislike women, and that many women settle 
for what straight men do, Ward (2020, p. 16) comments,
Often propelled by the essentialist and heteronormative logic that male 
and female “energies” are incomplete without each other or that “opposites 
attract”…, straight culture seems to rely on blind acceptance that women 
and men do not need to hold the other gender in high esteem as much as 
they need to need each other and learn how to compromise and suppress 
their disappointment in the service of this need.
The consequences are material (women still do much more unpaid 
domestic labor and childcare work as well as holding down paid jobs; 
women still get paid less than men for the same work in America, with 
black women and women of color faring worse than white women, 
Faludi, 2006; Lockman, 2019); emotional (the sadness, disappointment, 
exhaustion, frustration, hopelessness and, for men, anger, insecurity and 
violence that come from thwarted entitlement, Ward, 2020) and, of 
course, sexual.
Thomas et al. (2017) track how straight women negotiate interperson-
ally and psychologically the “unwanted sex” that is an ordinary part of 
their sexual relationships and experiences. Pretending to consent becomes 
one way to manage sexual encounters. As this suggests, in twenty-first 
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century consent studies, a binary view of consent is problematized: want-
ing is not the same as consenting; someone can be ambivalent and social 
scripts can conflict with bodily desires (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007). 
Straight women can and do consent without desire, disturbingly often 
(Thomas et al., 2017; Ward, 2020). “Unidimensional, dichotomous con-
ceptualizations of wantedness” (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007, p. 72) 
do not capture the complexities of intrapersonal and interpersonal het-
erosexual dynamics (for an example of the difference that class makes, see 
Bay-Chen & Bruns, 2016).
This includes agreement about what constitutes sex and when sex is 
over, which is usually with male orgasm (see also Ward, 2020). Gattuso 
(2016) tells it like it is:
Alas, friend of mine, you have had an orgasm and are falling asleep. I have 
not had an orgasm and am not falling asleep, which means I am awake, 
which means I am now going to lecture you… Who are you?… You are 
anyman, everyman,… You’re a decent guy… No, you’re not a bad guy. The 
sex wasn’t particularly bad, either… It was normal sex. Normal, boring, 
vaguely dehumanizing hetero sex.
Which is precisely the point: The normalcy…
Here, supposedly, is what you consider sex: We make out, you play with 
my boobs… Penis goes in vagina, penis moves in and out of vagina… penis 
ejaculates.
You roll off of me, get up, take the condom off/pee/do whatever it is 
people with penises do in the bathroom immediately after they’ve come 
(world’s great, great mysteries), put your pants on, come back into bed, and 
fall asleep. Sex is now over. Sex is now over because you have decided it is 
over. You have decided sex is over because you are a man, and because this 
choreography that favors men with penises—man becomes erect, man 
penetrates woman, man ejaculates—is what we have been told sex is…
[Y]ou need to know—that the way you conceptualize pleasure and its 
choreography is not the way sex inevitably is.
The “implicit rules of heterosex” (Thomas et  al., 2017, p. 283) also 
include that her orgasm is a sign of his prowess, and must be clearly indi-
cated via specific behaviors. This, suggest the authors, continues to 
encourage women to fake orgasm, despite “postfeminist” notions of 
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“freedom and choice” which position women’s sexual agency as equal to 
men’s, as apolitical and as entirely personal (this is consistently under-
stood to be a consequence of neoliberal formations, as will be seen in the 
next chapter; see Chowdhury & Gibson, 2019; Gill & Orgad, 2018; see 
also McClelland, 2010). However, “power imbalances are concealed in 
this repackaged construction,” not least because, “female sexuality con-
tinues to be understood predominantly in relation to male sexuality and 
ultimately to heterosexual intercourse” (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 282).
Heterosexual women engage in a specific kind of sex work in the name 
of love; “In the context of gendered discourses of sexual performance that 
privilege male pleasure, faking orgasm can be seen as emotional labour” 
(Thomas et al., 2017, p. 283). At the same time, faking orgasm can also 
be read as a political act, to enable sex to end. Thus, “The simultaneous 
positioning of (fake) orgasms as emotional labour and as an agentic prac-
tice trouble the taken-for-granted understandings of female sexual desire, 
pleasure, and consent in heterosex” (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 283).
Consent as a construct has not been comprehensively or consistently 
defined (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007). And after conducting a litera-
ture review on the topic, Beres (2007, p. 94) comments, “Even within the 
literature on sexual consent there is no consensus on what it is, how it 
should be defined or how it is communicated.” She asks how we know if 
sexual violence has occurred if there is no clear definition of consent. “I 
know it when I see it” (Beres, 2007, p. 94) does not prove to be a reliable 
metric, she says, and argues that the meaning of consent is produced by 
social discourses and cannot be assumed to have “common sense mean-
ings … without critically reflecting on the cultural, historical, and social 
forces that produced those meanings” (Beres, 2007, p. 95). If we do oper-
ate on an assumption of shared meaning, she shows, gendered “miscom-
munications” happen, where a woman’s behavior can be argued to be 
assumed to be consensual when she did not intend to be read as agreeing 
to sex. This, of course, is an example of objectification in action, justified 
by social assumptions as well as gendered entitlements to desire, sexual 
pleasure and other people’s bodies. Accordingly, Beres (2007, p. 97) cri-
tiques studies that assume that consent is something given by women to 
men, which establishes a norm where,
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[M]en are viewed as always desiring sex, and always in pursuit of sex. 
Through this discourse, men’s consent is assumed, so to question it or 
develop an understanding of it would be superfluous. This places women 
in a position of responding to men’s initiations, setting limits, and deciding 
if they want to participate in the sexual activity.
Thus, the active/passive gendered binary, based on a notion of sexual-
ity as underwritten by biology, is still in play. Also evident is a false asser-
tion of power given to women, as the ones who generate desire in men, 
who are less sexual than men and might not always be up for it, and who 
therefore control access to men’s pleasure.
Beres (2007) also shows how different definitions enable consent to 
become “consent,” when someone putatively consents because resistance 
seems futile, because they were drunk or for other reasons that compli-
cate the definition of “unwanted sexual activity” under duress, which can 
still be read as consent under certain definitions (Beres, 2007, p.  96). 
Consent is not best conceptualized as something binary—where one per-
son initiates activity and the other person then gives or refuses consent. 
Instead, in real time, initiation of activities can shift between partners. 
And of course, as Beres (2007) also acknowledges, the act of speaking, 
and especially speaking about something as personally and socially com-
plicated as sex and sexual desire, is not freely done. It takes place within 
the context of gendered power dynamics. Even consensual sex can be 
“harmful” when “the consensual force is social, rather than interpersonal” 
(Beres, 2007, p. 99).
Social coercion, different from interpersonal coercion, cannot be dealt 
with legally, and is much harder to hold accountable for its harmful 
effects:
Consent becomes something broader than just a “yes” to sex with a specific 
person, in a particular place, at a particular time. It becomes a negotiation 
of social expectations, a way of expressing a social identity, or of fitting in 
to a certain social world. It creates spaces for sex that are neither consensual 
nor criminal or violent, although they may be socially problematic. (Beres, 
2007, p. 99)
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Within a binary view of consent, there is no way to articulate the fact, 
or address the consequences, of what happens when women consent to 
sex they do not want. Thomas et al. (2017, p. 285) invented the phrase 
“gak sex” to try and indicate the variable experiences of violation and 
shifting desire that occurred under the rubric of unwanted sex that was 
apparently, in the heteronormative terms provided above, consented to. 
They eventually chose the moniker “problem sex” as more academically 
sound. They noticed that their study participants did not themselves have 
language to account for “problem sex,” that is, sex that was undesired or 
bad or both, but which the women themselves did not identify as coerced, 
despite the use of hedging, disclaiming, minimizing, deflecting or quali-
fying when accounting for how they experienced their consenting (or not 
consenting). As a result, the authors tracked discursive attempts to make 
sense of the experiences in the face of a lack of language available to the 
women as they described their “unwanted sexual experiences,” including 
experiences that the authors state can be “clearly identified” as rape, but 
were never described as such by the participants (Thomas et al., 2017, 
p. 287; see also Rutherford, 2018a). More often, the authors note, the 
young women in their study trailed off into silence after using negative 
formulations (it was bad sex, it was not good): “participants articulated 
what sex was not, however they struggled to find the language to com-
municate what it was” (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 292).
Young women (as is typical of the sampling used in much academic 
psychology research, the participants in Thomas et al.’s, 2017 study were 
undergraduates) are not always able to name sexual coercion when they 
experienced it. They have internalized the message that they are obliged 
to have sex, that consenting to sex they do not want or even, in some 
cases, that is consistently painful, is a normal part of heterosexual rela-
tionship management (the authors found that even while participants 
recounted experiences of sex without desire with other women, it was 
exclusively in the heterosexual encounters that they found the discursive 
complexities noted here). They are also not in possession of vocabulary 
for experiences where they felt unable to say no, or chose not to say no 
despite not wanting to have sex, but did not feel overtly coerced, at least 
not by their partners. They may well have been coerced by the rules of 
heteronormative binary gender in the twenty-first century, mediated as it 
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is through thousands of years of pressure and more recently through neo-
liberal discourses of personal choice, postfeminism and entrepreneurial 
agency. It is worth noting, as we consider the WEIRD (white, educated, 
industrialized, rich, democratic) samples used in most of the consent 
studies, Young and Hegarty’s (2019) calling out of the imbrication of 
sexual harassment as simultaneously the object of study and part of the 
culture of academic social psychology. They advocate, using literary met-
aphors, critical theory, biography and oral history, for a feminist method-
ology that challenges a “masculinist fantasy of unreflexive science” (Young 
& Hegarty, 2019, p. 453), a project of the psychological humanities if 
ever there was one.
Also disturbing is the implicit picture of hordes of young men who 
either do not know or do not care that their partners, often long-term 
partners, are not enjoying their sexual encounters. This implication of the 
research done with college women helps illuminate Ward’s (2020) work 
on the current state of the “seduction industry,” which exploits twenty- 
first century, feminist-derived discourses about respect and emotional 
intimacy to teach men how to manipulate women into the sex that these 
men continue to feel entitled to. Once again, these thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors can be understood as authorized by a binary view of gender, 
which makes men active subjects to the female objects they depend upon, 
and whose humanity, as Ward (2020) shows, they (therefore?) cannot 
tolerate.
Despite some cultural myths about “misunderstandings” between het-
erosexual partners resulting in experiences of sexual violation by women, 
the truth is much more complex (Beres et al., 2014), and has everything 
to do with binary gendered rules, the subjectivities they create and 
inform, and the gendered behaviors upheld by social norms and systems. 
The implications are relevant for all men, not just those who deliberately 
abuse their power. Most men need to learn to listen more honestly, to ask, 
to establish consent and desire, and also obviously to stop assuming that 
social, psychic and economic power entitles them to other people’s bodies.
There are also implications for women, who may find it very, very dif-
ficult to speak up in the complex system of power, sexuality and gendered 
selfhood within which they are trying to make a living, to make a person-
hood. Let me be clear: Most cases of sexual violence are not ambiguous. 
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There are far too many “unacknowledged rape victims” (Peterson & 
Muehlenhard, 2007, p. 74) as a direct result of the lack of vocabulary 
about the interactions of social rules for gender performances, internal-
ized gender rules, consent, wanting and the complexities and shifting 
nature of desire. This is not to mention the unacknowledged rape survi-
vors who are simply disbelieved or ignored despite their clear statements 
of having been overpowered and violated with no ambivalence on their 
part or the part of their attackers. There is no onus on women to prevent 
their violation. In the grayer areas also, consent must be established, not 
assumed. And this is the point: there clearly are gray areas, because of the 
rules of binary gender and the kind of heteronormativity they inscribe.
So it is not the outright violence I am working so hard to establish 
ways to talk about here. It’s the everyday, systemic, complicitous, inter-
twined violence that is also part and parcel of normative binary gender. 
Since the MeToo movement made male abuse of power in the realm of 
sexuality more visible and easier to insist on, since the profound cultural 
disbelief women and girls and other feminized people have always had to 
survive has been somewhat challenged by the public speaking (finally!) of 
sheer weight of numbers, many more female or feminized people are 
starting to talk about what happens to them at the hands of the men in 
their lives.
One of the first feminists to insist on the wide-scale scope of the prob-
lem of gender and structural violence, in the terms of modern psychol-
ogy, was Herman, in Trauma and Recovery (Herman, 1997). She insisted 
that if war is the arena where men are traumatized, the family is the 
gendered site of female traumatization (and the traumatization of chil-
dren). Her book encompasses many sites of what was then, even more 
than now, socially sanctioned gendered abuse, in part because her work 
helped bring attention to how systemic gender violence works. In con-
structing this argument, Herman was arguing for refusing the construc-
tion of certain spheres of life as “private” and therefore unavailable to 
interrogation for the relations and operations of power. She also writes in 
detail, and with evidence, about the gendered forms trauma can take. In 
so doing, she explains the behavior of women traditionally cast as hysteri-
cal, and, more recently, as borderline. She details trauma symptomology 
long unrecognized; she interrogates ways of understanding—or, more 
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accurately, the ways Western societies have persisted in not understand-
ing—women’s experiences of violence and violation at the hands of those 
they trust.
Thus, anticipating consent studies, Herman (1997, p. 65) explained 
why, “Because of entrenched norms of male entitlement, many women 
are accustomed to accommodating their partners’ desires and subordinat-
ing their own, even in consensual sex.” And, not surprisingly,
Many acts that women experience as terrorizing violations may not be 
regarded as such, even by those closest to them. Survivors are thus placed 
in the situation where they must choose between expressing their own 
point of view and remaining in connection with others. Under these cir-
cumstances, many women may have difficulty even naming their experi-
ence. (Herman, 1997, p. 67)
I want to make space to bring into focus the working of our inevitable 
complicities: not that victims are to blame, but that the rules of gender 
which make speaking up in intimate ways about our desires so damn dif-
ficult might be confounding of notions of female agency and of the value 
of female desire in heteronormative heterosexuality, and certainly in the 
rape culture that exists in tandem with it. Some women are not asked. 
Some women say no and are ignored. Some women do not say no but do 
not consent. Some women endure really, really bad sexual experiences, 
where they are used as objects, disregarded, where their desire is not hon-
ored or even expected. These are all part of rape culture, they are all dam-
aging, and they are all unacceptable. They are not all sexual assault.
I know how easily this can be read as victim-blaming, as excusing men 
at best careless and at worst brutal, as missing entirely the point that not 
everyone has equal access to voice in systems of power. I hope the more 
subtle point emerges: We must find ways to resist that inhabit the com-
plicit intersection of the personal and the systemic, that seek to clear the 
internal air of the social smog that teaches us we have to comply. This is 
in addition to, not instead of, naming criminal behavior, holding men 
accountable and putting the shame of violation where it belongs, on the 
violator.
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We would be better off engaging in much more depth with rape cul-
ture as a structural formation within which binary heteronormative gen-
der takes its shape. We would also be well-served by avoiding simplifying 
what are gray areas that arise in moments of intimacy because of the 
internalized injunctions of normative gender. Really, opening gender up 
beyond the binary will help everyone with this problem.
As we have seen, Thomas et al. (2017) identify that the young women 
in their study all fake pleasure and/or orgasm in order to end unwanted 
sexual encounters. They found that this strategy was used both to end 
unsatisfying sex and to end sex that was either unwanted or was painful. 
They recount an instance when the interviewer engages with this choice 
with one of the participants:
[I]n another section of the interview with X, the interviewer prompted her 
to consider ending sex without faking orgasm:
X: For me, like I said, the end result was just, let’s get this over with and the 
fastest way I can get this over with is t- for him to think that I had an 
orgasm? So he’ll have one? And we can be done. Um::
I: Right. To play the devil’s advocate for a second, a fast way- a faster way 
would be to say, yeah, no, let’s:-
X: Yea:::h hhh. I guess so… . I do- I don’t know if I could just stop mid(hh)-
w(hh)ay thro(hh)ugh, I re(hh)ally do(hh)n’t.
I: Yeah
X: I think that would just be, almost too awkward? Like, at least if you 
can—if he can finish, then you can just get up and leave and kinda go do 
whatever you have to do, or: whatever, whereas… if ya did just sorta stop 
part way through and say, “you know what? This isn’t working, and I’m 
do::ne?”
I: Right
X: I think that’s gonna lead into a discussion that maybe necessarily I don’t 
wanna ha::ve::? Or:::. I don’t know, I guess I take the easy way out? If 
that—pardon the pun, but, um:.
I: ((laughing))
X: It, uh. Yeah, to just sorta—to help him finish? Means that I could just 
walk away.
As indicated by X’s response, the interviewer’s suggestion that she could 
end sex directly appears inconceivable. (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 294)
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What is going on with heterosexuality when a discussion about mutual 
desire and pleasure is too much trouble? How is this young woman expe-
riencing her embodiment, her intimate connections? Her selfhood? Her 
body becomes a tool she herself uses to maintain these gendered relations. 
The authors note the women’s assumptions that “heterosex must and will 
end with male orgasm… In this way, women’s ability to express the desire 
to end a sexual encounter outside of this prescribed ‘ending’ is effectively 
restrained both discursively as well as materially” (Thomas et al., 2017, 
p. 295).
Yes, this young woman is constrained, by a host of forces beyond her 
control, including a paucity of language for her to make different sense 
for herself of what is happening within and to her. Rutherford (2018b) 
offers a comprehensive critique of how the discourse of empowerment 
acts on young white women under neoliberalism to compel them to feel 
they can choose as individuals, while denying structural factors that may 
be constraining them or acting on their senses of self. And the young 
woman in Thomas et al.’s (2017) study is also exercising a choice, how-
ever limited. She has some agency, and she uses it complicitously. This is 
not a criticism. It is an acknowledgment of how we survive the systems 
that shape us within a culture where race, gender and other markers of 
difference from a mythical norm are used to keep us in our assigned places.
Here is an example of complicity in action:
Faking orgasm can be regarded as a form of “embodied hedging” as it 
avoids the consequences that may come from a direct refusal to sex all the 
while allowing the woman to determine when the sexual encounter ends. 
Thus, we argue that feigning sexual pleasure is both problematic and help-
ful at the same time. (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 296)
The authors note that faking orgasm when there is a risk of violence is 
a necessary use of a normative heterosexual script, designed to mollify the 
man while protecting oneself from further harm. Therefore, “we are call-
ing to puncture the established parameters of heterosex for a social recon-
ceptualization that acknowledges, names and confronts the problems 
women spoke of in our interviews” (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 296). These 
problems cohere around the missing discourses of pleasure for the women 
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in the study, and the apparent use of their sexual agency to make their 
male partners happy at the expense of their own physical and/or psycho-
logical wellbeing. The paucity of language for describing the nuances here 
is telling of the power dynamics at play in the system of binary gender, 
and the material realities they enable:
When wanted and consensual yet disappointing/unsatisfying, sex is talked 
about in the same manner as experiences of unwanted and/or coercive sex 
and sexual assault, unwanted experiences may be at risk of being passed off 
as simply not pleasurable. Within dominant constructions of sexual assault, 
which dichotomize sex as either consensual and wanted or nonconsensual 
and unwanted (rape), all other experiences that do not meet either defini-
tion may be dismissed as “just (bad) sex”. (Thomas et al., 2017, p. 296)
The authors conclude that the real solution is in moving beyond the 
“existing limiting and dichotomous conceptualizations of heterosex” 
(Thomas et al., 2017, 297). In other words: the binary.
Endorsing the terms of the consent studies addressed here, Ward 
(2020) details how one of the aspects of straight culture has always been 
men’s sense of entitlement to women’s bodies and to their emotional 
labor. She shows how binary-formulated heterosexuality repeatedly puts 
the onus on women to do the work of managing this dynamic. It also 
leaves men hurt and angry when it fails to deliver. Ward (2020, pp. 114–5) 
writes of,
[T]he seemingly inextricable place of sexual coercion and gender injustice 
within straight culture… the violence and disappointments of straight cul-
ture… (the bad and coercive sex, the normalized inequalities of daily life, 
straight men’s fragility and egomania, straight women’s growing disillu-
sionment with men’s fragility and egomania, the failed marriages, the copa-
renting that is really solo parenting…)
One thing remains clear: The toxic rules of binary gender need to 
change. As much as social and political progress has been made for some 
women, cultural gender norms continue to structure psyches and rela-
tionships in damaging ways.
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I have not spoken here about masculinities, but it is very much to the 
point that men are also limited and defined by, as much as they profit 
from, normative gender and the power relations it encodes. Beres (2007) 
points out that one example of a consequence of compulsory heterosexu-
ality is to make a man who would like to be sexually involved only with 
other men, have sex with women. Ward (2020) shows how dependent 
heterosexual men are on acceptance from particular kinds of women, 
who carry the projections of their masculine self-worth.
Ward (2020, p. 155) looks forward to what she calls “deep heterosexu-
ality,” which is, essentially heterosexuality without heteronormativity. It 
is a way for people to relate intimately without their identities being 
structured by the complementarity of binary gender norms which, as 
Ward (2020) shows, means that what she calls straight culture begins 
with the paradox that men desire women they cannot like or respect 
as equals.
 Transnational Lessons
The involvement of well-intentioned Western queers (as this formulation 
suggests, structurally in the position of well-intentioned whites discussed 
in Chap. 2) in matters of African sexual and gender rights can cause 
active harm (Epprecht, 2013; see also Hayes, 2001). For example, 
Epprecht (2013, p. 13) details the damage done by “homonationalism,” 
which “means taking excessive pride in the achievements of gay rights 
activism in the West and showing chauvinistic regard for the Western 
model of outness.” This overlooks that for some subjectivities, experi-
ences of individual teleological development are not culturally appropri-
ate or relevant. It also overlooks the complexities of social, cultural and 
legal strictures that many people outside of the West must navigate, as 
will be explored in more detail below. As a result, the use of Western 
LGBTQ processes and terminology for understanding African sexualities 
remains complicated, something “Africans and Africanists who do gender 
and sexuality research remain extremely reluctant to embrace… even 
when they make use of insights from the queer canon” (Epprecht, 2008, 
p. 14). At the same time, as Hawley (2001, p. 12) also acknowledges, “the 
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‘universalizing’ of gay terminology (condemned… as hegemonically 
Western) in fact can serve a local liberatory function.” International 
human rights discourses and instruments rely on Western models of per-
sonhood and of Western legal norms, and can be helpful to some subjects 
in non-Western contexts even as they also interfere in  local formations 
and overlook or inadvertently harm others. This, too, will be explored 
below. The construction, Western LGBTQ discourse helpful to Africa/
Western LGBTQ discourse harmful to Africa, is an inaccurate binary. I 
hope to illustrate that on an entangled transnational level, colonial his-
tory has created its own forms of complicity, in this case in the realms of 
gender and sexuality. It is worth noting here, and this will be returned to 
below, that gender and sexuality are connected in many African places in 
a way they are no longer in Western LGBTQ+ discourse. This, too, cre-
ates difficulties in using Western terms to articulate some African 
experiences.
There is another way that Western frames are not helpful to the issue 
of sexuality justice in Africa. In 2016, I attended the annual conference 
of the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists, the 
national umbrella body for my profession. One of the keynote speakers 
was talking about the psychological effects of homophobia on LGBTQ 
individuals, and to illustrate some of his points, he showed us a video he 
found on the internet of homophobia at work. In Nigeria. We saw a con-
cerned white male American journalist interviewing abject black men, 
who spoke about their homosexual identification and the oppression 
they suffered accordingly. African conservatism, ignorance and dictatorial 
violence were set off against the West’s enlightened, modern, accepting 
views. Because, you know, there is no homophobia in America, and 
Africa is by definition premodern. Epprecht (2013, p. 10) tracks some of 
the ways that unwitting [promotion of ] stereotypes of “‘Darkest Africa’—
homophobic, violent, irrational… fundamentalist” only increases back-
lash against Western interference, as does the narratives of “those who 
would have us believe that nothing in Africa happens unless inspired by 
the West.” When I challenged the speaker on his decision to pick a depic-
tion of brutal African suppression of same sex love in order to illustrate 
the psychological effects of homophobia on gay-identified people, he 
replied that he had merely surfed the internet for illustrations of 
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homophobia to give at his talk, and that that the choice of Nigeria was 
random. Considering this was a plenary on the effects of culture on 
oppression, I found this an extraordinary response, and one that under-
scored an American tendency to forget that Africa is a complex collage of 
multiple cultures with different histories and dynamics, and a relation of 
power to the global system. Nigerian men articulating Western identities 
for American cameras as they fight for their lives is not a straightforward 
proposition, and certainly not an appropriate illustration of American- 
derived theories of the psychological consequences of homophobia for 
Western subjects.
Like many other Africans, although inflected differently by the coun-
try’s ideological location on the continent due to South Africa’s in-theory 
legal protections, same-sex loving South Africans and South African peo-
ple who identify as genders other than the ones they were assigned at 
birth have to engage with the inheritances of colonialism as they live their 
nonnormative lives. As Desai (2001, p. 156) puts it,
The question at this point… is not whether or not indigenous alternative 
sexual practices have existed or continue to exist in Africa, but rather, how 
one understands their historical emergence, the conditions of (im)possibil-
ity for identity formations based on these practices and in particular the 
relationship of these identities to racial and national identities.
The notion of “(im)possibilities for identity formation” in neocolonial, 
postapartheid South Africa sums it up nicely. People are expressing them-
selves and their sexual and gender identifications using, variously, exclu-
sively or in combination, Western LGBTQ discourses and traditional 
and indigenous frames. They are using and changing what the West has 
brought. They are doing this in the face of African patriarchies that want 
to invoke versions of tradition to enforce heteronormativity, and that 
want to scapegoat African gender and sexual queers for the profit of 
national identification and politics. These constructs of authentic tradi-
tion, of modern nationhood and of heteronormativity are, of course, 
products of colonial history.
In order to untangle the complicities at work here, we have to see how 
people navigate developing personal understandings of the relationship 
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between sex and gender, sometimes within versions of traditional culture 
as they are currently lived in neocolonial forms, instantiating the condi-
tions and possibilities of late modernity, and dealing with postapartheid 
nationalism, which continues to be in ambivalent relation to the coun-
try’s inclusive and protective Constitution (Epprecht, 2013; Munro, 
2012; Sideris, 2005; Van Zyl, 2009). As Trengrove-Jones puts it in 2008, 
in response to yet another murder of women identified as lesbians, “To 
inhabit an ‘alternative sexuality’ in South Africa at the moment is to be a 
raw receptor for the clash of cultures currently underway” (p. 182).
So-called gay rights (so-called because the moniker “gay” is too narrow 
to accommodate all the identities and practices-without-Western-identi-
ties that are affected by this issue) is the place where postapartheid South 
Africa’s newness and nondiscrimination commitments symbolically 
emerge, and it is a high-profile place where a conversation about decolo-
nialism can be abused. It is one place where discourses of authenticity 
and purity become so dangerous and invested. Munro (2012, p. xiii) 
comments, “Homosexuality in Africa is bound up with a contradictory 
modernity that has been produced both within and against imperialism, 
and this is what makes the question of gay rights in Africa so politically 
fraught.” As a local informant reported in a recent Economist article on 
the struggle for women’s land rights in the context of postapartheid com-
promises with the traditional authorities used by both colonial and apart-
heid regimes, “If you want to resist change, it makes sense to pretend it 
undermines your culture” (“Trust deficit” , 2020, p. 74).
These issues arose with the passage of the 2006 Civil Union Act in 
South Africa, which granted marriage rights to those who were intelligi-
ble to the Westernized legal system. Those same-sex-loving South 
Africans, often not in the metropolitan areas or not empowered to speak 
up in opposition to community pressure, who were to some extent or 
another queer-acting or queer-identified, were even more marginalized: 
The ship of gay rights had sailed, and they were not on board. Additionally, 
this situation crystallized a binary where modernity and civil protections 
are set up in opposition to more traditional African or Islamic cultural 
formations, which are then cast as by definition benighted (see Bilchitz & 
Judge, 2008; Bonthuys, 2008). The debates generated by this Act, about 
gay rights and about the new legal protections afforded women and 
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sexual minorities in the country, were complex affairs of assertions of 
cultural authenticity, misogyny and homophobia, and neocolonial deco-
lonial articulations (Reid, 2008).
Discourses that come from the West, even though—or because—they 
provide scope for changes to the current cultural and political systems to 
better accommodate some Africans whose sexuality appears “modern” 
(i.e., not “traditional”), also are available, by virtue of their origins, as 
ammunition for certain African leaders who are looking for smokescreens 
and decoys. Some invoke a neocolonial version of tribal law, which has 
passed through Christianity and also through Western political corrup-
tion to emerge abusively heteronormative and patriarchal, all in the name 
of an imagined authentically precolonial Africanness. Zimbabwe’s Robert 
Mugabe, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh, Nigeria’s 
Goodluck Jonathan, to name some, have at various points over the past 
decade contended that homosexuality is unAfrican, a Western import, a 
colonial disease. Contradictorily, they sometimes invoke that other 
Western import, Christianity, to deny the authentic Africanness of homo-
sexual desire. Since the identity position “homosexual” was invented in 
the West, to some extent they are correct. Nevertheless, those same-sex- 
identified Africans who identify as LGBQ or T in Western terms are 
surely no less African for doing so. But even without these terms, same- 
sex sexuality has always been part of African cultures.
Same-sex-loving Africans have always existed, and in fact, same-sex- 
oriented sexuality was woven into the fabric of precolonial African societ-
ies across the continent (Epprecht, 2004; Epprecht, 2008). Before 
colonialism, there were ways for same-sex-loving Africans to live within 
their societies undisturbed. In part, this was because their practices were 
not necessarily an identification and did not threaten the social structure.
So, for example, in Southern Africa alone, there are several social forms 
that facilitated same-sex intimacy in terms that utilize, and exist along-
side, heteronormativity. These include the relationships among adoles-
cent girls in Basotho, Venda and Zulu societies studied in the 1970s 
sometimes as “mummy-baby” friendships which involved both kinship 
and sexual relations (Wieringa, 2005). These relationships were seen as 
healthy forms of emotional connection as well as good preparation for 
heterosexual marriage. Part of the acceptance of same-sex female erotic 
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interaction was, and remains, the idea that nonpenetrative sexual activity 
is not sex.
So-called mine marriages were a complex institution between men 
emerging from colonial and apartheid economic practices. Men would 
contract relationships with each other on highly gendered terms. The 
authentically homosexual emotional and sexual components of these 
relationships have been articulated, in opposition to the frame of purely 
situational homosexuality (By Zachie Achmat, Hugh McLean and Linda 
Ngcobo, and William Spurlin, e.g.; see Spurlin, 2010).
In addition, traditionally, marriage between women was not an uncom-
mon practice in Southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent, before 
the missionaries arrived. A woman could take the structural position of a 
man, either in her own right or in the name of a deceased male relative. 
What was important was that the female husband could afford to pay for 
her wife, and that they used a man to help them have children, thus ful-
filling their commitment as a couple to the social order (Morgan & 
Wieringa, 2005).
None of this is queer in the Western sense—none of it seeks to defy 
categories or to demand new cultural spaces for people to self-define. 
People engaged in these activities mostly did not intend to challenge the 
dominant terms or power structures. They did not, and do not, require a 
discourse of coming out, or self-discovery, or an oppositional placement 
to one’s family or community. At the same time, these practices allowed 
people to have the space to live alternate sexual lives, in practice if not in 
identification.
And this history feeds into African queernesses that have emerged post 
colonialism and the neoliberal order it birthed, which gives some Africans 
access to Western modes. In South Africa today, an increasingly vocal 
constituency are the lesbian sangomas, whose sexual decisions are made 
through the proxies of the male ancestors they represent. As powerful 
spiritual leaders, they have a place within African traditions from which 
to assert their own legitimacy. Nkunzi Nkabinde was perhaps the most 
well-known South African lesbian sangoma, who at the time of her/his 
death in 2018 appeared to be exploring a gender transition; they pub-
lished an autobiography (Nkabinde, 2009), as well as engaged in docu-
mentary work with others in their community.
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Their writing shows that same-sex-loving female sangomas do not all 
identify, as Nkabinde did, at least for a time, as lesbian. Some speak a 
language that sounds to Western ears transgender, some hold a dual and 
unconflicted identity as what we might call bisexual and some identify as 
female men (see also Letsike, 2011; Morgan & Wieringa, 2005). This is 
not to suggest that the process is easy. Many of them are survivors of 
sexual violence and discrimination prior to and during their sangoma 
training processes, and some continue to be secretively sexually involved 
with their wives because of the stigma associated with LGBT identities in 
many communities. The violence they face is both on account of gender 
and of sexuality, as sexual violence rates are hideously high in South 
Africa, with same-sex-loving women being a specific targeted group 
(Gqola, 2015; Muholi, 2011).
Epprecht (2008) has demonstrated the ways in which traditional 
African social structures were disturbed by colonial rulers, missionaries 
and early anthropologists, who brought their Western disdain of same- 
sex practices to the African colonies at around the time that homosexual 
practices were crystallizing into homosexual identities in European dis-
courses. As was typical of colonial processes of binary meaning-making, 
Western observers constructed a sense of their own superiority and right-
ness by relying on the putative barbarism of the cultures they encoun-
tered, and could thus be called upon to civilize. Among other things, this 
dynamic set up an imperative to silence on the part of Africans who were 
adjusting to the new order, which helped to create what Epprecht (2008, 
pp.  34–64) has succinctly designated an “Ethnography of African 
Straightness.”
In addition, Western colonizers brought with them to Africa their con-
struction of African sexuality as unbridled (Epprecht, 2008). This racist 
discourse relied also on a vicious misogyny, legitimized by Enlightenment 
science, as the case of Sara Baartman has made so clear (Crais & Scully, 
2009). In life and death, Baartman’s black female body was made to stand 
for all that was denied in nineteenth century Europe’s picture of itself: 
exotic, hypersexual, available for consumption (see Perry, 2018). And if 
Africans were hypersexual, it was because they were hyper heterosexual. 
This Western imperative—that blackness carry the West’s stigma about 
sexuality—intersected with another Western discourse of Otherness, to 
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enable homosexuality to be “given” to the Orient, as its particular form of 
effeminized, luxurious inferiority. Africanness was by definition hetero-
sexual, according to the West (Epprecht, 2008).
So, if homosexuality as a modern identity exists in Africa because of 
colonial history, so does homophobia (see Epprecht, 2004). And ironi-
cally, tragically, when those African patriarchs make use of homophobia 
to encode a version of the postcolonial African nation designed to funnel 
power to themselves, by constructing a logic for who can be in and who 
can be out, who can be controlled according to the old rules and who 
must be purged, they are profiting from a discourse that is as fundamen-
tally racist as it is heteronormative. As we have seen, the connection 
between racism and heteronormative homophobia has its own history in 
America, too (Carter, 2007; Ward, 2020).
In contemporary Western discourse, there is a difference between 
transgender people and sexual queers: gay, lesbian, bisexual, asexual, 
same-sex loving and other people whose sexuality is nonheteronormative. 
Transgender identity is about gender, not sexuality. But trans people and 
queer people are often considered together, since all of those categories in 
some way disrupt the constitutive relationships between binary gender, 
heteronormativity, cisnormativity and the assumptions about bodies and 
identities they enable as complementary. All this should be familiar by 
now. In a South African context, the relationship between genders and 
sexualities is harder to articulate through a Western frame. Colonization 
brought political and social oppression, Christianity and bourgeois val-
ues. It set up a version of tradition which has affected postcolonial 
national identity politics. These histories intersect with pre-existing local 
expressions and enactments of alternative sexualities and gender identi-
ties. The result, in the context of decolonial imperatives to reject Western 
epistemologies and allow for the emergence of local ones, is, in this arena, 
a set of “contradictory tensions that seem to suffuse issues of gender in 
relation to sexuality” in Africa (Camminga, 2019, p. 18).
In South Africa, binary gender positions are sometimes invoked in 
service of queerness, so that same-sex relationships are expressed through 
male and female roles and identities, in ways which confound Western 
identifications, allowing, for example, straight men to be in relationships 
with men who identify as taking the female position because of their 
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sexuality, but who are not trans (Reid, 2005). Some of these ladies might 
identify as trans, given the option, but many may not need these kinds of 
categories to be who they are within the terms available to them. 
Camminga (2019) explores the case of two people from Malawi who, 
from their own identifications, seem to be what Western classifications 
would call a heterosexual man and a transgender woman, but who were 
received as gay men for the purposes of drawing attention to their perse-
cution and for the purposes of acquiring asylum, in the case of the woman 
(see also Epprecht, 2013). This is in part because of the lack of official 
recognition of Western-type transgender identities to date in the South 
African asylum application process.
Camminga (2019) traces how transgender as an identity travelled in 
specific ways to and in southern Africa. They trace the advent of what 
they, following Stryker (2008), call transgender phenomena in South 
Africa as a specific site, given its history and given its postapartheid 
Constitution, which uniquely in Africa protects the rights of gender and 
sexual minorities, as well as refugees to the country. Part of their project 
explores the relationship between classifications of sex and gender, 
imported from the West, and state mechanisms which enable national 
belonging; as well as the journeys toward an imagined home that are 
implicit in many conceptualizations of transgender, as well as in being a 
refugee.
Camminga’s project demonstrates the ongoing conflation of transgen-
der presentations with homosexuality, as well as the complexities of 
assigning a Western-developed discourse and/or the identities developed 
therein, to other cultural contexts, particularly given colonial histories. 
They conclude that because of its postapartheid legal instruments, as well 
as the way that transgender as a category and an identity evolved in South 
Africa in complex relation to both local LGB and international dis-
courses, “South Africa represents… a space which suggests that one’s ori-
entation in terms of desire and the shape of one’s body might be supported 
without necessarily having to use a specific discourse” (Camminga, 2019, 
p. 111). Transgender as a label and an identity continues to be emergent 
in South Africa and may always be in both dialogue and dispute with 
Western categorization.
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And things continue to change. In 2020, a year after the publication of 
Camminga’s book, the Professional Association for Transgender Health 
South Africa (PATHSA) was formed, “an interdisciplinary health profes-
sional organization working to promote the health, wellbeing and self- 
actualization of trans and gender diverse people” (pathsa.org.za). 
PATHSA presented itself to the international association of multidisci-
plinary transgender health healthcare workers, WPATH, in November 
2020 at the online WPATH conference. It is the first South African orga-
nization of its kind, and joins Gender DynamiX, formed in 2005 (gen-
derdynamix.org.za), as one of the very few specifically gender-focused 
groups in the country. Anecdotally, one of the first struggles faced by this 
organization is engaging with homophobic discourses authorized by a 
version of Christianity and the understanding it brings to the way trans-
gender people are seen.
The Anglican Church has around 77 million members. Over 30 mil-
lion of these are African (Hoad, 2007). This is, of course, thanks to colo-
nialism. But if millions of Africans are now devout Christians of whatever 
denomination, including versions that blend Western modes with African 
ones, then Christianity surely is as African as honoring the ancestors. As 
Hoad (2007) details, at the third Lambeth Conference, held in 1888 
when Europe was still dominating Africa in colonial terms, the bishops 
passed two resolutions on polygyny. The one, which applied to men, 
decreed that even a polygynist who converted to Christianity could not 
be baptized until he accepted monogamy. The other decreed that his 
wives could be baptized “under conditions to be decided on locally” 
(Hoad, 2007, p. 50). Hoad argues that if, in 1888, “[cis]gender carried 
the weight of cultural difference” in the Anglican Church’s attempts to 
engage with its African constituents, then a century later, “homosexuality 
hands this task over to sexuality” (Hoad, 2007, p. 52). This is seen in his 
exploration of the complexities of Western class and sexual norms at work 
in twentieth-century Africa, at the World Conference of Anglican Bishops 
that took place in Lambeth in 1998.
In 1888, the bishops in Africa were all British missionaries. In 1998, 
the by-now international body of bishops had a more tolerant attitude to 
polygyny, and an unaccepting view of homosexual Africans. Noncelibate 
homosexual clergy and the officiating of same-sex unions, issues in part 
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forced by the emergence of gay rights as a constitutional principle in 
postapartheid South Africa, were issues on the Lambeth agenda for the 
first time. The African bishops, with the exception of some from South 
Africa, unanimously argued that homosexuality was unchristian and 
unAfrican, and threatened to break ties with their European colleagues 
over the matter. Hoad (2007, p. 56) comments:
Why do African bishops pledge allegiance to a literal interpretation of 
Scripture with the attendant… wholesale disavowal of the possibility of 
indigenous same-sex practices?
He goes on to suggest that attacks on homosexuality, because it is seen 
to be specifically Western, is one way to repudiate the construction and 
imbrication of African barbarity and sexual incontinence. African bish-
ops can assert their respectability in the face of centuries of racist stereo-
typing of Africans, and in the terms given them by the racist West, by 
being the best homophobes possible. The ironies are painful, and they 
multiply when we remember that the tolerance of homosexuality is often 
constructed by developed nations as a sign of advanced civilized values, 
in opposition to more “traditional”—read developmentally impaired or 
teleologically backward—cultures.
The realm of sexuality becomes a place where the moral high ground 
can intersect with deep historical wounding. “Homosexuality” comes to 
stand for a nexus of meanings that encode contested definitions of civility. 
It also comes to be a frame through which to understand nonnormative 
genders, including transgender identification. Not surprisingly, sexual 
morality affects everyone’s gender roles, and the version of the authenti-
cally African nation which seeks to purge its homosexuals tends to rely 
equally upon a version of heterosexual domesticity which needs women to 
stay in their proper domestic place, often revered as symbols of Mother 
Africa, the nurturer, the home-maker for the children. This version of 
bourgeois respectability is precisely the one that was used against tribalized 
Africans when the civilizing mission began (Epprecht, 2008). It is now 
being used by some Africans against African women and queers. The post-
colonial African nation is, (im)possibly, formed by modernity and autho-
rized by an invested notion of tradition. The nexus of this contradiction is 
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the figure of the African homosexual, sometimes also transgender, and his 
or her repressed shadow is the “traditional” same-sex-loving African.
Violent homophobia continues to be an urgent problem in South 
Africa. Combined with misogyny and HIV, its expressions can be lethal. 
Photographer and activist Zanele Muholi has created an incredible 
archive which speaks to the emergence of indigenously queer communi-
ties and all they continue to endure, despite one of the most progressive 
Constitutions in the world. Muholi’s own identity journey marks a fluid-
ity in queer/African/nonbinary process, always centered in their race, 
place and nationality (Muholi, 2011; Muholi, 2018). If this is not a les-
son in what binary identifications leave out, I don’t know what is.
We need to problematize the ease with which African homophobia is 
available to underwrite the work of a Western LGBTQ politics and polit-
ical identity. There is no modern/traditional binary in practice. What we 
are left with is the impossibility of a neat binary of us and them, of right 
and wrong, of good and bad. I do not mean by this to deny the effects of 
oppression, to suggest that the workings of power on the bodies of queers, 
of women, of Black people, is in any way ambiguous or excusable. Instead, 
I want to surface the complexities of doing something about it—the 
necessity of holding our locations in time and place, and of owning the 
messy and complicit histories that have made us all, in relation to 
each other.
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We have been exploring how identities develop within the matrices avail-
able to us as humans in a world formulated by Western culture, specifi-
cally the Enlightenment and colonialism. I have been arguing that the 
liberal subject of this history is gendered cis male and raced white, and is 
dependent on binary thinking to keep his self and the systems that build 
and run his world intact. A theory of human complicity seeks to chal-
lenge this modus operandi, and to suggest that in practice, human being 
is a much more complicated and enmeshed process. Binary-structured 
subjectivity is an invested fiction. Oppression and suffering are caused by 
the processes of othering that result from the version of human being this 
dominant culture has evolved to experience as natural. I have been sug-
gesting that to resist this process of othering is to think differently about 
what it means to be human. It is to see that we are dependent on each 
other to be ourselves. As such, we are made by and continue to make this 
world, and we can change it, but we have to move beyond the terms it 
wants to give us. Articulating this vision requires bringing knowledge 
developed in the humanities to the psy disciplines to complement some 
of the knowledge already in circulation in psychology, through attach-
ment theory, object relations psychoanalysis or interpersonal 
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neurobiology, for example. How these approaches relate to a complicit 
frame for therapeutic practice is taken up in the next chapter.
This chapter explores how neoliberalism, the late capitalist instantia-
tion of the systems we have been exploring, interacts with social media, a 
relatively new technology at this stage of the West’s game. It suggests 
some consequences for relational human being. The chapter comments 
on how by now, the logic of profit is woven into personal relationships in 
ways this late capitalist culture takes for granted, and the internet exploits.
I suggest that the atomization of experience and the ferocious pressure 
to perform a self for (emotional, social and economic) profit enabled by 
the direction social media has taken is a result of a specifically American 
understanding of what it means to be a person: liberally individualist, 
and invisibly gendered and raced. This is affecting young Americans in 
generationally specific ways, with specific consequences for how identity 
becomes available to the self; in short, for ways of being human today 
that pull away from complicitous knowing and toward an intensified, 
commodified individualism, with all the implications for human systems 
that we have been exploring. The current context, of neoliberal economic 
pressures and the cultural and psychological formations they create, 
together with the turn technology has taken in the last 20 years, creates a 
specific environment within which human relations and human being 
must form.
Although anxiety about the effects of technology on human systems is 
not new (Mokyr et al., 2015), there is arguably something unique about 
the turn that current uses of technology have taken. As my analysis will 
show, I am not optimistic about where things are going for young Western 
subjects. I will argue that the use of technology in the context of a neo-
liberal world order “has ushered in new organizing principles and new 
configurations of the self and human relationships” (Goodman, 2020, 
p. 333), as a lesson in how the systems I have been tracking are taking 
their most modern form. At the least, psychotherapists can benefit from 
interrogating these processes and from being aware of how the psy disci-




Neoliberalism fractures social formations into individualized units, and 
focuses on competition as a force that will bring out the best in individu-
als, formulated in the first place as market participants. We all become 
entrepreneurs, responsible for our own economic survival, not entitled to 
rely on the state or its systems for help. In Chap. 2, we reviewed the basic 
definition of neoliberalism as a system that is both political and eco-
nomic, and its emergence from a set of historical circumstances that went 
on to occlude themselves, as neoliberalism presents itself as the natural 
and obviously best way to do things (Rutherford, 2018). Indeed, one of 
the things neoliberalism does so well is to render all aspects of life depo-
liticized by normalizing a brutal economic status quo which replaces the 
state, and obviates its responsibilities to citizens by extending to us an 
illusion of choice. As Zuboff (2019) maps in detail, capitalism is not just 
an economic system. It creates social reality and culture. And neoliberal-
ism laid the groundwork for a new kind of capitalism, which uses the 
technology of the twenty-first century to form its subjects.
Within neoliberal logic,
[T]he market is construed as something that is natural to human beings. 
We tend to believe the mythology that markets are natural because we are 
now constituted as members of society according to market terms… 
Neoliberalism, as such, is competitive citizenship and consistently demands 
more competition in every area of our lives. We are on an endless hamster 
wheel. There is no steady ground. (Perry, 2018, p. 100)
For younger people especially, who have become subjects in the con-
text of neoliberal systems since around 1980, life can often be fraught 
with anxiety; indeed, they have been called “the most anxious generation 
in history,” an assessment linked to the impact of social media on their 
social-emotional development (Docu, 2018, p. 2; see APA, 2018). Schore 
(2012, p. 18) calls the levels of emotional distress in American youth, 
“this crisis at the core of our culture.” They have been told that empower-
ment is their birthright and their responsibility (Rutherford, 2018), and 
that hard work will deliver success. Failure becomes a reflection of 
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personal inadequacy, as structural limitations are rendered invisible 
(Sweet, 2018). Success and failure, because market terms are naturalized 
and reach deeply into aspects of life that used to be private, are both eco-
nomic and psychological, and the two are entwined, as I will argue below.
It is within this context that the psy disciplines—whence comes the 
popular concept of identity in the first place (Erikson, 1968)—have 
helped to create an intensified version of the individual subject who is 
responsible for their own happiness, and for whom self-improvement is 
the means to manage psychological distress. Distress is conceived of as a 
personal issue, as the neoliberal subject does not have access to structural 
causes to explain their suffering. In the popular imagination and in many 
of the manualized approaches, psychological interventions aim at behav-
ior changes and at helping clients find internal resources to achieve their 
goals, in workplace jargon which is a metric of psychic success. The focus 
on chemical causation for mental health symptoms helps clients achieve 
a sense of control over what is apparently not working correctly in their 
brains, without the requirement to investigate emotional processes, struc-
tural brutality or deeper pain or trauma (Davis, 2020). Such approaches 
help reinforce an enterprise culture where depth work is irrelevant 
(Sugarman, 2020).
Rose (1998, p. 153) details how enterprise culture emerged as a funda-
mental concept of neoliberal theorists, where,
[T]he well-being of both political and social existence is to be ensured not 
by centralized planning and bureaucracy, but through the “enterprising” 
activities and choices of autonomous entities—businesses, organizations, 
persons—each striving to maximize its own advantage by inventing and 
promoting new projects by means of individual and local calculations of 
strategies and tactics, costs and benefits.
The self that is successful in such a culture is able to “maximize its own 
human capital,… a self that calculates about itself and that acts upon 
itself in order to better itself ” (Rose, 1998, p. 154). This way of thinking, 
of course, works well with the thinking developed in the psy disciplines; 
Rose (1998) argues that technologies of psychology were formative for 
enterprise culture. Specifically, Sugarman (2020) critiques positive 
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psychology as a technique of commodification of happiness, and as a way 
of thinking that renders deep wellness irrelevant. Rose (1998) explores 
how social psychology helped produce individuality as a technology of 
control under the aegis of democratic knowing. He also focuses on how 
the scientific stance of the psy disciplines is productive, enabling “tech-
niques that will shape, channel, organize, and direct the personal capaci-
ties and selves of individuals under the aegis of a claim to objectivity, 
neutrality, and technical efficacy” (Rose, 1998, p.  155). Rutherford 
(2018), Sugarman (2020) and Melluish (2014) all hold the psy disci-
plines accountable for how they have perpetuated a model of the self- 
contained individual, responsible for their own choices, given how this 
plays into neoliberal ideologies. Gill and Orgad (2018) explore the arrival 
of the concept of resilience to the work of neoliberalism, part of what 
they term the psychological turn within neoliberalism. They trace how 
issues of character have become part of the discourses of neoliberalism via 
discourses and practices of psychology.
There is no doubt that psy approaches have helped to inform what 
Davies (2016) calls the Happiness Industry. Rose (1998, p. 157) links the 
imperative to happiness with the role of psychological experts in helping 
to create individuals tasked with their own improvement:
Contemporary individuals are incited to live as if making a project of them-
selves; they are to work on their emotional world, their domestic and con-
jugal arrangements, their relations with employment and their techniques 
of sexual pleasure, to develop a “style” of living that will maximize the 
worth of their existence to themselves… Although our subjectivity might 
appear our most intimate sphere of experience, its contemporary intensifi-
cation as a political and ethical value is intrinsically correlated with the 
growth of expert languages, which enable us to render our relations with 
ourselves and others into words and into thought, and with expert tech-
niques, which promise to allow us to transform our selves in the direction 
of happiness and fulfillment.
Like Rose (1998), Melluish (2014, p. 542) also focuses on the role of 
the psychological expert in the intensification of psychological techniques 
for and on personhood:
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Increasingly, there are branded therapies, branded research methods and a 
connected process of marketization. Estimates suggest that there are 
100–140 different schools of psychological therapy… many branded in 
such a way that for a psychologist to use these ideas they are required to 
undergo specific accredited training. This proliferation of therapeutic mod-
els is in spite of the overwhelming evidence that common factors, princi-
pally the quality of the relationship between the therapist and the client, 
are more important than any specific differences in models.
Melluish (2014) also points out that these scientifically endorsed 
methods are exported from the West to the rest of the world. As such, 
they participate in globalized, neocolonial relations of power with the 
majority world.
These, then, are some of the qualities associated with the neoliberal 
self, formed in relation to the psychologized individual: enterprising, 
responsible for themself, energetic, ambitious, resilient, self-reliant, com-
mitted to improving as an investment in themself, flexible, mobile, calcu-
lating, active, goal-oriented, in control. Furthermore, these once-private 
personality traits must be displayed, in order for the neoliberal subject to 
ensure their marketability in this “contracting society” (Sugarman, 2020, 
p.76). Identity itself has been commodified:
An individual is properly understood to be an entrepreneurial self that 
needs to be branded, marketed, and sold on the open market… Selves are 
best thought of as consumer images that can be enhanced by purchasing 
the proper accoutrements or experiences. (Cushman, 2019, p. 261)
Or, as Horning (2015, n.p.) put it, “if your personality can’t be lever-
aged—then authenticity is not really available to you. You can’t afford to 
be yourself ” (qtd. Sugarman, 2020, p. 78).
The new markers of personhood, “visibility and recognition,” are con-
ferred through networks, not communities, Sugarman (2020, p.  78) 
points out, until “visibility and self-image become the engine of commu-
nity.” This new kind of community is characterized by a broadness of 
reach but a shallowness of connection. As we will explore in more detail 
below, within neoliberalism and increasingly under the surveillance 
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capitalism to which it helped give rise, particularly for those born into 
this world, identity has been commodified in specific ways. What used to 
be of value in private, personal terms, now acquires value in twenty-first 
century market terms, which “presume[…] the existence of property 
rights over processes, things, and social relations, [presume] that a price 
can be put on them, and that they can be traded” (Harvey, 2007, p. 165). 
As we saw in Chap. 2, such an ethics of human being for trade has 
emerged from historical processes that are economic and political. Perry 
(2018, p. 104) reminds us that, “the ‘free’ market as a theoretical frame-
work depends on the ‘unfreedom’ of those who are on the margins or 
outskirts of market activity and who are often dominated by those who 
employ them or extract their labor.” She points out that while more indi-
viduals are citizens now who would, at the start of modern capitalism, 
have been constitutive nonpeople to the Western colonially formulated 
state, they are subject to inherited economic inequalities, together with 
the increased and intense competition of neoliberalism. Zuboff (2019) 
likens the new system of capitalism that has grown out of the confluence 
of neoliberalism, the legal and political imperatives post-9/11, and the 
growth of machine learning, to the process of colonialism that birthed 
the modern subject. Late modernity, in this formulation, bears some 
resemblance to early modernity.
 The More Things Change
Shakespeare’s historical moment, the late sixteenth century, was the time 
Europe started moving in newly concerted way on what was to them, 
“the new world.” It was the time when early modernity, with its coloniz-
ing and capitalist drives, began to develop the cultural forces that con-
tinue to mutate today. Liberal, Enlightened, colonizing modernity has its 
roots in Shakespeare’s time. As always, cultural, economic and material 
developments co-constituted and all participated in this long transition 
(for a summary of how colonial discourses were developing in England at 
this time and how they fed into American life, see Kendi, 2016).
English itself was changing, part of a cultural shift that impacted 
England’s sense of itself: access to literacy was increasing, and with it, a 
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change to who wrote, and why. This fundamentally affected the alloca-
tion of authority. Whereas previously, only priests, monks and the aris-
tocracy produced, consumed and circulated texts, with the advent of 
moveable type by Johannes Gutenberg in the mid-fifteenth century, it 
became easier and cheaper to print and disseminate writing. This com-
mercial development worked together with the new sense of competitive 
national pride that emerged with proto-colonial expansion, and helped 
fuel access to literacy in languages other than Latin. There was a new 
excitement about what English might be capable of, and a concerted 
effort to demonstrate that new ways of communicating could enhance 
the culture. New technology, new ways to create and new identities fed 
into each other, illustrating Rose’s (1998, p. 200, n2) point that technol-
ogy “produces the possibility of humans relating to themselves as subjects 
of certain types,” an argument I continue to make below.
One of these new ways of relating is seen in how, in Shakespeare’s writ-
ing and that of his peers, a particular connection was made between rela-
tionships of love, and relationships meant to enable profit, as England 
transitioned from a feudal economy to what would become a capitalist 
one. Schalkwyk (2008) has explored the intertwining of what he calls the 
language of love and the language of service in Shakespeare’s work. 
Shakespeare was one of a group of newly emergent hopefuls, craving rec-
ognition of their intellectual gifts and, from there, economic and social 
mobility in a changing world whose rules for how to achieve success were 
becoming less rigid and more full of possibility, less dependent on who 
you were born to and more malleable to what you might accomplish for 
yourself. Those up-and-coming men of a newly emerging class who were 
smart enough to develop a network they could exploit for economic gain 
could change their social standing. They had to invoke and perform spe-
cific versions of themselves and in so doing, of their relationships with the 
aristocratic men and women who had the economic and social means to 
advance the careers of their apparently devoted poets (Burke, 1997; 
Eisaman Maus, 1995; Ferry, 1983; Greenblatt, 1984; Huntington, 2001; 
Warley, 2005).
The development of the technology for print was an important com-
ponent in this cultural change (Febvre & Henri-Jean, 1979; Saunders, 
1951). Once texts could circulate more freely, quickly and cheaply, which 
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helped increase literacy in general, individuals could profit from the texts 
they produced in new ways (Marotti, 1995). Before this cultural develop-
ment which quickly accrued economic imperatives, one did not think of 
oneself as the author of the text one produced in the sense we now take 
for granted after the Romantics. It was a display of one’s learning, not 
plagiarism, to draw from and imitate the classics. Originality was not a 
thing. Certain forms, like drama and some kinds of elite poetry, were 
much more collaboratively produced than our later ideas about creative 
genius can accommodate (Marotti, 1986). The emergence of the personal 
identity of creator and author, and the profit to be gained from asserting 
this identity—both a psychological profit and an economic one—marked 
a huge shift in what it meant to write, to be addressed as a reader, to put 
one’s work into the world (Fineman, 1986; Foucault, 1977; Greenblatt, 
1984). Also to the point for the argument I want to make here, the devel-
opment of print enabled the eventual constructions of modern publics, 
whether in the form of the nation, as Anderson (1991) has elucidated, or 
in the more diffuse and more modern sense of Warner’s (2002) idea of 
the public sphere, on which more in a moment.
I have lived in four countries, and I have been struck since arriving in 
America by how profit is woven into personal relationships in ways this 
late capitalist culture takes for granted, in ways that remind me of patron–
writer relationships in Shakespeare’s proto-capitalist England. It is com-
mon sense that personal relationships should be pathways to economic 
advancement, that who you know is, and should be taken as, a valuable 
career resource. Part and parcel of this assumption is that how you pres-
ent yourself, your personal narrative, should be carefully curated to pres-
ent your best, most desirable, most valuable self to the world. Like 
Shakespeare’s England, these cultural imperatives are facilitated by the 
expansion of new technologies of communication that fundamentally 
alter social, economic, educational, national and psychological dynamics.
In such a symbolic economy, relationships do not have value solely as 
themselves; they have commercial value as well, or instead. Human inter-
actions have commodifiable potential, a fact that seems to be accepted as 
natural and obvious here in ways I have not experience elsewhere. If you 
want a job, you will likely not even be considered if you simply submit a 
resumé via the formal channels. Rather, you should approach someone in 
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a position to give you that job or to introduce you to someone else who 
might. You approach them with strategic interest in who they are and 
what they have done. You approach them in the first place with your own 
personhood on offer, not your skills: They will help you if they like you. 
The purpose of the meeting or attempt to connect is not primarily to 
present what you can do, but who you are. If this meets with approval, 
you may get a step up in your career, or at least an addition to your net-
work, which is useful because of how it may eventually yield career ben-
efit. This is remarkably like the interweaving of the languages of love and 
service that Schalkwyk (2008) identified in Shakespeare’s time. The per-
sonal is the commercial. The self is for sale, as is the very idea of human 
connection, which is assumed to exist for the purpose of profit as much 
as, if not more than, for its own sake. There is little intrinsic or implicit 
value in attachments in this universe outside of a capitalist logic. I am not 
suggesting intimate or family relationships are also this instrumentalized, 
although family connections are crucial to getting ahead in the networks 
that structure this country and its major institutions of power, from com-
merce, to elite universities, to the presidency. But certainly the ideas of 
friendship, and certainly the idea of what constitutes a public, are affected 
by this value system and this system of attributing relationship value as 
commodity value. If human connection is understood to be available for 
profit, then human selfhood is too, since the one depends upon the other.
Zuboff (2019, p.  44) tracks how neoliberalism has created an eco-
nomic system which is explicitly “neofeudal” where wealth and power are 
consolidated in an elite, “far beyond the control of ordinary people and 
the mechanisms of democratic consent.” In her account, the emotional 
malaise of the twenty-first century is a direct consequence of liberal sub-
jects passing through neoliberal economic formations and their social 
and political consequence:
This is the existential contradiction…: we want to exercise control over our 
own lives, but everywhere control is thwarted. Individualization has sent 
each one of us on the prowl for the resources we need to ensure effective 
life, but at each turn we are forced to do battle with an economics and poli-
tics from whose vantage point we are but ciphers. We live in the knowledge 
that our lives have unique value, but we are treated as invisible… Our 
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expectations of psychological self-determination are the grounds upon 
which our dreams unfold, so the losses we experience in the slow burn of 
rising inequality, exclusion, pervasive competition, and degrading stratifi-
cation are not only economic. (Zuboff, 2019, p. 45)
This world produced what Zuboff (2019) calls surveillance capitalism, 
born of the way technology has been utilized to monetize our behaviors 
in an already neoliberal system which individualizes in order to exploit. 
Perhaps we are indeed returning to a version of a power hierarchy where 
love (friendship, connection, the meeting of curated selves for mutual 
profit) is money. The difference is that in Shakespeare’s time, Western 
subjects were not yet Enlightened.
Zuboff’s narrative traces the implications for subjects who have been 
formed in liberalism and capitalism. She (Zuboff, 2019, p. 189) invokes 
the internet as putatively “a mighty democratizing force that exponen-
tially realizes Gutenberg’s revolution in the lives of billions of individu-
als.” But, she says, this potential has been colonized by the imperatives of 
surveillance capitalism, which uses the internet to collect information 
about us in order to render us the raw material of its profit-making. The 
small group of engineers who run this system are the new “narrow priest-
hood” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 189), akin to the priests of old whose preprint-
ing press hold on literacy made them the mediators between ordinary 
people and their God. According to Zuboff (2019), Western culture has 
been quickly, oppressively and dishonestly altered by the ways the new 
technologies have come to be monetized. We are, she says, reverting to “a 
pre-Gutenberg order” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 189). The consequences for the 
kinds of subjects, the modes of human being, that are created accordingly 
are quite profound. We are left with senses of selves that expect to be 
autonomous and self-empowered, but are in fact radically hobbled by 
relations of power that we need in order to exist as subjects, but have no 
agency over, indeed, are controlled by.
If Shakespeare’s time was emerging from feudalism and setting the 
stage for colonial expansion and all that came with it for the creation of 
modernity, then perhaps our time is indeed neofeudal, coming around in 
a loop to remake relationships for profit. How does one find oneself in a 
culture which is not only relentlessly selling one’s connections, but one’s 
identity?
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 Finding Oneself in the Public Eye
Warner (2002, pp. 50–1) describes how publics are created by the mode 
of address that assumes them into existence, what he describes as the 
dilemma of the chicken and the egg:
Could anyone speak publicly without addressing a public? But how can 
this public exist before being addressed? What would a public be if no one 
were addressing it? Can a public really exist apart from the rhetoric through 
which it is imagined?… A public might be real and efficacious, but its real-
ity lies in just this reflexivity by which an addressable object is conjured 
into being in order to enable the very discourse that gives it existence.
Publics are reliant on the words and images that call them into being, 
on the process of acting on the idea that they exist. A public can only exist 
as long as it is being addressed, and can only be invoked by its constituent 
members as long as they are paying attention (Warner, 2002). There is a 
precarity here that is also a condition of existence. There is also a clear 
sense of the imbrication of a public with its individual members. They 
make up each other. They make each other up. This dependent precarity 
is an excellent frame to bring to a discussion of the effects of the internet 
on the senses of selves of that group of younger people whose worlds are 
constituted by the idea of an online public.
Warner (2002) identifies several constituent factors to what makes up 
the idea of a modern public. These include the necessity of strangers to 
self-identity: in previous eras (Shakespeare’s, too, Fiedler, 1973), the 
stranger was a threatening, external figure. The modern public relies on 
the idea of strangers out there who are like us, whose existence confirms 
our own. “In the context of a public,” says Warner (2002, p. 56), “strang-
ers can be treated as already belonging to our world. More: they must be. 
We are routinely oriented to them in common life. They are a normal 
feature of the social.” As Warner (2002, p.  57) puts it, “stranger- 
relationality” is today “made normative, reshaping the most intimate 
dimensions of subjectivity around co-membership with indefinite per-
sons in a context of routine action.” Necessary to this process is the sheer 
fact of the ongoing attention of strangers, regardless of the “cognitive 
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quality” of that attention. “Some kind of active uptake—however som-
nolent—is indispensable” (Warner, 2002, p. 61).
Written in 2002 (which Zuboff, 2019 times as the start of Google’s 
consolidation of using surveillance to change the direction internet tech-
nology was taking), this certainly seems like a prescient description of 
how the online social media world has increasingly come to function, 
with quantifiable implications for those subjects formed within it 
(Calancie et al., 2017; Docu, 2018). Online profiles made to attract dates 
or sexual partners, networks of friends and their friends sought for the 
purposes of the upsell (personal or commercial), the use of Twitter to 
encourage fans who buy stuff to feel personally connected to the celebrity 
brand, the use of this technology to disseminate not only opinion, but 
now, political fiat, careers being made through blogs, the Instagramming 
of experience and the development of followers into both fame and, 
sometimes fortune, all of these depend on attracting the attention of 
strangers. It is the attention that matters, the attention that can be made 
into money and power.
Warner (2002) also explores the need for modern publics to be formu-
lated by speech that is simultaneously both personal and impersonal. 
Public speech, says Warner (2002), must be understood by each of its 
addressees as being not exactly addressed to them, specifically, but to the 
stranger they were just before they were addressed, the stranger that 
makes possible the idea of a public to be addressed. Understanding that 
each addressee toggles between these two positions, strange and known, 
as a condition of being part of a public, is a conscious aspect of participa-
tion, he says. “The benefit of this practice is that it gives a general social 
relevance to private thought and life” (Warner, 2002, p. 58). Or, taken 
one step further, it brings private thought and life into the social as a 
means through which to connect with the public. This imbricates in very 
specific ways with the neoliberal puncturing of the sphere of the private. 
Private experience and personal identity become connected to the public 
realm through commercial imperative, which is experienced as natural, as 
an element of human being and relating.
To sum up: Warner (2002) offers one way to understand the pressure 
to be called into being as a successful self by seeing oneself in the public 
eye. He demonstrates the toggling between what he calls the personal and 
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impersonal, as part of the condition of participation in this public. I sug-
gest that what is going on with social media culture today is not a move-
ment between, but an inseparable imbrication of, the private and the 
public. Warner (2002) also discusses the necessity of strangers to one’s 
sense of self, when that self takes shape in relation to an idea of the public 
to which one belongs. This idea can also be articulated, using an attach-
ment theory lesson, as the self ’s reliance on the mirroring back to itself by 
an imagined public. This public is simultaneously created by the idea, in 
the minds of its members, that it exists, and the work that it does in con-
structing its members.
Dean (2002), too, in her marvelous book on how publicity works in 
the internet age, writes about the ways subjectivity has been changed by 
the knowledge that countless others have access to (your) information, 
and the specific meanings made about this access by what she calls com-
municative capitalism. Zuboff’s (2019) surveillance capitalism can be 
understood as the updated iteration of what was beginning in 2002, 
which, she (Zuboff, 2019) elucidates, was the nascent understanding that 
people’s online activities could be translated into behavioral data that 
became the raw material for this new kind of capitalism. The monetiza-
tion of surveillance begins with the new evaluation of online 
communication.
Dean (2002) argues that the secret is central to this world, where 
everything is connected and knowable, where the public can and should 
exercise their right to know. The idea that everything is knowable and 
shareable is given meaning only by the idea that something needs to be 
exposed. It is the secret which proves that “everything should be out in 
the open,” by its very existence. If for Warner (2002), the fact of being 
addressed generates the public that is addressed thereby, for Dean (2002, 
pp.  10–11), “secrecy generates the very sense of a public that it pre-
sumes… it presupposes… that subject with a right to know.” Either way, 
the idea of the public relies on something other than its own solidity to 
exist, and what it relies upon, one way or the other, is something indi-
vidual, something hidden, something private. The private, the cordoned- 
off from the vast network of performance and visibility that constitutes 
the social world of the internet age, is implicated in the public eye. Under 
neoliberal imperatives, the private becomes an asset, and by now, under 
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surveillance capitalism, the private’s asset value is being actively tracked, 
mined, predicated and controlled for the purposes of generating profit 
(Zuboff, 2019).
Following Dean’s (2002) formulation, this is a culture that is formed 
by the interaction between the idea of freedom as freedom of access to all 
information, and the idea of the secret that gives the notion of access its 
power. Implicit in this dynamic is both “a drive to be known, and the 
presumption that what matters is what is known” (Dean, 2002, 
pp. 12–13). People know they exist, she (Dean, 2002) argues, because 
they know their secrets are online. And as Zuboff (2019) has tracked, and 
as the many theorists cited above have argued, neoliberalism monetizes 
the individual who exists in this online context.
Dean (2002) says that the individual in technoculture is a cynical, 
ironic participant in these systems. She (2002) gives the example of par-
ticipating in reward programs. We know the supermarket is doing it to 
make money, and that we are actually being “rewarded” very little while 
being interpolated into participating in making them that money. We do 
it anyway. Similarly, we do not have to actually believe that publicity 
indicates intrinsic value; we can know that it is the result of a media cam-
paign or a reality TV show. But by participating in the structures that do 
this work, we participate in the valuing of publicity as a marker of worth, 
“materializing a belief through our actions even if we don’t think we 
believe it” (Dean, 2002, p. 6). Drawing on the work of Zizek, Dean dem-
onstrates how what we know is less important than what we do in the 
creation of ideological systems—such as the valuing of publicity as a 
marker of worth, even when we know that the whole thing is in the ser-
vice of the generation of capital for the benefit of others. Zuboff (2019) 
adds an analysis of how surveillance capitalism wears us down as it profits 
from our behaviors, so that we become not ironic participants, but help-
less puppets who do not believe we can change the power of technocul-
ture over our lives.
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 Truth, Lies and Mediascape: Trump’s Bullshit
As I revise this chapter, America is reeling from a coup attempt on the 
Capitol on January 6, 2021.
This was a direct consequence of Donald Trump’s penchant for “alter-
native facts,” a ridiculous but dangerous bit of cognitive-dissonance- 
inducing phrasing coined by his erstwhile senior counselor Kellyanne 
Conway during an interview on January 22, 2017. A lie about the size of 
the crowd at Trump’s inauguration was countered by Conway: “You’re 
saying it’s a falsehood… And [we] gave alternative facts” (Bradner, 2017, 
n.p.). Thereafter, alternative facts became available to spread false 
information.
Alternative facts are ideas about the world informed by emotion (what 
someone wished had happened, or wishes to profit from), not what actu-
ally occurred in a basic historical sense. It is no coincidence that the issue 
of the inauguration crowd size needed to be lied about, because it arose 
from Trump’s narcissistic need for affirmation. From early in his presi-
dency, Trump was resisting a world in which he was unpopular, tweeting 
in 2017, “Any negative polls are fake news” (Kurtzleben, 2017, n.p.). But 
the implications for Trump’s insistence on bending the world to his will 
are far greater than the size of his ego.
Kurtzleben (2017) tracks how Trump’s repurposing of the notion of 
fake news undermined, as intended, the ability of news media to speak to 
what he was actually doing. Instead, he created a world where what he 
wanted the public to believe is true became the driving force behind the 
point of a public sphere. Subjective emotion became the touchstone for 
what is real, at least for Trump’s supporters, of which we now know there 
are over 70 million, given the amount of people who voted for him in the 
2020 Presidential elections. And of course, the harnessing of emotion to 
manipulate people’s beliefs and behaviors on a new scale was possible 
because of the internet (d’Ancona, 2017). Zuboff (2019) argues that sur-
veillance capitalism has an investment in keeping users online, and that it 
recycles the information it garners about us in order to find and target 
users with the most emotionally inciting information. The use of 
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emotion to generate an online audience is an imperative of the system, 
which Trump exploited.
The result, as Kurtzleben (2017) shows, is a dichotomous world of real 
fake news and fake fake news, with different definitions of the phrase 
being wielded online by the far right and by the left, resulting in one 
more way that different groups live in “increasingly different realities” 
(Kurtzleben, 2017). Dean (2002) rather accurately predicted how the 
excess of information and its relentless accessibility would result in the 
advent of the idea of fake news, which cynically manipulates a suspicion 
of information that can be produced anywhere, anytime, by anyone say-
ing anything. That the truth no longer actually matters in this environ-
ment is evidenced by the finding that even when presented with the 
actual hard facts, voters do not necessarily change their conclusions, since 
what has been activated is connected to what voters already think about 
the issue being lied about (Barrera et al., 2020; in the case of this study, 
immigration in France). Voters’ prior schemas guide their behavior, even 
after factual inaccuracies have been corrected; loyalty to Trump trumps 
actual facts (Swire et al., 2017). We are now in a “‘post-truth’ era,” driven 
by “ideological beliefs and ‘common sense’ assertions” (Harrison & 
Luckett, 2019, p.  259); in other words, what we feel to be true (it is 
worth noticing that it is idiomatic in America to say, “I feel like…” 
instead of “I think that…”).
Trump’s use of rhetoric, a deliberately emotion-generation use of lan-
guage (Mercieca, 2020; Rowland, 2019), capitalized on the dynamics 
inherent in modern technologies of communication, and the communi-
ties they create. He used emotion (Rowland, 2019) instead of, or to 
counter, fact-based reality. This is not to endorse the idea that absolute 
truth exists independent of the symbolic system through which we as 
humans make sense of the world. But it is to argue that the amount of 
people who attend an event, whether or not a massacre happened at a 
specific place and time, or the numbers of votes counted for one politi-
cian over another, can be treated as something nonnegotiable. These 
things belong to the realm of the real, and are not culturally mediated.
The rise of lies in the public sphere for the purposes of political gain 
has been specifically linked to Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and 
then his ascension to power (Ball, 2017). To be more specific, Davis 
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(2017) differentiates between lies, which still bear some relation to the 
truth they distort, and bullshit, which contains no relation to external 
facts. Bullshit, he (Davis, 2017) says, has grown exponentially in the sec-
ond decade of the twentieth century, culminating in the posttruth of 
Donald Trump’s America.
The notion of alternative facts was not just rhetorical. It had real impact 
on the lives of marginalized people (Castrellón et al., 2017). It also func-
tioned to disseminate both lies and bullshit via social media platforms 
and to normalize the onslaught of alternative reality, until the final lie 
that Trump had not lost the 2020 election to Joe Biden. Insisting repeat-
edly that he had won by a landslide and that the election had been stolen, 
Trump used emotion generated by bullshit to drive his supporters to vio-
lence in an attempt to overthrow the election results. This is typical dem-
agoguery, but what is notable here is the use of the twenty-first century 
form of communication, and the kind of political public it enabled 
Trump to create. Trump’s desire not to be a loser authorized a wholescale 
invention of reality, made solid through digital repetition. This is the 
world in which those born into the internet age must develop senses 
of selves.
 Being Millennial
There is extensive discussion in the academic literature, the business and 
marketing journals, and online, about who exactly can or should be con-
sidered millennial. There are also well-placed warnings about taking the 
constructed notion of the “generation” as an absolute and absolutely 
accurate signifier. Nevertheless, generally speaking, millennials are taken 
to be those young adults born in the later 1970s and early 1980s, at the 
same time as neoliberalism began to take root. Sometimes, those born in 
the later 1980s and the 1990s are considered the next generation, or Gen 
Z (if millennials are Gen Y to Douglas Coupland’s, 1991 Gen X). Now 
in their 20s and early 30s, millennials will soon be the largest group in the 
world’s workforce. In addition, they, and their younger versions, are a 
focus of extensive corporate attention, so much so that it becomes diffi-
cult to separate out who the millennials “are” outside of the hype about 
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them, a hype that is driven in most cases either by a gleeful focus on them 
as a market, or an idealized and optimistic construction of them as instan-
tiating a new way of being thanks to the technology they live with.
Serazio (2015) warns against falling for the myth of the idea of a gen-
eration, especially now, in light of how constructed the millennial genera-
tion is by industries that want to market to them a sense of who they are 
or should be, and how to buy their way there, what he describes as a 
“project of power: summoning into being the consumer subject’s sense of 
self so as to activate commercial activity from him or her” (Serazio, 2015, 
p.  601). We can see in this a version of Warner’s (2002) public sum-
moned into being by Zuboff’s (2019) surveillance capitalism.
There is also the “kids these days” version of millennials and so-called 
Gen Zers, which bemoan their every behavior and collective value as 
degraded (see Bauerlein’s, 2009, The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital 
Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future [Or, Don’t Trust 
Anyone Under 30]). The idea of the millennial generation, whatever its 
conceptual limits or false boundaries, has everything to do with the rise 
of the internet, and the accompanying new digital and social medias that 
have resulted in a new sense of what human being means.
The internet has brought with it new modes of subjectification, new 
ways of being that constitute a rupture with older ways of being individu-
als and of being social. Much of the writing about millennials asserts that 
growing up digital natives have wired millennials’ brains differently. The 
idea of a generation shaped by access to the internet and all it entails—
endless accessibility, global communities, apparent self-empowerment, 
the ability to influence the world on an unprecedented scale, the ability 
to connect across the surface of topics, images, links, and likes, automatic 
and effortless multitasking rather than depth thinking, cyberbullying, 
new forms of dopamine addiction, new forms of self-presentation and 
peer judgment, an expectation of interactivity in any learning experience, 
a psychological reliance on being instantly connected through smart 
phones, to name a few—is an idea whose power lies in the experiences of 
some members of this generation.
On May 20, 2013, Time Magazine ran a cover story entitled, “The Me 
Me Me Generation: Millennials are lazy, entitled narcissists who still live 
with their parents. Why they’ll save us all” (Stein, 2013).
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Stein (2013) offers what starts out as a rollicking, sardonic put-down 
of this group. He says they are influenced by their peers to an unparal-
leled degree, to their detriment. Their use of technology has resulted in 
quantifiable lower creativity and empathy. And, he says, in an about-face 
that hinges on the ways he is also influenced by technology, they are more 
tolerant and nicer than previous generations, as well as close to their par-
ents and unconcerned by authority in general. He sums up:
They’re earnest and optimistic. They embrace the system. They are prag-
matic idealists, tinkerers more than dreamers, life hackers. Their world is so 
flat that they have no leaders…. They want constant approval… They have 
massive fear of missing out… They’re celebrity obsessed but don’t respect-
fully idolize celebrities from a distance… They want new experiences… 
They are cool and reserved and not all that passionate. They are informed 
but inactive… They are probusiness… They love their phones but hate 
talking on them.
Many of these characteristics recur in descriptions and analyses of mil-
lennials, as we will see a little below. Many are also reductive or superficial 
descriptors of an inevitably more multifaceted group. Often left out is the 
difference material access makes—Stein (2013) says it makes no differ-
ence, but it always does. Warner (2002) makes the important point that 
the material form of the circulation of the texts that publics rely upon to 
exist, as well as the time that circulation takes, is a crucial component to 
bring to any understanding of a particular public. The consequences of 
the specific materiality upon which depends the ephemeral web, the digi-
tal cloud, are certainly relevant to any understanding of the nature of a 
public created by the digital media. Warner (2002) speculates briefly on 
this topic, in order to suggest that the internet may change the compo-
nent of temporality in the constitutions of publics. A public is reliant on 
the channels of circulation it needs to perpetuate the discourse that cre-
ates it (Warner, 2002); access to computers and to internet literacy is a 
crucial, unspoken component of this process. The seamless navigation of 
this online public is a reality only for economically and socially enabled 
youth, on the global stage.
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Writers responding to Stein’s (2013) article also pointed out the diffi-
culty defining the parameters of who constitutes this generation, and 
especially the economic constraints many young people have to manage 
(see Hipp, 2016; Kendzior, 2016). These are good correctives to a conver-
sation that is often either utopian or apocalyptic. I am leaving out of the 
picture those components of being millennial or younger that include 
crushing student debt, lack of access to affordable healthcare or stable 
work and ongoing financial dependence on parents not through choice, 
but through resultant necessity. It remains to be seen what difference the 
coronavirus pandemic will make to these systems. These are, however, 
important elements of this “generation’s” experience to at least acknowl-
edge in a discussion about their emotional reliance on a public sphere 
that is driven by a performance of self which depends upon the com-
modification of the personal or private.
What millennials are consistently defined by regardless of the tone or 
sophistication of the argument is their access to and comfort with tech-
nology. When it is celebrated, millennial culture is usually celebrated as a 
discontinuity from the past, a complete break, a revolution in thinking, 
learning and being caused by millennials being the first generation with 
unique access to and comfort with computers. Perhaps one of the most 
well-known cheerleaders for the digital generation is Tapscott (2009):
With their reflexes tuned to speed and freedom, these empowered young 
people are beginning to transform every institution of modern life. From 
the workplace to the marketplace, from politics to education to the basic 
unit of any society, the family, they are replacing a culture of control with 
a culture of enablement.
Their brains have been rewired in ways that make them smarter than 
their parents, indeed, “the smartest generation ever,” and their influence 
on altering institutions is democratizing and fostering tolerance and 
diversity, he says. Tapscott’s (2009) one concern was their lack of care 
over privacy, an attitude which may have changed in the intervening 
years, given how the internet has evolved (Zuboff, 2019).
He (Tapscott, 2009, p. 30) also notes they have changed “the concept 
of the brand” because, he says, of their insistence in participating in the 
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process; they are not consumers, they are prosumers. Here is the line 
where the personal becomes not the political, but the commodifiable. 
Because it is clear that active participation and the insertion of agency 
into new media processes become a new way to market and sell both 
products and behavior via identity.
For Tapscott (2009), there is something intrinsic to the technology 
itself that causes creativity, connection, and new, better, ways of being in 
the world. This assumption about the technology itself as either good or 
bad, as seen in what it produces, is usefully called into question by 
Buckingham (2008; see his Growing Up Modern website). He warns of 
the dangers of a binary view of digital technology. He reminds us that 
there are, and always have been, continuities between old ways of doing 
things and new; that youth should not be romanticized; and that there is 
a material reality, or “digital divide” and not everyone who is young has 
equal access. He also points out that since the invention of electricity, at 
least, there has been a simplified debate about the benefits and risks of 
modern technology. This is an important set of caveats. What makes the 
difference, I think, what makes the current use of this technology poten-
tially particularly pernicious, is the way the use of digital media has been 
so thoroughly saturated with market dynamics as imbricated with iden-
tity creation. As we have seen, Zuboff (2019) suggests that a new form of 
capitalism has resulted, which uses human behavior as its raw material. 
For generations who came of age in this universe, the implications for 
how they understand themselves and their relationships with others have 
been profoundly affected. This is not to argue that these technologies are 
only bad, or that they are intrinsically so.
But we are in a world where the potential of technology, whatever that 
means, has been thoroughly interwoven with the logic of profit, in the 
context of the crafting of a generation’s (and future generations’) psycho-
logical and social meanings, in their imaginings of themselves (Rizvi, 
2006). The crafted definition of millennials as “digital natives” (the term 
was coined by Prensky, 2001, 2006, one of the cheerleaders of the revo-
lutionary learning potential of computers) is dependent on not only their 
comfort with technology, but with the monetizing potential of this com-
fort. Here is an extract from a 2010 marketing report, entitled, 
“Millennials: Marketing to a Different Mindset”:
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Millennials are inherently aligned with technology. Intimacy with the digi-
tal world is one of the greatest strengths of their generation. Never having 
known a world without digital technology, Millennials… experience the 
world in a completely different way than previous generations. They recog-
nize the power and importance of social networks and utilize the Internet 
as a trusted source and a platform for self-expression. In the eyes of the 
Millennials, personal online networks hold as much importance and 
authority as any conventional media channel. (Qtd. Serazio, 2015, p. 605)
Personal online networks, therefore, are marshaled for revenue in ways 
previously confined to what used to be conventional media channels. 
Again, Zuboff’s (2019) recent work gives additional context to this pro-
cess, asserting that the online world developed within the logic of a new 
kind of capitalism which relies on both capturing and controlling our 
online behavior to provide the information about us that creates the mar-
kets we become. This commodity-generation logic in turn creates form 
and meaning for personal online networks: the chicken and the egg. 
Corporate marketing strategies create the image of what a successful mil-
lennial is as much as they refract it, what Serazio (2015, p. 604) calls, “the 
industrial construction of audiences.” Millennials as an idea are a public, 
created as much by the idea of who they each are as members and as a 
group as they set the terms for their group. And crucially, whereas in 
earlier “generations,” driving forces in the construction of the public 
might have been the polis, or nationalism, or even counterculture, always 
influenced by multiple social and economic forces, today it is unapolo-
getically and primarily capitalist—or, as Zuboff (2019) would say, sur-
veillance capitalist, where what is for sale is human behavior, generated 
through the control of our thoughts, feelings and habits.
In his work, Serazio (2015, p. 601) details “how millennials are ‘gen-
erationed’ by commercial interests through a prism of technological bias.” 
Serazio (2015) also confirms what my own internet search suggested: that 
most of the thinking and writing—the knowledge-production—about 
the relationship between millennials and new media (online and digital 
technologies) is currently being produced by marketing companies and 
agencies, not by academics or scholars. Even the metadiscourse is directly 
commodified, so that most attempts to characterize and define 
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millennials are by their buying potential or behavior, in order to suggest 
ways of branding products to speak to their identities in order to capture 
them as consumers. And not just as consumers, but as sources of profit 
whose senses of themselves are tied to the product being peddled, such 
that the relationship is not apparently a commercial one, but deeply per-
sonal: Tapscott’s (2009) prosumers. Marketers and consultants are baldly 
discussing how to produce the sense of agency and participation for 
which millennials are famous in order to profit from it (Moreno 
et al., 2017).
Here is the abstract from a 2017 article in the International Journal of 
Marketing Studies:
The millennials constitute an important group of consumers. Therefore, to 
know how they behave has become an important issue. This paper aims to 
explain who the millennials are, to explain who belongs to this generational 
group and why they have become an attractive group for different social 
and economic sectors, by showing the most outstanding attitudes, tastes 
and buying behaviors… The findings suggest that millennials are a highly 
attractive market as they have grown up in an environment where technol-
ogy provides a platform for personalization and immediate gratification in 
all aspects of life… The results contribute to the literature by providing a 
description of millennial consumers; showing in detailed the importance 
of this market segment and their buying behaviors. (Moreno et  al., 
2017, p. 135)
Serazio (2015) theorizes that new methods of selling to millennials 
increasingly commodify the cultural and the social, resulting in ways of 
being that make living and buying inseparable. He (Serazio, 2015, 
p. 600):
[I[lluminates how millennials are “sold” in a double sense: both the online 
promotional tactics used to target a cohort so often decried as unreachable 
through traditional channels as well as the stereotypes spun about this gen-
eration’s values and behaviors that, cyclically, legitimate the commercial 
work that is produced for them.
 N. Distiller
187
In his work on the constitution of modern publics, Warner (2002) also 
notices how more recent discourses explicitly commodify aspects of cur-
rent youth and/or minority identities and cultural practices, so that the 
mass circulation of cultural ideas functions specifically as marketing. 
Marketing, display and subjectivity-creation become co-constituting. 
“You perform… your social placement… through [the deployment of 
commodified cultural memes],” says Warner (2002, p. 73).
The deployment of commodified cultural memes is otherwise known 
as the successful circulation of something “on brand.” “Brand authentic-
ity”; “brand community”; “brand meanings”; “brand image;” “brand 
trust;” “brand affinity”; “brand intimacy” and “brand advocate”; these are 
all terms that recur when people in business talk about attracting the mil-
lennial market. “A brand moment” means something important or mean-
ingful has been captured, and, implicitly, rendered valuable because of its 
concomitant ability to get somebody to buy something, either now or 
upstream of the brand moment event. All of this brand energy coheres in 
the idea of the “personal brand”—how you present your experiences, 
biography, friend connections, likes and dislikes, avatars, photographs 
and life. Here is one of the consequences of the commodification of what 
was previously, in modernity at least, coded as the private, the intimate: 
who you are is for sale, and so the desirability of who you are is under-
written by its commodity value. It is likely quaint of me to be disturbed 
by this (although Zuboff, 2019 works hard to reinvigorate a sense of 
alarm about the turn capitalism has taken through the internet). It seems 
important to say, though, especially in the face of the broad characteriza-
tion of internet culture as democratizing—although perhaps post- 
Trumpism, this will change.
Dean (2002) suggests that as the promise of decentralized information 
access took on the flavor of a democratic revolution thanks to the advent 
of personal computing, a new kind of subjectivity was generated. One of 
the results, as I have been arguing, was a blurring of the line between 
public and private as realms of experience; the new technology brought 
with it new “idealized norms of publicity: communication, participation, 
and personalization,” part of a new way of being: technoculture. But it 
also brought with it a new “mode of subjectification.” The subject in the 
new digital age requires publicity to know that it exists as a subject: 
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“People’s experience of themselves as subjects is configured in terms of 
accessibility, visibility, being known. Without publicity, the subject of 
technoculture doesn’t know if it exists at all,” and, “Publicity in techno-
culture functions through the interpellation of a subject that makes itself 
into an object of public knowledge” (Dean, 2002, p. 90, p. 114).
The result of the internet age is not an enriched democratic public 
sphere. Instead, the result of vastly increased access to information is a 
new iteration of capitalism, which reaches inside the subject in new ways. 
The kind of communication now taken for granted on the internet pro-
duces a specific kind of public, which relies on specific ideas about its 
constituent members. These ideas include the assumption that the per-
sonal is and should be available for branding, and that the success of the 
brand is what the self depends upon to know itself. Information about all 
things is implicitly available, and also implicitly valuable especially inso-
far as it can attract marketable attention. Put another way, all attention is 
implicitly good because implicitly value-bearing because implicitly a rev-
enue stream, either now or down the line, at the very least in the form of 
networks, whose publicity value is priceless for the self. The ultimate 
profiteerers from this new system are not human beings, but corporations 
(Zuboff, 2019), but this is obscured by a technoculture that normalizes 
being-for-profit.
What happens when the “nascent self is based upon mere marketed 
meanings” (Serazio, 2015, p. 603)? What are the consequences when the 
selves that are emerging in this culture are intertwined with the idea of 
the brand, not just as self-expression, but as self-knowledge, self- 
instantiation, selfhood itself? What happens when identity becomes “a 
product of the brand” (Serazio, 2015, p. 609)? What are the implications 
when branded identity becomes valuable in relation to how much public-
ity it can garner to itself?
Young people need self-expression, and they need community; these 
are appropriate developmental requirements. These have been commodi-
fied and exploited in a concerted drive that “erodes clear borders between 
commerce and sociocultural life.”
We ought to question the consequences of identity being channeled 
through digital branding schemes at such a critical developmental stage… 
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In some ways, this networked hypersociality and participatory exhibition-
ism are perhaps just the latest manifestations of more enduring phenomena 
of youth when it comes to needs related to community and identity. Yet the 
interactivity endemic to digital media use maps usefully (for brands) onto 
these same critical developmental needs. (Serazio, 2015, p.  600; 
p. 603; p. 607)
Understanding that psychological processes—the centrality of mirror-
ing to the ability to be a self; the reliance on community for all of us, and 
particularly at the vulnerable developmental stage of emerging from one’s 
family and community as Western youth do—have been publicized and 
commodified in ways specific to how technology has come to be utilized 
in technoculture, is one way to answer the question of how new processes 
of subjectification are taking place. And this also helps me to understand 
some of the patterns I see in my therapy practice.
One of the populations I serve in my work as a psychotherapist in the 
San Francisco Bay Area is that group of millennials who either have, or 
are striving to be one of the ones that have made it in the tech industry 
which dominates the economy and the entrepreneurial youth culture 
here, or did until the coronavirus started to alter life in the Bay Area 
(Bowles, 2021). These are young adults in their late 20s and early 30s 
who live in a world where personal and career success are intimately tied 
to self-presentation, networking, selling one’s personality as much as one’s 
ideas: to, in a word, branding.
 Love and Money
The observations which follow have not been based on a comprehensive 
quantitative study like Tapscott’s (2009), who solicited hundreds of sto-
ries via Facebook, accessed networks of thousands of millennials on the 
internet and interviewed over 6000 people. Or Deloitte’s Millennial 
Survey (2019), which interviewed over 13,000 young people in 42 coun-
tries. Instead, these comments are based on in-depth therapeutic relation-
ships developed with clients, and on conversations with colleagues who 
also work with this population.
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I have been struck by the highly intelligent, highly resourced, highly 
educated, often (but not always) privileged young adults of this part of 
America who presented to the private therapy clinic where I first began to 
work with them as a group, and who I continue to see in private practice, 
with one of two emotional problems. Either they have made it in the tech 
world, working for or forming successful start-ups, weathering the pres-
sures of self-presentation, getting good jobs with great salaries, and find-
ing after committing all of themselves to their work that once they have 
achieved the prize, they are no longer sure of its meaning. These young 
adults are successful and miserable, feeling lonely, alienated, unsure of 
themselves, like they live in a world where they can never be sure which 
relationships are real. They feel pressured to socialize with people they do 
not like, and to be available for out-of-office interactions with bosses they 
do not respect, because the personal is the vehicle upon which they 
believe their commercial success rides. They do not have a sense of profes-
sional boundaries, and their interpersonal interactions at work are fraught 
with the need to manage office politics, grabs for power, their own ambi-
tions, through the need to be likeable. Many of them seem to navigate 
the internal gap of, on the one hand, knowing they are part of an eco-
nomic and social elite, and on the other, feeling unworthy—a version of 
imposter phenomenon. They tell me how incredibly well they have done, 
that they are living the start-up dream, and that they do not know who 
they are, exactly, or why this all should matter so much. They talk of feel-
ing like there is a void inside them, or of feeling unaccountably depressed, 
or so anxious about work that they engage in maladaptive coping strate-
gies that are making them miserable.
The other version of this I see are equally talented young people who 
have not yet made it, and fear they never will. Their fear of failure is 
woven into a fear of not being good enough, which does not mean not 
being smart enough, but not being likeable enough, not being lucky 
enough, not being connected enough. They know they are smart and 
talented, but they lack the networking knack, and/or they are haunted by 
having made the wrong choices and thereby not getting into the right 
elites to aid their careers. They often seem to be collapsing under the 
imperative to sell themselves, to measure the worth of one’s life by the 
amount of profile and money one achieves, the sooner the more 
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impressive and therefore the better. Those without the ego, the structural 
privilege, the charisma, the connections, the luck, or any necessary com-
bination, feel like failures before they even begin, or cannot begin under 
the weight of the failure they feel.
Some of these psychological dynamics can be accounted for in terms 
of intrapersonal and family histories, to be sure. Some young people have 
parents for whom nothing was good enough; some have parents whose 
own failures haunt their children with the fear of who they might become 
if they do not succeed. Some come from poverty, or minority communi-
ties, and struggle with a sense of not belonging to the elite institutions 
and or corporate cultures they worked so hard to join. Some are immi-
grants, to whom American corporate individualism feels like an extremely 
uncomfortable costume they must wear. Some are female, which tends to 
bring with it a consistent struggle to embrace success while remaining 
feminine enough to be acceptable, and the necessity of navigating perva-
sive, unspoken misogyny and sometimes harassment. Taking up the right 
kind of space in the right kind of way is a particularly fine-tuned balanc-
ing act for some of these young women. The struggle to feel good enough 
in external settings has always been at least somewhat about a person’s 
internal landscape, as well as the contexts in which that person must 
function. But there does seem to be a pattern here, or at least a similarity 
across people of the same, broadly millennial, generation.
The term “imposter phenomenon” was first coined in 1978, to describe 
a sense-of-self deficit experienced by high-achieving women of a particu-
lar class and race demographic, the usual WEIRD sample (Clance & 
Imes, 1978). Its argument seems to me a more modern version of a point 
made by psychoanalyst Joan Riviere, in a 1929 essay entitled, 
“Womanliness as a Masquerade.” Riviere (1929) argued, via a case study 
of a woman who might have been Riviere herself, that women seeking 
achievements and approval in “male” environments—that is, professional 
life—have to compensate for the gender anxiety this causes by assuming 
veneers of femininity. Wanting to be seen as worthy (worth attention, 
worth money, worth being seen) in public has long been a cause of anxi-
ety for those assigned female at birth and raised as such. The reasons are 
somewhat obvious: there are different implications for women demand-
ing the right to be looked at and valued in the public eye, worth 
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intellectual and commercial respect. The stigma and violence against sex 
workers, but not their clients, illustrates what can be at stake for women 
who do not conform to normative gender rules for acceptable femininity, 
which include highly occluded access to active sexuality/inviting public 
attention/ambition. That these characteristics are in fact culturally con-
nected in Western thought Freud’s discourse made clear, and any investi-
gation into the material history of authorship in the West illustrates 
(Distiller, 2008; Wall, 1993; see Zambreno, 2012 for a millennial explo-
ration of these ongoing gender issues). It is worth remembering that 
“imposter phenomenon” initially had a gendered meaning, and was 
speaking specifically about women not feeling they deserved what they 
had achieved at work. While these issues remain pertinent as gender 
issues, the emotional processes described by the fear of being a fake in the 
public eye clearly by now have resonance across gender.
If the number of TED Talks on the subject of what is now usually 
called “imposter syndrome” is anything to go by, the concept has enor-
mous valence in this culture. Its origins in gender difference have been 
ameliorated. Now, it seems, the majority of high achievers in the Western 
world (70%, according to Solomon, 2016) suffer from not believing their 
achievements are based on solid ground. Many successful younger people 
in America struggle to believe they are worth what the public world of 
work says they are worth, even after hard work and sacrifice got them 
there. It seems they feel to some degree or another like they have faked 
their way to success, or like they are not as good as they appear to be.
Subsequent to the original 1978 study, which examined 150 mostly 
white middle and upper class professional and academic women, a litera-
ture has developed which applies the concept to other “minority” groups, 
and to men (McGregor et al., 2008). Recently, an exploratory 2018 study 
entitled, “Are all impostors created equal?” sets out to “Explor[e] gender 
differences in the impostor phenomenon-performance link.” It found 
that imposter syndrome not only affects men too, but, in the study’s 
terms, affects them worse. There are some comments that could be made 
about the interpretations in this exploratory study (men showed higher 
anxiety and less effort in response to their anxiety; women worked harder 
in response to the anxiety they felt, interpreted as indicating higher levels 
of suffering in the men). Most interesting to me here is that the cohorts 
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recruited for the research are likely to be millennial, and were all from the 
United States: they were undergraduates from an American public uni-
versity (Jarrett, 2018). Worth noting is that this study was framed in 
terms of its implications for how managers handle their personnel, once 
again linking the personal with the commercial.
Why are so many successful younger people convinced they have 
somehow fooled the world into thinking they are all that? Why do they 
feel that they are, in fact, charlatans and fakes? The original suggestion—
that women struggle to navigate their socialized gender in the context of 
the public realm—needs another angle these days.
The feeling of having an internal void is a metaphor that seems to 
come up fairly often with my millennial clients. Why? Self-identification 
requires a relationship with another, ideally another that one recognizes 
is also another self rather than being experienced as an object, which 
causes problems in the process of finding oneself through the other 
(Benjamin, 1988; Bryson & MacIntosh, 2010), as I have argued in previ-
ous chapters. What happens to this process of self-identification when 
the other is an internet public, and the self knows itself through its own 
commodification, that is, in order to be experienced as a self, it must 
experience its own objectification via “[t]he act of always performing 
oneself with an audience’s potential response in mind and the need for 
reciprocal exchange” (Bryson & MacIntosh, 2010, p. 115)?
The pathway to self-identification is not, in this symbolic universe, 
through a relationship with another self. It is through a relationship with 
a very specific kind of public idea of worth, of public reflection of worth. 
If the psychodynamic idea is that the subject reaches for the recognition 
of the other as a way to understand itself, perhaps the subject of techno-
culture suffers for reaching for the recognition of celebrity as reflected by 
an idea of many anonymous, networked, others, Warner’s (2002) strang-
ers. Relationship quality is not what matters here. Relationship quantity 
is. Alienation is the result. A sense of hollowness, an anxiety manifest in 
a restless, relentless superficial movement on the surface of things, across 
clicks and likes and happy photographs and carefully curated profiles.
Perhaps the internal feeling of the psychic void is the inevitable conse-
quence when the self looks to find itself, not through repeated moments 
of neurobiologically felt presence, but through fame-based reflections in 
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the imagined eyes of a digital public. There is no actual, embodied, there 
there. Instead there is a decentralized network whose psychic energy is 
the energy of constant, surface-based, movement. This kind of attention, 
by definition, is always on to the next thing. No wonder so many of my 
younger clients are anxious (APA, 2018).
Dean (2002) theorizes the underlying dynamics of celebrity in the 
technocultural symbolic economy by refiguring Lacan’s ideas about desire 
and drive through the work of Zizek. In doing so, she accounts for the 
empty repetition for its own sake that characterizes much online activity: 
the technocultural subject is formulated by the endless, restless circularity 
of drive energy, not the lack at the center of the desiring subject which 
Lacan said propels us all into language and independent selfhood. Desire 
yearns for what it cannot have (in the first place, a feeling of wholeness, 
of return to the womb or union with the mother, according to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. This loss lies at the heart of each of us, and propels us into 
human systems of meaning). Drive, a different kind of energy, creates 
restless movement in the attempt to fulfill its needs. The repetitive circle 
of the drive produces its own kind of empty pleasure. The circular energy 
of the drive becomes, in the imperative to celebrity, a “drive to make 
oneself seen that is crucial to publicity in technoculture.” Desire impels 
the subject to look for the gaze of the other, but what desire cannot ever 
see is the point from which the other gazes; the subject cannot see the 
other’s point of view. The energy of drive, in Dean’s (2002) formulation, 
is the subject’s work to make itself seen: “I make myself open, accessible, 
available, visible to that mysterious, unknown, secret thing, to the place 
from which I am gazed back at. In my very looking, I make myself visible 
to this object, the gaze” (Dean, 2002, p. 121). In my looking, I make 
myself visible to the gaze I need to know I exist (and which, by desire’s 
definition, I cannot ever have). This seems to me a concise and resonant 
summation of the dynamics of self-constitution that millennials, those 
younger people who are trying to build human being in a universe struc-
tured by internet culture, have to navigate. This explains the internal void 
so many of them talk about.
Goodman (2020, pp. 341–2), in a discussion about how social media 
has altered subjectivity, recounts an experience with a student of his:
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The ocean was surging against the rocks… I was enamoured with the 
intensity and grandness of what I was beholding. I turned to see my stu-
dent pointing her phone at the water and heard her whisper “come on 
water, do something exciting.”… She expressed that these experiences feel 
most real when she is able to capture them and show her friends through 
her social networks. She feels uneasy when she does not have this mecha-
nism of expression… Later at dinner, she “checked in” on Facebook to 
allow her friends to know where she was. There was a way in which she did 
not feel as though she was sitting at the restaurant unless others knew 
her location.
Dean (2002) brings this reflexivity—I make myself seen in order to see 
myself being seen—into her definition of technocultural celebrity, which 
she says is an integral part of how publicity works in this culture. Celebrity 
is about being known for being known. “In celebrity, publicity is reflex-
ivized, turned back on itself such that not only is something seen, but it 
makes itself seen—accessible to, information for—others.” Because tech-
nocultural publicity is driven by the energy of celebrity, the subject pro-
duced by technoculture is itself “configured by celebrity” (Dean, 2002, 
p. 122, p. 13). The mediated performance of the private lives of celebri-
ties fuels this desire and imperative to be seen publicly in order to exist. 
It flavors the public’s idea of itself, its members and its members’ ideas of 
themselves as members of this public.
In December 2018, Rolling Stone carried a cover story about Shawn 
Mendez, which it billed as “confessions of a neurotic pop idol.” Mendez 
is the very young (16 when he achieved pop stardom) Canadian who 
became famous “not long after he picked up a guitar for the first time” by 
“drawing half a billion views” on Vine, a social media app which allowed 
him to post 6-second versions of other people’s pop songs (Doyle, 2018).
The article presents us with an anxious young man who does not quite 
believe his own success, which Doyle gestures toward by quoting specific 
lyrics from the Bruno Mars song that Mendez sang the first time he sang 
in public: “‘Easy come, easy go!’” (Doyle, 2018). These lyrics suggest the 
ephemerality of Mendez’s position by underscoring its genesis in internet 
celebrity. The house of cards nature of whole enterprise is implicit in its 
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very nature, and this, Doyle slyly suggests, accounts for Mendez’s ongo-
ing, underlying anxiety, or his “neurosis.”
The story starts by recounting to us a daily encounter between Mendez 
and the world of social media which made him famous:
Shawn Mendez was up late in his hotel room a few nights ago, scrolling 
through photos online. He kept seeing Top 40 A-listers with their part-
ners… and he was starting to get a little jealous. “I had this thought: ‘I have 
to get paparazzied with someone. Who am I gonna get? I’m not relevant’”. 
(Doyle, 2018)
Doyle addresses the subtext that Mendez was made by the internet 
public and needs to keep courting its attention:
It’s easy to be skeptical of his success—just ask Mendez, a self-described 
“extremely neurotic” 20-year-old who spends much of his time second- 
guessing his career choices. “It’s literally my biggest fear, to wake up tomor-
row and nobody cares,” he says. (Doyle, 2018)
Mendez’s celebrity, and its vulnerabilities, exemplifies the way things 
now are for people seeking success online. He is one of the more success-
ful ordinary people whose internet access brought him fame and riches. 
One of the rules he has to keep himself “on track… as he tries to build 
the long-term career of a Sheeran or a Taylor Swift” is, “Never say no to a 
selfie.”
When he walks out of the lobby of the… [h]otel…, there are already a few 
dozen girls waiting by the entrance. “Hold on,” Mendez tells his team. “I 
gotta take some photos.” After a minute or two of efficient chitchat—
“You’re amazing!” he tells one fan…—he makes his way to the van. 
(Doyle, 2018)
Mendez’s availability to his fans is as much a part of his career profile 
as his music. Accessibility of his person is part of his success strategy. This 
is packaged as a personal exchange, where he pretends to recognize and 
value an individual fan’s subjectivity. He is like the early modern poet, 
invoking his patron in language of intimacy in order to further his career, 
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which specifically means enable the conditions of production to create 
something artistic (writing in the one instance, music in the other). He is 
also the quintessential millennial subject, caught in the endless cycle of 
offering himself up, through pseudo-connection, in order to ensure his 
commercial existence. His bankability is his likeability. How well can he 
make her feel connected to him? How efficiently? Because the more the 
better. In fact, the more connections he makes, the more he needs to keep 
up with the connections, because if they go away, so does “Shawn 
Mendez, pop idol” (Doyle, 2018).
Mendez’s commitment to his fans, his willingness to always pose for 
selfies, suggests he is driven by technocultural celebrity. He has to have 
his celebrity seen by the public in order for it to exist, and he has to work 
constantly to tend to it in these precise terms. And Rolling Stone’s (2018) 
offer to present us with his “Confessions” contributes to the work of 
technocultural subject-production through the idea of accessible infor-
mation, as Dean (2002) suggested. We are offered access to his secrets, 
which make his manufactured selfhood (seem) real and authentic. If we 
can access the real Shawn Mendez, the person himself, we can feel we 
know him, feel closer to him, know something about him and so rein-
scribe his celebrity by participating in the commercial exchange of per-
sonhood. We can feel connected to the pop idol who exists because we 
feel connected to him. Our connection to his celebrity feeds into our 
own awareness of our existence.
This explains his anxiety, an existential awareness of the reliance of his 
very existence as “Shawn Mendez… pop idol” (Doyle, 2018) on an end-
less reflexivity, where his work’s value is not in the work, but in the extent 
to which the work ensures that his fans are interested in looking at him. 
And by “work” I mean to invoke not only his music, which he also writes, 
but the constant, ceaseless work of self-assertion, self-presentation, self- 
fashioning (Greenblatt, 1984) that was always the core of his celebrity.
Doyle describes the original publicity work Mendez did, at Meet and 
Greet Conventions where, along with people who were famous for van-
dalizing supermarkets, he participated in “a platform for teen boys with 
large social followings to meet the fans who felt as though they already 
knew them… ‘We were like zoo animals,’ he says. [Fans] would just stare 
at us and take photos with us. We would do whatever they say’” (Doyle, 
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2018). Somehow, this is supposed to be different from, if precursor to, 
what happens now:
A wave of shrieks erupt from the parking lot. Hundreds of girls have their 
phones ready… Mendez takes a picture with each one, a smile pasted on 
his face. After he works his way through, he blows one last kiss and gets in 
the next van… “It’s pretty dope here,” he says, then goes quiet for a while. 
“I don’t know, man,” he mumbles as we approach the hotel. “I feel fucking 
weird”. (Doyle, 2018)
I am struck, in these descriptions, by how both parties are willingly 
participating in an exchange which they know is not about their actual 
selves being seen, but about a commodified, branded interaction: Mendez 
pretends to care about each fan, and in return they award him celebrity. 
He serves up his personality, or a version of it, and in return they feel seen 
by him, connected to him. Some of this is, of course, typical to any 
dynamic of fandom. What is specific here is how it needs to be endlessly 
recorded and disseminated for each party to reap their full investment in 
the exchange. That Mendez seems to know this, and that Doyle certainly 
does, is encoded in the final quote above—““I don’t know, man,” he 
mumbles… “I feel fucking weird’”—which ends a section of the story.
Mendez is presented as suffering from anxiety and a kind of inexpli-
cable depression: “‘You know when you’re in a state of unhappiness when 
you have no reason to be unhappy?’ he says. ‘I hate that’” (Doyle, 2018). 
He comes across as sweet, kind, and utterly devoted to his own success, 
which is going well. And yet, unhappy. Mendez, of course, is barely mil-
lennial—but he is the next incarnation. His antidote to the depression, 
Doyle (2018) reports, is to pretend he is on stage, with “‘people that 
love me.’”
The story ends with a tale of Mendez hooking up with a bartender for 
a night, and how “fans have even begun speculating about the bartender, 
because he followed her on Instagram that night.”
Actually, he adds, he didn’t: when Mendez was in the bathroom, she 
grabbed his phone and followed herself from his account. He shakes his 
head. “Gotta give her credit for that”. (Doyle, 2018)
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And those are the closing words of the story. The bartender’s exploita-
tion of their intimacy, however fleeting, deserves grudging credit. Because 
Shawn Mendez should and does expect to have his celebrity self profited 
from, hall of mirrors style. This is the world he lives in.
The structural imperative to publicity demanded by the internet in the 
lives of all the characters is woven through this account, unremarked, but 
clearly telling the story of Shawn Mendez, the “neurotic pop idol.” It is a 
story, as I have been suggesting, that illustrates Dean’s (2002) theoretical 
model of how technoculture works to produce subjects, dependent on a 
kind of publicity that is constituted by twenty-first century celebrity. To 
this formulation I have added two characteristics of the subjects of this 
culture: that their love and friendship, their intimacy and connections, 
their personalities, are fundamentally commodities; and that they are 
inexplicably anxious, even when they seem to have everything they have 
worked for. The reasons connect through the effects of technoculture on 
the kind of subjectivity that can be found in this symbolic economy. It 
knows its own fakeness, and so does everyone else. It does not have to 
believe in itself. The system believes for it. But at the end of the day, it 
feels its own precarity. It senses the void underneath all that anxious, self- 
reflexive, self-fueling drive energy.
There is another component of Mendez’s story that is instructive. 
Shawn Mendez has garnered an awful lot of online attention which spec-
ulates on his sexuality, or as he tells Doyle (2018), “This massive, massive 
thing for the last five years about me being gay.” Doyle explains: “Examples 
of what he means are all over YouTube and Twitter. There are memes that 
pair photos of Mendez with jokes about being closeted and videos that 
scrutinize his gestures” (Doyle, 2018).
Mendez describes being extremely affected by this coverage. He:
[O]ften finds himself watching his own interviews, analyzing his voice and 
his body language. He’ll see an anonymous stranger comment on the way 
he crosses his legs once and try not to do it again. (Doyle, 2018)
Doyle recounts how his attempt to address the issue directly, that is, 
via Snapchat, backfired, and Mendez’s panic after allowing Taylor Swift 
to post a video of her putting makeup on him:
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He told her it was fine without thinking, but later that night, he woke up 
in a cold sweat. “I felt sick,” he said. “I was like, ‘Fuck, why did I let her 
post that?’ I just fed the fire that I’m terrified of”. (Doyle, 2018)
Once again, incidentally, we are reminded of how carefully celebrities 
have to consider and curate the information they release about them-
selves. But most interesting here is Mendez’s horror of being considered 
gay when he is not. If he is not, as he insists, gay, then what is a stake, 
especially in his demographic, where sexual and gender fluidity is more 
available to public figures than ever before (see the treatment of Harry 
Styles in Vanity Fair a couple of years later, Vanderhoof, 2020)? I am not 
dismissing the ongoing reality of homophobia and gender-related pho-
bias, and Mendez himself acknowledges that he is uncomfortable with 
the homophobia he knows his response demonstrates (Doyle, 2018). But 
cold sweats and sickness because of a misrepresentation of this most per-
sonal of qualities? This is the distress of misattunement, of looking into 
the eyes of the mirroring other and seeing something that you know is 
wrong reflected back at you. It is a feeling of wrongness that causes anxi-
ety, depression, self-loathing—as queer, trans, and nonbinary folk know 
very well. It is further evidence that Mendez’s selfhood is being formu-
lated by this public presentation of his celebrity self, that the personal and 
the public, and the valuing of the inner self through commercial/celebrity 
success, are all dependent on each other in this world.
“Easy come, easy go”: Perhaps it also lets us know that Shawn Mendez, 
despite how hard he has worked, also feels like he may be exposed as not 
all that, if he doesn’t play his cards exactly right. If he cannot succeed in 
controlling representations of the celebrity self that create him by circu-
lating through his fandom, will he continue to exist as a celebrity? Is 
imposter syndrome so much a part of this culture because its version of 
subjectivity depends, by definition, on the condition of celebrity? I am 
not presuming to diagnose Shawn Mendez, I am speculating, using this 
article about him as a cultural text: If the self is dependent on its public 
to underwrite its value, and its public is fed by the curation of the self as 
product, it makes sense that the person underneath all that would feel 
like the image had taken over.
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Dean (2002) links the centrality of the promise of celebrity to the 
work of subjectivization it does, to “the fundamental diversity and opac-
ity of cyberspace: we are known, but the terms of this being known are 
never transparent to us” (Dean, 2002, p. 122). She details the sense we all 
have of knowing there is information about us online that we cannot 
control the circulation or the content of (Zuboff, 2019 adds horrifying 
and extensive detail to exactly how and why this happens). She names the 
“insecurity” this causes—“How, exactly, are we being looked at? One 
never really knows who one is” (Dean, 2002, p. 123). If the internet says 
you are gay, does that make you so? If the internet says you are gay, does 
that affect your brand? In ways you cannot control? What other secrets 
might it make up about you? How will this affect how you are seen? It is 
worth noting here that we have indeed experienced technoculture as a 
place where reality is invented through online repetition, the key to 
Trump’s political brand.
The subject’s only option to ensure its existence is “to make itself visi-
ble over and over again. It has to understand itself as celebrity, precisely 
because the excess of cyberia makes it uncertain as to its place in the 
symbolic order” (Dean, 2002, p. 123). This is what makes Shawn Mendez 
like “us”, and “us” like Shawn Mendez, because his celebrity was crafted 
by and through the internet. Mendez could easily be one of my clients: 
his anxiety about his own existence as “Shawn Mendez, pop idol,” his 
ongoing commitment to keeping himself in the eye of a public that exists 
as an uncontrollable, fragmented gaze to which he must continually offer 
his self in order to make his music, and his money, these feel familiar. 
Technocultural celebrity doubts itself, because it is reliant not only on 
knowing one is known but on knowing one is not in control of how, 
where, when, and why one is known. Hence Shawn Mendez, terrified of 
being thought to be gay, anxiously monitoring his own existence insofar 
as it can be sustained online and through social media.
Celebrity is not a true source of identification, says Dean (2002). It is 
not analogous to being mirrored, because the source of the gaze in which 
one seeks oneself is “a point hidden in an opaque and heterogenous net-
work. One is compelled to make oneself visible precisely because of the 
uncertainty as to whether one registers at all” (Dean, 2002, p.  124). 
Perhaps this is the central change wrought on millennial personhood by 
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the computerized online world millennials have always traversed. What 
has been lost, more even than daily opportunities for human connection, 
is personhood based on personhood, people who are people because of 
other people. Instead, people are reliant on anxiously offering a commer-
cialized version of themselves to a fragmented and unknowable network, 
whose attention is uncertain, capricious, and, unless constantly re- 
engaged by ongoing content, brief. And to reiterate, Dean’s (2002) celeb-
rity is not a simple desire for fame; it is a fundamental reliance on being 
known in a system where the subject cannot know or control how she is 
known, by whom, or why. This subject knows the public who sees her is 
multiple, fragmented, often hostile, often misinterpreting the informa-
tion she cannot control about herself that is being shared out there. It is 
a self who needs to see she is seen before she can know she exists, but not 
in the way in which the infant is reliant on mirroring to organize her 
internal landscape, to learn the meaning of her experience and how to 
manage it. The millennial self subjectivized through celebrity is eternally 
anxiously caught in the circular drive to attract the right kind of attention 
in order to achieve its goals. And being successfully interpolated by this 
system, succeeding in knowing oneself because one knows, for a moment, 
that one has been seen, is by definition to trivialize oneself, to reduce 
oneself to being just another transient piece of content in an endless series 
of replaceable stories. Success in this system cannot but become devalued 
as human experience by its inevitable commodification. Every piece of 
content will know it is successful when it becomes the next “scoop” 
(Dean, 2002, p. 129). Success is successful, transient posturing.
Goodman (2020, p. 333) asks precisely the question, has the new tech-
nology, with the ways it has undoubtedly shaped human interaction, 
enabled “a new epoch in the shape and nature of human subjectivity, inti-
macy, and desire?” He answers by suggesting that psychic distance, invisi-
bility, and invulnerability have always been elements of Western 
subjectivity, which during the Enlightenment came to inform the value 
placed on rationality and self-containment, Descartes’ self-enclosed think-
ing subject. Not incidentally, this self, able to control what he thinks and 
wants, but free from being seen or controlled, unconnected to or impli-
cated in other selves, is a subject who creates and uses others. The self-
containment enables objectification of other subjects. Goodman (2020, 
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p. 336) thus locates the internet’s mediated and avatar-based interactions 
not as something new, but as a radical continuation of elements in Western 
culture, where “we get to manage and modulate our presence.”
The difference now, he suggests, is in how the subject feels compelled 
to make itself visible, to be seen in order to know that it exists through 
public declaration. Unlike attachment mirroring (In the world of social 
media, “Experience [becomes] owned by the recognition of a nonparticu-
lar other” Goodman, 2020, p. 342), the way this is playing out in the 
new public sphere dislocates, to use Goodman’s (2020, p.  337) word, 
subjectivity from connection, and refashions it as, in my word, brand:
I can “post” myself in the manner most conducive to my desire and to what 
I perceive to be the desire of others. I make myself more consumable. I 
become more of a commodity. What is more desirable in a capitalistic, free 
market economy? (Goodman, 2020, p. 337)
In other words, Goodman continues to describe the implications of 
neoliberalism, working together with our new technologies and the new 
forms of capitalism that are resulting, for human subjectivity in the twenty-
first century. This will inevitably affect those born into this world more 
intensely than those of us initially formed in a previous iteration of this 
culture. As Goodman (2020, p. 344) concludes, “With the advent of per-
sonal computing devices, modern technology has become a central mediat-
ing force within human exchange, and with it, human subjectivity… The 
norms of connection, intimacy, and public/private experience are shifting.”
To this I would reiterate that we need to bear in mind the material 
investments implicit in these shifts. These new developments grow out of 
and intensify neoliberal dynamics. Neoliberalism is itself an end-product 
of colonialism, which was enabled by the philosophies and economies of 
the Enlightenment. In Zuboff’s (2019) account, we are being newly colo-
nized by a new kind of capitalism which uses the technology of the 
twenty-first century to render human being itself as profit, and truncate 
our ability to have agency over our selves. Our behaviors are both mined 
and moderated. This brave new world runs the risk of collapsing our 
chances to think complicitously about ourselves, our world, each other.
That this is indeed happening among younger users in ever more inten-
sive ways is evidenced by brown’s (2020) recent response to the advent of 
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cancel culture online. She (brown, 2020) issues an appeal to progressive 
online users to tolerate each other’s mistakes, engage productively in con-
flict rather than shut each other down, and not to reproduce the punitive 
and annihilating systems that structure the state’s relationship to its oth-
ers, which she (brown, 2020) identifies as unconscious identification pro-
cesses at work in these online communities. It is only by recognizing how 
we are all implicated in all of the systems at play here that we can resist its 
historically familiar terms. None of us is better than the other.
I write this as Joe Biden is about to be inaugurated. I write it with a 
sense of dread and the disempowerment Zuboff (2019) argues is a conse-
quence of the workings of surveillance capitalism. This new force requires 
people to be engaged online and creates imperatives to do so. She (Zuboff, 
2019) also tracks how the development of twentieth century industrial 
capitalism, which transmuted into neoliberalism, favored machines over 
people. This choice created an economically and thus socially disempow-
ered class of Americans who previously had voice and earning potential, 
developed, I would add, in a society that had always conferred racialized 
privilege. Zuboff’s (2019) economic history, together with the structur-
ing history of white supremacy in America outlined in Chap. 3, seems to 
me intimately connected to the communities Trump and Trumpism have 
marshaled online and on the streets (Parmar, 2021). I fear that we are 
further than ever from a shared vision of human complicity, where hate- 
based othering processes are rejected as hurtful to everyone, and where 
human being can be experienced differently to the inheritances handed 
down to us by the racism and misogyny of colonialism, and the destruc-
tive, entitled individualism that found its most powerful instantiation in 
neoliberalism.
Works Cited
American Psychiatric Association. (2018). Americans say they are more anxious 
than a year ago; Baby Boomers report greatest increase in anxiety. Retrieved 
January 6, 2021, from https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/news- releases/
americans- say- they- are- more- anxious- than- a- year- ago- baby- boomers- 
report- greatest- increase- in- anxiety
 N. Distiller
205
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread 
of nationalism. Verso.
Ball, J. (2017). Post-Truth: How bullshit conquered the world. Biteback Publishing.
Barrera, O., Sergei Guriev, S., Henry, E., & Zhuravskay, E. (2020). Facts, alter-
native facts, and fact checking in times of post-truth politics. Journal of Public 
Economics, 182, 1–19.
Bauerlein, M. (2009). The dumbest generation: How the digital age stupefies young 
Americans and jeopardizes our future (or, don’t trust anyone under 30). Penguin.
Benjamin, J. (1988). The bonds of love: Psychoanalysis, feminism and the problem 
of domination. Random House.
Bowles, N. (2021, January 14). They can’t leave the Bay Area fast enough. New 
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/technology/san- 
francisco- covid- work- moving.html
Bradner, E. (2017, January 23). Conway: Trump White House offered “alterna-
tive facts” on crowd size. CNN Politics. Retrieved January 12, 2020, from 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne- conway- alternative- 
facts/index.html
brown, a.m. (2020). We will not cancel us: And other dreams of transformative 
justice. AK Press.
Bryson, M. K., & MacIntosh, L. B. (2010). Can we play Fun Gay? Disjuncture 
and difference, and the precarious mobilities of millennial queer youth narra-
tives. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 23(1), 101–124.
Buckingham, D. (2008). Introducing identity. In D. Buckingham (Ed.), Youth, 
identity and digital media (pp. 1–19). MIT Press.
Buckingham, D. (n.d.) Growing Up Modern. Retrieved January 13, 2021, from 
https://davidbuckingham.net/growing- up- modern/
Burke, P. (1997). Representations of the self from Petrarch to Descartes. In 
R. Porter (Ed.), Rewriting the self: Histories from the Renaissance to the present 
(pp. 17–28). Routledge.
Calancie, O., Ewing, L., Narducci, L. D., Horgan, S., & Khalid-Khan, S. (2017). 
Exploring how social networking sites impact youth with anxiety: A 
 qualitative study of Facebook stressors among adolescents with an anxiety 
disorder diagnosis. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on 
Cyberspace, 11(4), article 2.
Castrellón, L. E., Rivarola, A. R. R., & López, G. R. (2017). We are not alterna-
tive facts: Feeling, existing, and resisting in the era of Trump. International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 30(10), 936–945.
Clance, P. R., & Imes, S. A. (1978). The imposter phenomenon in high achiev-
ing women: Dynamics and therapeutic intervention. Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research & Practice, 15(3), 241–247.
5 Love and Money 
206
Coupland, D. (1991). Generation X: Tales for an accelerated culture. St 
Martin’s Press.
Cushman, P. (2019). Travels with the self: Interpreting psychology as cultural his-
tory. Routledge.
d’Ancona, M. (2017). Post-Truth: The new war on truth and how to fight back. 
Random House.
Davies, W. (2016). The happiness industry: How the government and big business 
sold us well-being. Verso.
Davis, E. (2017). Post-Truth: Why we have reached peak bullshit and what we can 
do about it. Little, Brown Book Group.
Davis, J. E. (2020). Let’s avoid talk of “chemical imbalance”: it’s people in dis-
tress. Psyche. July 1, 2021, from https://psyche.co/ideas/lets- avoid- talk- of- 
 chemical- imbalance- its- people- in- distress
Dean, J. (2002). Publicity’s secret: How technoculture capitalizes on democracy. 
Cornell University Press.
Deloitte Millennial Survey. (2019). Retrieved January 13, 2021, from https://
www2.deloitte.com/nz/en/pages/about- deloitte/articles/millennial-
survey.html
Distiller, N. (2008). Desire and gender in the sonnet tradition. Palgrave Macmillan.
Docu, V. (2018). Millennials and anxiety: An exploration into social networking 
sites as a predisposing factor. Romanian Journal of Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy and Hypnosis, 5(1–2), 1–11.
Doyle, P. (2018, November 26). Shawn Mendez: Confessions of a neurotic pop 
idol. Rolling Stone. Retrieved January 13, 2021, from https://www.rolling-
stone.com/music/music- features/shawn- mendes- cover- interview- 756847/
Eisaman Maus, K. (1995). Inwardness and theatre in the English Renaissance. 
University of Chicago Press.
Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity, youth, and crisis. WW Norton.
Febvre, L., & Henri-Jean, M. (1979). The coming of the book: The impact of print-
ing 1450–1800. NLB.
Ferry, A. (1983). The “inward” language: Sonnets of Wyatt, Sidney, Shakespeare, 
Donne. University of Chicago Press.
Fiedler, L. (1973). The stranger in Shakespeare. Stein & Day.
Fineman, J. (1986). Shakespeare’s perjured eye: The invention of poetic subjectivity 
in the sonnets. University of California Press.
Foucault, M. (1977). What is an author? In D.  Bouchard (Ed.), Language, 
counter- memory, practice (pp. 113–138). Basil Blackwell.
 N. Distiller
207
Gill, R., & Orgad, S.  S. (2018). The amazing bounce-backable woman: 
Resilience and the psychological turn in neoliberalism. Sociological Research 
Online, 23(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/1360780418769673
Goodman, D. M. (2020). The pornographic self: Technology, vulnerability, and 
“risk-free” desire. In D. Goodman & M. Freeman (Eds.), Psychology and the 
other (pp. 332–347). Oxford University Press.
Greenblatt, S. (1984). Renaissance self-fashioning. University of Chicago Press.
Harrison, N., & Luckett, K. (2019). Experts, knowledge and criticality in the 
age of “alternative facts”: Re-examining the contribution of higher education. 
Teaching in Higher Education, 24(3), 259–271.
Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Hipp, P. (2016). Fuck you, I’m not a millennial. Retrieved January 13, 2021, 
from https://medium.com/@thehipp/fuck- you- i- m- not- a- millennial- e92 
e653ceb39
Horning, R. (2015, August 12). Do the robot. The New Inquiry. Retrieved 
January 7, 2021, from http://thenewinquiry.com/blog/do- the- robot
Huntington, J. (2001). Ambition, rank, and poetry in 1590s England. University 
of Illinois Press.
Jarrett, C. (2018). Research Digest. June 1. A new study claims that, under pres-
sure, imposter syndrome hits men harder than women. Retrieved January 12, 
2021, from https://digest.bps.org.uk/2018/06/01/a- new- study- claims- 
that- under- pressure- imposter- syndrome- hits- men- harder- than- women/
Kendi, I. X. (2016). Stamped from the beginning: The definitive history of racist 
ideas in America. Bold Type Books.
Kendzior, S. (2016, June 30). The myth of millennial entitlement was created to 
hide their parents mistakes. Quartz. Retrieved December 28, 2020, from 
https://qz.com/720456/the- myth- of- millennial- entitlement- was- 
created- to- hide- their- parents- mistakes/
Kurtzleben, D. (2017, February 17). With “fake news” Trump moves from alter-
native facts to alternative language. NPR Politics. Retrieved January 12, 2021, 
from https://www.npr.org/2017/02/17/515630467/with- fake- news- trump- 
moves- from- alternative- facts- to- alternative- language
Marotti, A. (1986). John Donne: Coterie poet. University of Wisconsin Press.
Marotti, A. (1995). Manuscript, print, and the English Renaissance Lyric. Cornell 
University Press.
McGregor, L. N., Gee, D. N., & Posey, K. E. (2008). I feel like a fraud and it 
depresses me: The relation between the imposter phenomenon and depres-
sion. Social Behavior and Personality, 36(1), 43–48.
5 Love and Money 
208
Melluish, S. (2014). Globalization, culture and psychology. International review 
of psychiatry, 26(5), 538–543.
Mercieca, J. (2020, June 19). A field guide to Trump’s dangerous rhetoric. The 
Conversation. Retrieved January 18, 2021, from https://theconversation.
com/a- field- guide- to- trumps- dangerous- rhetoric- 139531
Mokyr, J., Vickers, C., & Ziebarth, N. L. (2015). The history of technological 
anxiety and the future of economic growth: Is this time different? Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 29(3), 31–50.
Moreno, F. M., Lafuente, J. G., Carreón, F. A., & Moreno, S. M. (2017). The 
characterization of the millennials and their buying behavior. International 
Journal of Marketing Studies, 9(5), 135–144.
Parmar, I. (2021, January 11). The Trump coup d’etat and insurrection was long 
in the making, and will continue. The Wire. Retrieved January 18, 2021, 
from https://thewire.in/world/the- trump- coup- detat- and- insurrection- 
 was- long- in- the- making- and- will- continue
Perry, I. (2018). Vexy thing: On gender and liberation. Duke University Press.
Prensky, M. (2001). Digital natives, digital immigrants. On The Horizon, 
9(5), 1–6.
Prensky, M. (2006). Don’t bother me, mom – I’m learning! Paragon House.
Riviere, J. (1929). Womanliness as a masquerade. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 10, 303–313.
Rizvi, F. (2006). Imagination and the globalisation of educational policy 
research. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 4(2), 193–205.
Rose, N. (1998). Inventing our selves: Psychology, power, and personhood. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rowland, R. (2019). The populist and nationalist roots of Trump’s rhetoric. 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 22(3), 343–388.
Rutherford, A. (2018). Feminism, psychology, and the gendering of neoliberal 
subjectivity: From critique to disruption. Theory & Psychology, 28(5), 619–644.
Saunders, J. W. (1951). The stigma of print: A note on the social bases of Tudor 
poetry. Essays in criticism, 1, 139–164.
Schalkwyk, D. (2008). Shakespeare, love and service. Cambridge University Press.
Schore, A. (2012). The science of the art of psychotherapy. Norton.
Serazio, M. (2015). Selling (digital) millennials: The social construction and 
technological bias of a consumer generation. Television & New Media, 
16(7), 599–615.
Solomon, L. (2016). The surprising solution to the imposter syndrome. 
TEDXCharlotte. Published November 30.
Stein, J. (2013, May 20). The Me Me Me Generation: Millennials are lazy, enti-
tled narcissists who still live with their parents. Why they’ll save us all. Time. 
 N. Distiller
209
Retrieved January 11, 2021, from http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/
article/0,33009,2143001,00.html
Sugarman, J. (2020). Neoliberalism and the ethics of psychology. In D. M. Goodman, 
E. R. Severson, & H. Macdonald (Eds.), Race, rage, and resistance: Philosophy, 
psychology, and the perils of individualism (pp. 73–89). Routledge.
Sweet, E. (2018). “Like you failed at life”: Debt, health and neoliberal subjectiv-
ity. Social Science & Medicine, 212, 86–93.
Swire, B., Berinsky, A. J., Lewandowsky, S., & Ecker, U. K. H. (2017). Processing 
political misinformation: Comprehending the trump phenomenon. Royal 
Society Open Science, 4(3), 1–21.
Tapscott, D. (2009). Grown up digital: How the net generation is changing your 
world. McGraw Hill.
Vanderhoof, E. (2020, November 12). Harry Styles confirms that he is 2020’s 
ideal mascot. Vanity Fair. Retrieved January 19, 2021, from
Wall, W. (1993). The imprint of gender: Authorship and publication in the English 
Renaissance. Cornell University Press.
Warley, C. (2005). Sonnet sequences and social distinction in Renaissance England. 
Cambridge University Press.
Warner, M. (2002). Publics and counter publics. Public Culture, 14(1), 49–90.
Zambreno, K. (2012). Heroines. Semiotext(e).
Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future 
at the new frontier of power. Profile.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
5 Love and Money 
211© The Author(s) 2022




Complicities offers a theory, not a therapeutic practice, but if it is taken in 
as a way of understanding human being, it will inevitably affect practice, 
as it will affect how the therapist knows what she is doing in her work, 
and why. And there are practices that take into account the theory of 
human being I have described under the rubric of complicity. In this 
chapter, I will detail the established ways of working that help us to apply 
the theory of human being I have explicated. In addition to Internal 
Family Systems (IFS), which understands each one of us as a system of 
parts carrying reactions to our experiences in the world, I will briefly 
explore the role of neurobiological implications for psychotherapy prac-
tice through interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB) and polyvagal theory. I 
will also look at how attachment theory intersects with these somatic- 
based ideas. Complicities is nothing if not a systems theory, but a systems 
theory that brings also the notion of the fold. We are not working with 
black boxes or binaries, but with complex, rhizomatic relations between 
self and other, constitutive relationships between inside and outside. 
History, both personal and community history, matters to the system’s 
functioning. I have also referred to intersubjectivity throughout this 
book, and I will return to it as a useful frame for practice.
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If subjects are best thought of as rhizomes or assemblages that “meta-
morphose or change their properties as they expand their connections” 
(Rose, 1998, p. 172) and not as binary structures based on self/other or 
subject/object, then we have a model, following Rose (1998) and Butler 
(1997) (who both follow Foucault), for understanding subjectification as 
a process embedded in regimes of power and the realities they enable. 
This model is responsive to the implications of attachment theory and 
IPNB, which demonstrate the subject’s reliance on their context, includ-
ing people, to be a subject. We are so far from the Cartesian lone ego. We 
are, in fact, imbricated on each other physiologically, vulnerable to and 
dependent on relationship. If there is a core to human being, that is it. 
Attachment theory and IPNB also illustrate the places where therapy 
comes in: with a physical understanding of how and why the therapist is 
complicit in the client’s healing. This will be described in more detail below.
A complicit approach might also be seen to bring a set of values to 
psychotherapeutic practice. I have often been uncomfortable with the 
conflation of a social justice orientation with the right to judge clients, or 
when a client’s hour is talked about as an opportunity to do advocacy 
work, as I have heard at some conferences for therapists with a social 
justice awareness. Advocacy work for a better world is important and 
admirable, but in my opinion, it is different to the job of a therapist, 
which is to hold space as nonjudgmentally as possible. IFS would say 
nonjudgmental acceptance is the necessary prelude to change. We all 
have parts that act out in rage or shame or hatred or fear. Understanding 
those parts and what they are trying to protect is the first step toward 
enabling them to transform their roles. Rage, shame, hatred and fear are 
burdens. Judging them is not helpful.
Of course this does not mean that we are objective. What it does mean 
is that if there are issues, attitudes or types of people we cannot or do not 
wish to tolerate, it is our responsibility not to work with those types of 
people or those issues or attitudes. Otherwise, in my opinion and in my 
practice, my job is to help clients understand themselves, in the shaping 
context of a relationship with me. As should be clear by now, this means 
also working together on understanding context—family systems; child-
hood experiences; what specific relationships are doing and what clients 
are doing in them; identity; culture and histories. The last moving piece 
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is what happens relationally between a client and my own person-and/
in-context. So a complicit mindset is a value system that brings together 
a theory of what human being is, as outlined in this book, and an 
approach to therapeutic work that takes seriously what nonjudgment 
means: We are none of us innocent, and we are all of us implicated in 
each other. I say a little more about this toward the end of this chapter.
The history of psychotherapy has marked a gradual coming together of 
two different approaches. One is the intrapsychic model of psychoanaly-
sis, which at its start was concerned only with what was happening inside 
the client (it has since evolved, as the concept of the intersubjective third 
makes clear). The other is the systems approaches of community mental 
health and family therapy, developed partly in reaction to psychoanaly-
sis’s initial repudiation of context on the inner life of the individual 
psyche. A theory of complicity shows us that both models need to be 
taken into account, as each exists in and because of the other. In this 
chapter, I will account for how I think about the work I do, beginning 
with my idea of my role, my therapeutic stance. For me, this is feminist.
 Stance
Rose (1998) details how one of the signature markers of a scientific 
approach is the assertion of objectivity. This value—or perhaps, more 
accurately, fiction—was also an informing element of classic psychoanal-
ysis, although as mentioned above, a more sophisticated understanding 
of the role of the therapist’s personhood is now mainstream in psycho-
analysis (see Cooper, 2007). But the idea of the therapist as expert, and 
thereby as possessed of a scientifically endorsed objective take on a client’s 
person, is still an informing power dynamic of the psy disciplines. This 
power dynamic is enforced by institutional encroachments on clients’ 
lives and identities, especially for clients who are queer, BIPOC, indige-
nous, poor, trans, disabled, or at the intersections of these or other oth-
ered identities and social positions. The institutional power of the psy 
expert draws its authority from the history of psychology as outlined in 
Chap. 1, where the discipline emerged from and helped underwrite a 
series of related social forces, including colonialism, patriarchy, liberalism 
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and capitalism. Psychoanalysis, a major force in the emergence of psy-
chology as a mainstream discourse of self-understanding, also played a 
role, deploying a complex jargon which helped create an insiders’ club, 
and having an original vision of the therapist as both patriarch and expert 
(ask Freud’s client Dora, Bernheimer & Kahane, 1985).
Feminist therapy has been around since the 1970s, and started respond-
ing to and integrating with existing therapeutic approaches through the 
1980s (Dankoski & Deacon, 2000; Hare-Mustin, 1978; Williams, 
1995). Reviewing definitions of feminist therapy from this time period, 
Dankoski and Deacon (2000) summarize that feminist therapy: recog-
nizes the historical and ongoing fact of women’s oppression, which by 
now I would expand to include all gender oppression as I detailed in 
Chap. 4, as well as intersectionality; works to understand and change 
gender oppression; brings social context into intrapsychic models; and 
challenges binary gender norms. In its evolution, it has had to account 
for transnational and decolonial dynamics, and evolve to accommodate 
majority world needs and knowledges (Boonzaier & van Niekerk, 2019; 
Collins et al., 2019). In its Western origins, feminist therapy was more 
collectively formulated than many other approaches (Sang, 1995), 
although like white feminism in general, it needed to learn to be properly 
inclusive. It currently still needs to account for its relationship to hege-
monic, WEIRD-driven academic psychology and to transexclusionary 
ideologies.
Feminist therapists are committed to “a non-hierarchical relation-
ship… [and] empowerment” of clients (Dankoski & Deacon, 2000, 
p. 53). Many first-generation feminist therapists recount the experiment 
with informational equality in the early days of feminist therapy, where 
the therapist abandoned the stance of objective expert and engaged as a 
co-partner, including self-disclosing to address the power imbalance in 
the relationship. The general conclusion seems to be that respecting the 
relationship as an unequal one in terms of both institutional power and 
emotional disclosure is more advantageous (Robbins, 1995). In other 
words, the feminist therapist has an ongoing responsibility to acknowl-
edge the power she has in the relationship, while also affording clients 




Therapeutic healing is also connected to the acknowledgment that 
external power dynamics affect the client, and that social change is also 
needed to address individual suffering (see Herman, 1997). Thus, in all 
its complexity, it is the therapist’s job to engage with power dynamics not 
only in the therapeutic relationship, but also in clients’ lives. There is an 
acknowledgment that context affects and structures psyches (Dankoski 
& Deacon, 2000).
In other words, being a feminist therapist means acknowledging that 
we are not objective experts, because, being human, we all have stand-
points that inform what we can see and how we understand the world 
and each other (Brown, 2018). It also means acknowledging that in the 
systems which have formed modernity, including psychotherapy, there 
are always power relations that need to be acknowledged and worked 
with. This entails recognizing injustice. As feminist therapist Greenspan 
(2017, p. 335) puts it, “We live in the world, and the world lives in us. 
It’s not too far from this awareness to becoming a radical feminist activ-
ist.” Brown (2018, p.  40) provides a framework for identifying power 
dynamics in “four realms… somatic, intrapersonal/intrapsychic, intrap-
ersonal/social-contextual, and spiritual/existential, all in constant 
exchange and interaction.” She (Brown, 2018) suggests that a feminist 
therapy understands that client distress comes from disempowerment in 
one or more of these realms, and not from individual pathology.
If we have an awareness of power dynamics at all levels of all systems, 
as well as the understanding that intersectionality and, and in, context, 
always matters (Zerbe Enns et al., 2020), we can acknowledge the limits 
of our knowledge and understanding. In this way, we also acknowledge 
that the client is an expert of their own experience. The feminist thera-
pist’s job is to hold the awareness of the limits of her knowing in open-
ness, curiosity and respect, to allow the creation of a mutually enabling 
and respectful third space (on which more below).
In all these ways, feminist therapists are not objective scientific experts. 
At the same time, as therapists we bear the bulk of the responsibility for 
the therapeutic relationship. Holding this responsibility with awareness 
of our own complicit humanity I hope allows us (at least in our best 
moments) to be fully human in the room, and to tolerate our own limits 
and imperfections. Then we can better accompany our clients.
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A feminist stance is against neutrality, which does not recognize power 
relations and does not, to my mind, work with the attachment compo-
nent of the therapeutic relationship. A stance of neutrality can be with-
holding, even cruel. It certainly works to keep the therapist safe. But 
then, I am not by nature someone to sit back. Accordingly, I work to find 
the balance between holding space for the client’s questions, concerns, 
feelings and experiences, and being present as myself. In psychotherapeu-
tic practice, this process can sometimes be put in the language of directive 
or nondirective approaches or styles. I would suggest that a complicit 
therapist recognizes there is really no such thing as being nondirective. By 
being present with a client, we direct change, as the neurobiological theo-
ries detailed below explain. Even holding space, or unconditional positive 
regard, as a main intervention is engaging complicitously, because we are 
human. We are implicated in each other on all systems levels, and therapy 
is an intimate connection. It is far more of a poetry than a science. Indeed, 
to make the point again about the inadequacy of binaries, neuroscience 
proves that human being is poetic.
 Trauma-Informed, Body-Based Theories
Psychotherapists are applied neuroscientists. (Cozolino, 2010, p. 341)
Interpersonal neurobiology tracks the physiology of complicity, show-
ing how mind, body and brain are formed in relation to the minds, bod-
ies and brains of others (Solomon & Siegel, 2003). IPNB is interdisciplinary 
(Siegel, 2019). Like the psychological humanities, it recognizes that we 
have to get outside of silos of knowledge in order to understand the full 
picture of human being. Like the notion of complicity, it is all about the 
constitutive role of connections in the making of personhood. Somatic 
therapy practices like Somatic Experiencing (SE) therapy or Hakomi 
therapy, and body-based understandings of emotional states like Polyvagal 
Theory, show how emotional experiences of self and other are carried in 
the body, and exactly how the body’s knowledge helps form the brain and 
mind (Kurtz, 2007; Payne et  al., 2015; Porges, 2018). Together these 
approaches help us understand how all kinds of trauma, from 
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single-incident PTSD to complex or developmental traumas to attach-
ment woundings, shape an individual’s internal system. More generally, 
they show how relationships shape us biologically. They demonstrate how 
individual systems co-relate, co-regulate, and co-create each other. Each 
individual is also a self in larger sociocultural and historical context, con-
nected rhizomatically to other individuals, as I have been arguing. Each 
individual is also a self in a body, whose expressions are personal, cultural, 
familial and interconnected. Each autonomic nervous system and the 
mind it helps create is complicit in a network of others, known and 
inherited.
In the last few decades of the twentieth century, some academics and 
practitioners of psychology began to integrate neurobiological findings 
into their theories of human affect, exploring how we can physiologically 
map the ways our early years help form our subjectivities: “Both the brain 
and the self are built in a stepwise manner by experience” (Cozolino, 
2010, p. 31). Furthermore, our minds are co-created with other minds, 
and are not co-terminous with our brains; we are both “mind-as-brain 
activity and mind-as-relational activity” (Siegel, 2019, p. 225). And the 
two are complicit in each other in networks of nested systems that force 
us to include others and the so-called outside world in each one of us, and 
in the therapy process.
These scientists and physicians offered theories to account for why 
therapy works. They married attachment theory and the awareness of 
processes of somatic co-regulation and the physiological, and therefore 
emotional and cognitive, consequences of interpersonal interactions. The 
constitutive role of social systems in creating a nervous system that can 
feel safe and work well shows us how early and ongoing reactions in the 
body help set the terms for the mind’s sense of itself (Cozolino, 2010; 
Porges, 2018; Siegel, 2019; Van der Kolk, 2014).
Explicating the constitutive energies between brain, mind, relation-
ships with others and relationships with bodies (our own and the body of 
the other), IPNB and other theories that explore the interweavings of self 
and others on a physiological level has illustrated complicity at work in 
the process of therapy (Afford, 2020; Badenoch, 2008; Schore, 2012). 
Right brain processes, body-based experiences and unconscious aware-
ness are valued over cognitive and behavioral-based models (McGilchrist, 
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2009; Schore, 2003). Together with IPNB, this marks a “paradigm shift 
in psychotherapy practice towards the acknowledgement of the value of 
non-verbal, implicit processes in the clinical setting” (Peña, 2019, p. 102). 
Psychoanalysis accommodates this awareness and has been integrated 
with a neurobiologically driven theory of human being (Schore, 2012).
We know now, therefore, that nonverbal, right brain, affect-based 
communication is a crucial component of self (Afford, 2020; McGilchrist, 
2009; Schore, 2003); that “the body keeps the score” in ways the con-
scious mind cannot remember (Van der Kolk, 2014); that there are 
“intersubjective origins of the implicit self ” (Schore, 2012, p. 34); and 
that, “actions are automatic and adaptive, generated by the autonomic 
nervous system well below the level of conscious awareness… These are 
autonomic energies moving in patterns of protection” (Dana, 2018, 
p. 6). This last point, which focuses on the role of the autonomic nervous 
system in generating unconscious responses to implicit or perceived 
threat, based on previous trauma to the client’s social bonding system, 
comes from Polyvagal Theory (Porges, 2018):
Polyvagal Theory demonstrates that even before the brain makes meaning 
of an incident, the autonomic nervous system has assessed the environ-
ment and initiated an adaptive survival response. Neuroception precedes 
perception. (Dana, 2018, p. 6)
Neuroception describes the out-of-awareness work done by the auto-
nomic nervous system, based on its expectations of the world. 
Neuroception sets the terms of possibility for a client’s sense of self and 
other. This is one way the past lives within each of us, and helps shape the 
present. The process of co-regulation via the ventral vagus-linked social 
engagement system (Dana, 2018) is one way the therapeutic relationship 
can help change a client’s neuroceptive responses. Polyvagal theory works 
well with attachment theory and its mapping of attachment styles, which, 
based on early relational experiences, set the terms for what we expect 
from the world and how we implicitly experience others. Polyvagal the-
ory also works with trauma-informed therapies and with somatic- 
informed approaches (Levine, 2018; Ogden, 2018; Van der Kolk, 2018). 
Together, they help fill in the details of both why and how the past, 
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including the people in past relationship with the client; the present and 
its stimuli and triggers; and the therapist’s self (with its past and present 
formative markers and responses), are all complicit in and with the client.
Early childhood experiences occur before the prefrontal cortex is devel-
oped, and are experienced on a physical level. They are encoded in the 
brain as preverbal understandings. Before we develop the capacity for 
language and for explicit memory recall, we come to know things literally 
via our bodies and the sensations they communicate to us (Bretherton, 
1992; Langer, 2019; Schore, 2003; Siegel, 2003; Stern, 1985). This 
knowledge is stored in implicit memory. This is one way that our early 
contexts are inscribed on and in our subjectivities. From a relational 
point of view, Harris (2009, p. 178) explores a child’s dependence on 
their first caregivers in a way which makes clear there is no reclaimable 
self before attachment:
A developmental account of identity formation must elaborate the dialecti-
cal and paradoxical idea that self, including a gendered self, emerges from 
an interaction in which the child is already interpreted, experienced, and 
understood. The experience of being mirrored becomes an inextricable ele-
ment in the child’s internal self-schemas in a way that forever blurs the 
distinction between an experience’s beginning inside or outside.
So we are made by the way we are treated and how it feels in our bod-
ies. (Langer, 2019 has pointed out the implications for transgender 
humans in a symbolic system that assumes cisgender human being unless 
explicitly told otherwise.) These early interactions with others set the 
terms by which we know who we are, what to expect from the world, and 
how and why to relate to others. These are the terms of attachment the-
ory, of course:
Originating in an amalgam of psychoanalysis and behavioral biology, 
attachment theory… posits that the real relationships of the earliest stages 
of life indelibly shape us in basic ways, and… attachment processes lie at 
the center of all human emotional and social functions. (Schore, 2012, 
p. 27; see Karen, 1994)
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IPNB confirms this. This interdisciplinary marriage brings together a 
psychoanalytic awareness of the formation and consequences of the 
unconscious; a systems thinking understanding of the constitutive impor-
tance of context and the power of relationships to set the terms for indi-
viduals; and somatic and polyvagal understandings of how emotions are 
encoded in the body and implicitly in the brain, outside of prefrontal 
cortex awareness and control.
As therapists, we treat this by bringing our own selves to interact with 
the client’s dysregulated, frozen or traumatically fragmented inner system 
(Afford, 2020; Badenoch, 2008). We have to bring our bodies and our 
limbic systems, as much as, or perhaps even more than, our scientific 
inquiring minds: “psychotherapy is not the ‘talking’ but the ‘communi-
cating’ cure” (Schore, 2012, p. 39). The notions of the intersubjective 
and of the internal family system have a role to play in understanding and 
feeling our way through this therapeutic process, and each will be 
addressed in more detail below. Understanding that the therapist’s sense 
of self is the guiding framework for the therapy process is a complicit 
feminist awareness. It means we cannot see ourselves as above or outside 
what is going on. We cannot assume the scientific, objective expert posi-
tion. We are together with each client.
The therapist’s right brain interacts with the client’s right brain, out-
side of awareness and outside of and beyond language. In order to engage 
with and help heal a client, we literally do physical, feeling work with 
them (Afford, 2020; Badenoch, 2008; Geller & Porges, 2014). This is a 
fully complicit engagement, not only between participants but in the 
therapist’s embodied stance too.
It follows that, in order to be as fully physiologically, implicitly avail-
able as possible for the interpersonal process, that therapist is ideally 
available to themself first. In IPNB terms, the therapist’s own brain is 
integrated, allowing for a flexible mind; and in IFS terms, explored below, 
the therapist works best when in Self. This means knowing as much as we 
can about our own minds; countertransferential triggers, in psychoana-
lytic terms. In his explication of the neuroscience of psychotherapy, 
Cozolino (2010, p. 30) writes,
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Each therapist-client pair creates a unique system resulting in a particular 
outcome… [T]he therapist’s unconscious contributes to the context and 
outcome of therapy… [T[herapists… will be putting their imprint on the 
hearts, minds, and brains of their clients.
Knowing our own complicit systems is step one. Learning what we can 
about our client’s is step two. To do this we use both our minds and our 
bodies, listening to information from both on their varied and connected 
(complicit) levels. This has been put in terms of the neurobiological role 
of clinical intuition, and the knowledge that gut feelings connect via the 
autonomic nervous system to right brain processes and implicit memory- 
based understandings that are embodied (Peña, 2019). Understanding 
that our system and our clients’ interrelate—that therapy creates inter-
subjective space which is biological as well as psychic—is the final step, 
and it is in this space that therapy happens. I hope it can be seen how this 
frame, which connects different approaches, makes use of both science 
and the art of psychotherapy (Schore, 2012); indeed, understands that 
they work together, or not at all.
Cozolino (2010, p. 46) suggests “a number of working hypotheses” 
generated from considering the neuroscientific underpinnings of a range 
of psychotherapeutic modalities, from depth work to systems work to 
cognitive behavioral approaches. These are, first, that intellectual (left 
brain, prefrontal cortex) understanding of a problem without (right 
brain) integration of feelings and sensations cannot bring about psycho-
logical change: “Whether it is called symptom relief, differentiation, ego 
strength, or awareness, all forms of therapy are targeting dissociated neu-
ral networks for integration” (Cozolino, 2010, p.  46). This process 
requires a therapist who is empathetically attuned to the client’s spoken 
and unspoken experience, resulting in secure attachment (see also Afford, 
2020; Geller & Porges, 2014). It is also reliant on the leveraging of “opti-
mal stress” (Cozolino, 2010, p. 46), or what SE therapy calls working 
with the window of tolerance: emotions must have room to be safely felt 
and contained in the therapeutic process, and “[a]ll forms of successful 
therapy strive to create safe emergencies in one form or another” 
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 46). The resulting experience creates opportunities 
to change autobiographical memory, aka conscious sense of self, as well as 
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the body’s unmetabolized memories of the past (Van der Kolk, 2014): 
“psychotherapy involves changes not in the cognitions of the patient’s… 
mind/brain… but in the affective embodied experiences of his or her [or 
their] brain/ mind/ body” (Schore, 2012, p. 12).
Schore (2012, p. 10) describes the implications of the findings that 
early childhood experiences shape the brain and mind, and that right 
brain affective processes may be more important than left brain cognition 
in understanding and treating mental health:
Previously the Cartesian mind/ body split has plagued not only psychology 
and psychiatry but medicine in general… The current paradigm shift in 
research from cognition to emotion has been a major force in resolving the 
Cartesian problem and generating theoretical models that integrate… 
“nature and nurture.”
Schore (2012, p. 16) also suggests that modern culture has become too 
invested in and reliant on left brain processes, resulting in,
[A]n overemphasis on psychopharmacology over psychotherapy, an undue 
influence of the insurance industry in defining “normative” and “accept-
able” forms of treatment, an overidealization of “evidence-based practice”, 
an underappreciation of the large body of studies on the effectiveness of the 
therapeutic alliance, a trend towards “manualization” of therapy, a training 
model that focuses on the learning of techniques rather than expanding 
relational skill…
These critiques should be familiar to the reader by now, along with 
their social, historical and economic complicities. It is worth noting that 
these are all the same complaints made about the consequences of view-
ing psy work as a science, explored in Chap. 1. Schore (2012) invokes 
McGilchrist’s (2009) warning of the development of a technocratic, neo-
liberal world order, also as a consequence of ignoring the importance of 
right brain, affective, embodied and interconnected elements of human 
being, as explored in Chap. 5.
From his work on the importance of the implicit, affective experience 
of self in the formation of later, thinking, self-awareness, and the neuro-
scientific evidence behind this explanation of how the unconscious works, 
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Schore (2012, p. 119) concludes, “The concept of a single, unitary ‘self ’ 
is as misleading as the idea of a single, unitary ‘brain.’” Porges (2018) 
suggests the brain is also in the body; and Schore’s (2012, p. 119) work 
shows how the self begins in the preverbal right brain: “The left and right 
hemispheres process information in their own unique fashion” and com-
prise two systems, conscious and unconscious. There is no Cartesian 
unity here, not even on a physical level (see McGilchrist, 2009). If there 
is one modality that most embraces the idea of the self as a collection of 
parts, which takes into account systems thinking, depth work and somatic 
experiences, it is Internal Family Systems.
 Internal Family Systems
Internal Family Systems (IFS) is both a way of understanding human 
being and a therapy modality. It was developed by Richard Schwartz out 
of family therapy approaches to clients with eating disorders (Schwartz & 
Sweezy, 2020). IFS has been shown to be effective with a range of clients, 
individual, couple and family groupings, and a range of diagnoses 
(Haddock et al., 2016; Lucero et al., 2018; Sweezy & Ziskind, 2017). It 
has been demonstrated to significantly improve the ability to mentalize 
and perspective-take (Böckler et al., 2017) and has been recognized by 
the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices as an 
evidence-based treatment for anxiety, depression and medical conditions 
(Matheson, 2015; Schwartz & Sweezy, 2020; Sowell, 2013). It has also 
been extensively used in therapy with survivors of childhood sexual abuse 
(Goulding & Schwartz, 2003).
IFS counters the mainstream Western idea of the unified self, explored 
in Chap. 1, by understanding subjects as made up of a collection of parts, 
as well as a core Self who has the innate, organic capacity to lead the sys-
tem. There are two broad categories of parts, protectors and exiles, with 
the latter carrying the burdens of unmetabolized emotions and traumatic, 
horrifying or hurtful experiences.
IFS offers a sophisticated view of how systems are made up of complicit 
relations. It applies systems thinking, which traces relational patterns and 
sees a system as self-organized, complex and striving toward health:
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Systems thinking helps us examine the various systems surrounding or 
within a client to find and release constraints. Constraints may exist in a 
client’s system of inner personalities, in the client’s relationship with vari-
ous family members, in the way the family in general is organized, in the 
way various institutions outside the family affect it… and in the way the 
client’s ethnic community and the larger society affect the families values 
and beliefs. All of these human systems are interlocked. They affect and are 
affected by each other. (Schwartz & Sweezy, 2020, p. 26)
Furthermore, attest Schwartz and Sweezy (2020, p. 26), these systems 
mirror each other structurally at each level. There is thus “a good deal of 
universality” in the operating principles across systems. This framing, as 
we will see, allows IFS to envision its model of parts with roles that can 
go awry as applicable to all levels of human being and the institutions 
that structure our outer, and therefore help to structure our inner, lives.
IFS assumes that our parts always work for us, even if they sometimes 
are at odds with each other (as when one part of you wants one thing, and 
another part wants the opposite), or are doing counterproductive work 
(such as internally shaming a person to try and keep them safe from 
revealing a shamed part). This is a way of understanding binary positions 
as polarizations between two parts, which are invariably working at log-
gerheads for the same thing. The solution is not to take sides, but to 
facilitate understanding between the parts—to break the binary energy 
that is keeping them both stuck and escalating in relation to each other.
IFS is nonpathologizing, seeing symptoms as the behaviors caused by 
parts that need to be heard and understood. It is each person’s unique, 
intrinsically healing Self that does the hearing and helping of component 
parts. The therapist is a guide, not an expert—how can she be expert 
about someone else’s internal system?
The IFS process entails finding, identifying and listening to parts. Parts 
can be held in places in the body, and can also be frozen in a traumatic 
moment in time. As such, IFS offers a practice that understands and 
makes use of the insights of both depth and systems psychotherapies, as 
well as the techniques of somatic psychologies that understand how the 
past can be held in the body, and from there, impact the psyche.
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This offers an understanding of the ecological relationship not only 
internally but between people and their wider systems. It is a fundamen-
tally complicit understanding of human being, bringing an awareness of 
how systems both form and impact each other, as well as an optimistic, 
empowering view of the systemic striving for health:
[H]uman systems—parts, individuals, families, communities, and cul-
tures—nest, mirror, and interact. And since all systems sustain injury at 
times, all are at risk of developing burdens that can be passed down for 
generations. At the same time, all systems seek balance and make attempts 
to self-right. (Schwartz & Sweezy, 2020, p. 228)
Schwartz and Sweezy (2020, chapter 18) apply IFS to American soci-
ety, and their findings echo the assessments made in Chaps. 2 and 3 here. 
They suggest that America carries legacy burdens of racism, patriarchy, 
individualism and materialism (what I have named as capitalism), all of 
which were brought by Europeans fleeing not only persecution, but a 
culture that brutally controlled and punished its members (Foucault 
graphically details these methods of control in Discipline and Punish 
Foucault, 1977). They also account for Trumpism in an interesting way, 
as a rigid, protective defense against economic changes of the past 
40 years.
In this way, the IFS understanding of how systems work, sometimes 
maladaptively, to protect and maintain the status quo, layers onto histori-
cal explanations for the development and maintenance of binary systems. 
It also offers an alternative psychological model to the psychoanalytic 
self/other understanding as to why this culture has developed the pro-
cesses of toxic othering that have driven value systems and the institu-
tions that perpetuate them:
The American legacy burdens of racism, patriarchy, individualism and 
materialism imbue protectors with… contempt. As a result, the United 
States not only exiles a greater percentage of its population than any other 
Western nation, it has less compassion and more contempt for its exiled 
populations. (Schwartz & Sweezy, 2020, p. 246)
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Parts work goes well with the understanding of neural networks and 
the habits of being they set up and can be changed by (Badenoch, 2008). 
IPNB’s focus on the complex system that makes up our selves—or, 
indeed, in IFS’s term, Selves—includes the expectation that the system 
strives toward harmonious self-organization, which means health is 
achieved through flexibility and integration of systems (i.e., systems work 
smoothly together) (Siegel, 1999). Anderson (2013, p. 108) suggests that 
working with parts “can create the optimal environment for the brain-
stem, limbic system, cortex, and especially the prefrontal cortex to work 
together, promoting neural integration and creating new pathways in the 
brain.” In other words, there may be a neurobiological explanation for 
how and why IFS works, which includes the interpersonal forces detailed 
by Siegel (1999, 2007) and the nonverbal, embodied right brain pro-
cesses tracked by Schore (2003) and by somatic-based psychotherapies 
like Hakomi (Kurtz, 2007) and Somatic Experiencing (Levine, 1997; 
Payne et  al., 2015). Anderson (2013) suggests that IFS helps implicit 
memory become explicit, integrates experience and creates new neural 
networks to enable new responses to situations, stimuli and people. Thus, 
IFS works with aspects of trauma theory which trace the ways trauma is 
encoded in the body (Van der Kolk, 2014). He (Anderson, 2013, p. 109) 
also proposes that certain reactive parts ‘live’ in the brainstem or amyg-
dala, and that “over time… we will learn where all the parts are located in 
the brain.”
In my experience, IFS’s nonjudgmental, nonpathologizing approach 
to whatever a client is experiencing is not only appealing for a feminist 
therapist, it is extremely effective. As Schwartz (2017) commented in a 
discussion about working with racist parts as a white man, hating our 
parts has never worked in getting them to change. Learning to know our 
parts is a powerful way to understand how our internal systems work, 
because it allows us to see the internal connections, alliances, arguments 
we have going on and how these structure our responses and reactions to 
ourselves and others. It sees binaries as unhelpful oppositions to be medi-
ated and resolved, so that co-operation is possible between parts. It also 
accounts for the impact of external systems of all kinds on the experiences 
and reactions of specific parts. Because IFS is collaborative in approach, 
it fits with a feminist stance. It does not expect the therapist to be the 
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expert; it wants to hear from the parts. Crucially, also, IFS’s main goal is 
to support a client’s Self in taking leadership internally. IFS allows the 
therapist and the client to problem-solve together. While trust in the 
therapist is an important enabling component of this approach as all oth-
ers, mutuality is a value in IFS (Schwartz, 2013).
IFS is not a system of object relations in the psychoanalytic sense. It 
takes parts literally, not metaphorically or symbolically, or as introjects. 
Intersubjectivity, as it is developed in psychoanalysis, begins by interro-
gating the classic psychoanalytic self/other binary, where the other is both 
an internalization used by the self, and, crucially, in need of recognition 
as an independent subject, not just material for object relations.
 Beyond the Self/Other Binary: Thirdness
If IFS sees parts as literally independent entities or subpersonalities that 
are in relation to the Self (we are made up of others who are also our-
selves), intersubjective psychoanalytic psychotherapy aims to own the 
self ’s dependence on the other. Here the other is both outside of, and 
then introjected into, the self. In this sense, it is a part. Crucial to the 
intersubjective understanding is the recognition that the other—the lit-
eral outside person upon whom the subject is dependent, in the first 
place the mother or first caretaker—is also a self. The object in object 
relations theory is thus restored to its own humanity, from whence comes 
its power and importance as internalized object in the subject’s psyche. 
The self craves the other’s recognition, which means the self needs the 
other to be also a self, and not just an object (Benjamin, 1988). This 
breaks the objectifying power of binary energy, and, as Benjamin (1988) 
points out, the constituting logic of patriarchy’s rules for personhood, 
where the female is the first object on which the self depends.
Benjamin (1995) details how the self needs to hold the other both as its 
own independent self, and as an internalized other. Locating oneself 
between these two places of the other is necessary to respect the other’s 
personhood as well as to inhabit one’s reliance on the other, she says. This 
fundamentally nonbinary understanding of human being is what Benjamin 
(1995, p. 5) calls an “ambiphilic” approach. She explores the consequences 
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of asking about the difference between other as another subject (a “real” 
object) and other as internalized part (an object relation), while acknowl-
edging that “both are endemic to psychic experience” (p.  29). 
“Intersubjectivity was formulated in deliberate contrast to the logic of sub-
ject and object, which predominates in Western philosophy and science” 
(Benjamin, 1995, p. 30). Thus, she insists on a both-and approach.
This nonbinary approach facilitates the embrace of the intersubjective 
as the space where therapy occurs. The therapist’s self is complicit in the 
process, and in the client’s experience of self through the therapist as 
other. This third space, between and because of the dyad of two selves in 
the relationship, is constituted through body-based and right brain, affec-
tive, nonverbal communications (Schore, 2012). To add Benjamin’s 
(1988, 1995) intersubjective vocabulary and perspective to this process, 
the client must experience the therapist as an independent subject in 
order to benefit from their healing presence, while at the same time tak-
ing the therapist in to facilitate a different sense of self, of what is possible 
inside and in relation, and therefore, to change. Once more, the com-
plicit nature of human being—the ways our minds rely on and make 
each other—is core to the therapy process theoretically as well as actually, 
in physical reality. The focus becomes squarely relational, on attachment 
processes and the feelings of love, safety, recognition and pleasure that 
occur when selves embrace all aspects of their complicities. Gesturing 
toward the consequences of viewing self as self-contained, Benjamin 
(1995, p. 32) comments, “The idea of pleasure was lost when ego psy-
chology put the id on the backburner, but it might be restored by recog-
nizing the subjectivity of the other.” Benjamin’s (1995) definition of 
pleasure is pleasure in and of mutuality. It is a result of the relation 
between two selves, which means the rejection of the self/other binary.
The interpersonal neurobiological intersects with the idea of the cre-
ation of a third as the result of the relation between two, a model of 
nonbinary human complicity that describes what therapy is:
The social synapse is the space between us… When we smile, wave, and say 
hello, these behaviours are sent through the space between us via sights, 
sounds odors, and words. These electrical and mechanical messages received 
by our senses are converted into electrochemical impulses within our 
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brains. These signals stimulate new behaviors, which, in turn, transmit 
messages back across the social synapse. (Cozolino, 2010, pp. 179–80)
Afford (2020) tracks in detail how this interpersonal neurobiology 
works in the therapy room. What does an online, mediated world, as 
explored in Chap. 5, do to this necessary human interaction? And what 
has the past year of largely online therapy conducted under the shelter- 
in- place rules of life during the coronavirus pandemic done to our work? 
What will it mean if we choose to continue virtual living once coronavi-
rus is more contained? What will the cyborg third feel like? Certainly, 
Benjamin’s (1995, pp. 36–7) articulation of the risk of intersubjectivity 
speaks to some of the relational consequences this culture is seeing in a 
socially mediated world:
The need for recognition entails this fundamental paradox: at the very 
moment of realizing our own independent will, we are dependent upon 
another to recognize it. At the very moment we come to understand the 
meaning of I, myself, we are forced to see the limitations of that self. At the 
moment when we understand that separate minds can share similar feel-
ings, we begin to learn that these minds can also disagree.
Ideally, we learn ultimately to tolerate the spectrum of differences 
between self and self, from different needs, to disagreement to conflict. 
We need the self not to become an objectified other, which Goulding and 
Schwartz (2003, p. 46) describe as the “distorted” results of polarization, 
where another’s multiplicity is lost to the extreme reaction of a triggered 
part. For the other to retain their personhood in the face of conflict or 
disagreement, a state of “constant tension between recognizing the other 
and asserting the self ” must be possible (Benjamin, 1995, p. 38). It is not 
a resting place. It is a place of ongoing doing, which requires us to man-
age the “sting” (ibid, p. 47) of having to engage with, manage, accom-
modate, speak back to, see, difference. Rather than use the other as an 
object to secure the borders, the stability, of the self, which is the typical 
use of otherness in Western colonial, patriarchal self/other psychology.
In the description above, Benjamin (1995) is tracking a developmental 
process in the young child: If he can learn to see his mother as a person, 
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he can learn to tolerate her difference from him. Then he will not need to 
control her to feel safe. Elsewhere she (Benjamin, 1988) details how, in a 
patriarchal culture, the refusal of mutual recognition and the establish-
ment of a sense of self built on the other as object set up relations of 
domination. The first object, in such a culture, is the mother, and the 
subject is the child of Freud’s Oedipus complex, detailed in Chap. 2. 
Sexual difference becomes the lynchpin of the system. Patriarchy inter-
sects with racism, with colonialism and with the neoliberal capitalism 
that resulted from the historical outspooling of all three, together with 
the centering of the self-contained, dependency-rejecting, left-brain- 
valorizing Cartesian subject as the model for Western subjectivity. 
Othering, cancelling, entrenched partisanship: what are these if not an 
inability to tolerate the subjectivity of the other? And if mutuality requires 
an embodied component, it is no wonder that a society increasingly built 
on social media is struggling to cohere as a society. As detailed in Chap. 
5, my contention is that the computer age, late modernity, has exacer-
bated many of the dynamics of early modernity, whence began the mod-
ern systems of domination with all their consequences for human being 
across a globe subjected to Western norms.
The idea of the intersubjective third also includes social, political and 
historical dynamics, as we saw in Chap. 2. Sehrbrock (2020) calls this 
social thirdness, and writes about how therapists should manage the 
intersubjective consequences of what he calls prejudice, which creates 
two subjects locked in their own positionality with regard to each other. 
Attention to the social third—the space made of the collective and the 
cultural as well as the interpsychic—is crucial, according to Sehrbrock 
(2020), to avoid reproducing the silencing imperatives of homophobia 
and misogyny, and other prejudices. This is one way to understand how 
a social justice commitment enters clinical practice without becoming an 
imposition of therapist values on the client:
Attention to the social third, to me, is thus a clinical and ethical obligation 
of exercising social conscience…. by silencing or ignoring the subtle and 
gross intersectionalities of social thirdness, psychoanalytic practice perpet-




His conclusion: “In order to realize psychoanalytic principles in the age 
of #MeToo, Time’s Up, and BlackLivesMatter, we need to recognize social 
thirdness as an aspect of our conscience, our ethics, and our psychoana-
lytic politics” (Sehrbrock, 2020, p. 294). Stephens (2020) explores how 
the intersubjective process of knowing ourselves with and through the 
other can help with long-standing racialized dynamics in Western culture. 
An intersubjective approach, she (Stephens, 2020) suggests, can counter-
act the binary dynamics in self/other thinking that perpetuate dynamics 
of oppression and the typical affective responses of guilt and rage.
As I have been illustrating, the therapy process is an interaction 
between two embodied, contextualized minds. The intersubjective space, 
itself existing in context, is reliant on right brain, affective, intuitive, non-
verbal, embodied relating between client and therapist (Peña, 2019; see 
Afford, 2020). In exploring the implications of intersubjectivity for a 
Western psychology rooted in a self-contained ‘I’, and intuiting IPNB, 
Coelho and Figueiredo (2003, p. 195) ask:
But is it in fact possible to perceive what the other self feels, what it per-
ceives? We assume that in some way it is, since psychological practices are 
based on elements of perception, and especially on mutual perception. 
Possibly most communication depends on a sophisticated interplay 
between the perceptions of the participants in the therapeutic process… 
There are pre-verbal, infra-verbal, pre-representational, corporal and per-
haps even instinctual forms of communication, as well, of course, as verbal 
communication itself. There are conscious, pre-conscious and, who knows, 
perhaps even unconscious perceptions. Why not? We often transmit what 
we do not know we have perceived, and also recognize sensations and feel-
ings whose origin we are unsure of. We recognize our own feelings, but are 
they really ours, or the other’s?
IPNB answers the first question posed here (“is it in fact possible to 
perceive what the other self feels?”) with a resounding “yes,” and also 
explains how. We not only perceive the feelings of the other, through 
various channels of communication, as Coelho and Figueiredo (2003) 
detail above, but we can account for the ways the feelings of the other not 
only resonate within, but help to constitute, the self, physically as well as 
psychically.
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Thus, working in the intersubjective space means working with the 
lessons of the somatic-informed therapy practices. It also means working 
within a systems focus, because culture, history and inheritances are an 
inevitable part of the space, within and between each participant, thera-
pist and client. IFS therapy calls some of these inheritances, the ones that 
cause or carry trauma in the broad sense, burdens. It looks to see which 
parts of both therapist and client hold and respond to burdens, in order 
to help free them of their constraining roles. All of these approaches can 
be understood as acknowledging and responding to the fact of complicity 
as the fundamental marker of human being. They merely approach this 
fact in their own, often complementary and intersecting, ways.
 A Social Justice Practice
How to engage in a discipline, psychotherapy, that stands accused, as we 
have seen, of co-creating the oppressive systems of modernity? How does 
the therapy space take full account of the social third if therapy itself is a 
force of Foucaultian discipline and subjectification? Despite the ongoing 
work of liberation psychologies, critical psychology, feminist and decolo-
nial psychologies, psychology remains a powerful proponent and cause of 
binary thinking, and often reliant on the stance of scientific objectivity, 
with all the objectifying dynamics we have traced so far. Psychotherapy 
stands accused of helping to invent and perpetuate the liberal subject, 
today neoliberally subjected by all the institutions of the Western world.
Psychoanalysis offered the insight that the subject is a subject by virtue 
of its alienation from itself, and therefore cannot be the imagined master- 
full, self-centered, liberal subject the West believes it to be. This has been 
very productive for literary theory, but less transformative of mainstream 
psychotherapeutic practice. In 2021, with the ongoing dominance of 
behavioral medicine and under the influence of the healthcare industrial 
complex, the psy disciplines remain “the very heartland of the self ” (Rose, 
1998, p. 8), helping to perpetuate the idea that, if we can afford it, we are 
responsible for ourselves, and for improving so as to be productive citi-
zens of late capitalism. Rose (1998) argued that no one theory of the 
human subject (such as psychology) could account for the process of 
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subjectification in which such theorizing participated. He reminds us to 
pay attention to the “complex of apparatuses, practices, machinations, 
and assemblages within which human being has been fabricated” (Rose, 
1998, p.  10). Given that the humanities at least has known this for 
decades, what do we do now, in a Trumpified, burning, melting, drown-
ing, contagious world? What can psychology do, given its complicity in 
the creation of this world?
For example, Binkley (2020) writes about the emotional postures of 
black rage and white listening, and how together they serve to reinforce 
white privilege. He details his personal experience of trying to under-
stand his ambivalence about being invited to occupy the position of 
white listener, in an “unholy contract” of “raging and listening… sustain-
ing and enriching each other, wedded in a conspiracy to keep me where 
and who I was, and to suppress any possibilities for an overturning of 
things as they were. Or imagining things as they might be” (Binkley, 
2020, p. 93). He offers a genealogy of these raced emotional positions as 
they exist in liberal institutions. He suggests that the expressions of strong 
emotion as catharsis, met with an empathetic listening, are psychologized 
technologies: ignorant white privilege learns to know and transcend itself 
via an empathetic encounter with the rage of the raced other. Responsible 
listeners learn their own authentic personhood and how to undo racism.
The result is,
Where once the politics of race might have been about conflicting ideas, 
structural analyses, and moral commitments, today it is about empathetic 
sensibilities, emotional states, and the capacity to sense and respond to 
what others around you are feeling. (Binkley, 2020, p. 93)
If Binkley is correct, this suggests that the current state of resistance to 
racial injustice is individualized and psychologized through the modern-
izing, political, processes mapped by, for example, Rose (1998) and 
Sugarman (2020). In being individualized, this process is rendered binary, 
and reduced to a self/other relation that by definition will always need 
someone to despise. This someone is as easily the listening white as it is 
the constitutive other of privilege’s invisible self. It is the inadequate cis 
feminist or the ignorant rich kid. It allows progressive culture to frag-
ment itself.
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The feeling of being trapped Binkley describes is familiar to me, as a 
well-intentioned white person who is committed to interrogating the 
comforts of my privilege and resisting the collapses of fragility. I am not 
rendering structurally equivalent the oppressed subject of institutional 
inequality and/or structural oppression, and the well-intentioned listen-
ing white. But I am suggesting that the same binary structure, when it is 
the essentialized model for accounting for oppression, can undo our 
chance for real systemic change. Historically, oppression in Western 
modernity operates along a self/other binary, where the constitutive other 
is made to bear the self ’s projections so that the self can experience itself 
as good and whole and in control. To counter such a structure, we need 
a different model. We need a theory of the complicit subject, where inno-
cence or guilt, goodness or badness, cannot be the focus. Furthermore, 
we need to think in more complex ways about where the language of 
psychology, and particularly ideas of wounding, trauma, rage, guilt, and 
intention have left us. To do this, we do would do better to challenge the 
idea of individual subjects locked in positions of privilege versus posi-
tions of victimization.
In tracking her evolution as a feminist therapist from social activist, 
aware of the importance of context to each human, to a more profoundly 
connected understanding of human being through what she calls the 
dark emotions, Greenspan (2017, p. 342) writes of “a new paradigm of 
emotional ecology in which our seemingly most personal emotions are 
connected to their larger social and global contexts.” Goodman and 
Freeman (2015, p. 9) call for the need to “think otherwise” in psychology. 
To reject the bounded self of modernity, of liberal individualism, is to 
embrace a self open to what it does not know, which is to say, the world 
outside itself. For Goodman and Freeman, such a psychotherapeutic 
practice is “more relational” and, implicitly therefore, “more ethical.” And 
that, finally, is what the idea of the complicit subject offers: an ethics of 
“being-with” (Goodman & Freeman, 2015, p.  9) that might help us 
engage with the systemic injustice that harms us all.
None of this is intended to downplay the inheritances of race, class, 
gender, religious, geographic, cis-privilege or ablebodied-privilege. I am 
not trying to excuse or ignore the abuses of power on which the neocolo-
nial world is built. I am certainly not resisting the recent public discourse 
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about privilege, especially white privilege, which is finally being heard by 
at least some white people thanks to the hard and careful work of the 
Black Lives Matter movement. America is built on the exploitation and 
suffering of Native, Black and brown people, and those foundations can-
not be dug up. Western culture is built on a cisgender binary that informs 
all its systems of thought and meaning. It is also true that until white 
people and cisgender people and ablebodied people and people assigned 
male at birth and those with class privilege can bear to take responsibility 
for these foundations, outrage remains appropriate. But outrage, however 
painful and true its source, is easier than holding the complexity of com-
plicit, flawed humanity. This includes learning to understand and accept 
all of our parts, and how they—and we—are reliant on each other.
This is one suggestion for how we truly make space for the other, what 
it means to hold therapeutic compassion, perhaps especially for those 
very different from ourselves. A theory of complicity is at odds with iden-
tity politics and the binary positionings identity politics have unfortu-
nately sometimes come to reinscribe. Identity politics are necessary for 
visibility within a liberal system, as explored in Chap. 2, and also bring 
important self-affirming, empowering possibilities in the context of 
Western individualism, allowing for solidarity in the face of oppression 
and the concomitant negation of personhood suffered by so many. But 
basing a program for change on a way of thinking that defines us all 
according to our place in the current structure, and from there, in binary 
relation to each other, has its limits, in terms of ways forward out of the 
system. We have seen how, in political science, Brown (1995) has written 
about this, and from gender studies, so has Butler (1993). Gamson (1995, 
p. 391) also explores the paradox that in America, “fixed identity catego-
ries are both the basis for oppression and the basis for political power.” In 
another example, this time from the discipline of history, Scott (1991) 
explores the importance and the implications of making visible homo-
sexual practices and the institutions that enabled them, as a project of 
reclaiming a denied history:
History is a chronology that makes experience visible, but in which catego-
ries appear as nonetheless ahistorical: desire, homosexuality, heterosexual-
ity, femininity, masculinity, sex, and even sexual practices become so many 
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fixed entities being played out over time, but not themselves historicized. 
(Scott, 1991, p. 778)
Thus, “The project of making experience visible precludes analysis of 
the workings of this system and of its historicity; instead, it reproduces its 
terms” (Scott, 1991, p. 779).
Scott (1991) acknowledges the importance, for someone who has 
experienced marginalization, of visibly experiencing oneself as part of a 
mass of people like oneself, of belonging to a movement, for both iden-
tity and political safety. Such movement processes allow challenges to 
what were previously master narratives of normality and moral goodness, 
which either left out or used (othered) the experiences and identities of 
marginalized groups. Counter-narratives, the right to make one’s own 
meaning of one’s self, life, desires and group, are powerful and important 
pushbacks against oppressive meanings being made of one and one’s group.
At this point in history, some of us are more free of powerful institu-
tions claiming the right to decide about who we are, who we should be 
and what is to be done to us to make it so. So-called conversation therapy, 
the attempt to change sexual orientation or gender identity, is now illegal 
in a number of states (Drescher et al., 2016; Newhook et al., 2018). One 
consequence of postmodernity, however, is that evidence becomes always 
partial—there can no longer be absolute proof of one absolute truth, 
since the postmodern reality is one of fractured, competing, different 
stories, narratives of and about difference. In a binary frame, difference 
always means power dynamics, and so meanings are contested. One 
result, writes Scott (1991, p. 777), is that “experience” becomes an under-
writer of historical evidence, of the truth of someone’s reality:
It is precisely this kind of appeal to experience as uncontestable evidence 
and as an originary point of explanation—as a foundation on which analy-
sis is based—that weakens the critical thrust of histories of difference…. 
these studies lose the possibility of examining those assumptions and prac-
tices that excluded considerations of difference in the first place. They take 
as self-evident the identities of those whose experience is being documented 
and thus naturalize their difference. They locate resistance outside its dis-
cursive construction and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individu-
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als, thus decontextualizing it… Questions about the constructed nature of 
experience, about how subjects are constituted as different in the first 
place,… are left aside. The evidence of experience then becomes evidence 
for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is 
established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects 
who see and act in the world.
Scott’s (1991) meta-analysis of how meanings are made in history par-
allels Rose’s (1998) insistence that the psy disciplines cannot be taken at 
their word, since they have helped to construct the language in which we 
speak subjectivity. These lessons from the humanities have still to be 
taken seriously. The constructed nature of identity categories themselves, 
the way difference is made to do the work of meaning-making from 
within the terms of the dominant system, these things are elided by the 
reinscription of binary categories: privileged/marginalized; oppressor/
oppressed. Here, we see the pull toward the construction of another 
binary, mentioned in Chap. 1, where material reality (suffering, exclu-
sionary practices, actual violence) is placed against theory, the desire for 
meta-analysis of the meaning-making processes that underlie and enable 
the material suffering. My point, of course, is that they are complicit in 
each other, not at odds. Material reality is created by discourse, by power 
dynamics, by the meanings made of difference. And within, between, 
seeping outside of these processes, human being exceeds the binary posi-
tions imposed on it by systems of power, by history, by inheritance. If this 
were not true, what would be the point of therapy? Identity positions 
may be necessary to begin the work of resistance, but if they are also the 
end point, the system remains in place.
Lorde (1981) comments on being told she speaks with “the moral 
authority of suffering” because she is black and lesbian. Her response is, 
“what you hear in my voice is fury, not suffering. Anger, not moral 
authority. There is a difference.” She details the importance of anger when 
there is injustice and suffering, where there is hatred of the difference 
represented by othered groups: “This hatred and our anger are very differ-
ent. Hatred is the fury of those who do not share our goals [of liberation], 
and its object is death and destruction. Anger is a grief of distortions 
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between peers, and its object is change.” She asks for the creative, empow-
ering use of anger to generate an ability to engage with difference, “to 
alter those distortions which history has created around our difference. 
For it is those distortions which separate us. And we must ask ourselves: 
Who profits from all this?”
The system based on binary thinking, on misogyny, racism, cisgender-
ism, ableism, classism, colonialism, profits. Certain groups, for whom 
this system was developed, profit. But even those of us who profit are 
intersectional, and therefore subject to the system. And since binary logic 
is false and artificial, as I have explored, what seems to be pure profit is 
always complicit, vulnerable. To use Lorde’s (1981) idea, anger can be a 
force to break the binary, to shift us out of relations of victims and oppres-
sors, to make us all peers in human being. Individuality, neocolonial dis-
cursive and material structures, liberal rights, neoliberal pressures and the 
twenty-first century imperative to profit from your personhood are forces 
against which rage is appropriate. And a complicit take on these dynam-
ics allows us to start with the evidence of the experience of these systems, 
but not to end there, which would return us to the same terms.
Lorde’s (1981) wisdom, as usual, remains relevant to our complex 
times. She rejects the commodification of suffering, while claiming and 
harnessing her righteous anger. She denies that anger has to turn into the 
same kind of othering hatred that generated the suffering and the anger 
in the first place. She refuses the charge that being angry because of rac-
ism makes her problematic or destructive to any cause, and she rightly 
returns the responsibility to the white women who are rendered guilty or 
uncomfortable by her anger. She also refuses the charge of causing hope-
lessness or of collapsing into victimhood: she is speaking about the pro-
ductive and empowering use of anger to address injustice, and the 
necessity of allies being able to hear and learn from this, not collapse in 
the face of it, as the privileged often tend to do. She (Lorde, 1981) asks, 
“What woman here is so enamored of her own oppression that she can-
not see her heelprint upon another woman’s face? What woman’s terms of 
oppression have become precious and necessary to her as a ticket into the 
fold of the righteous, away from the cold winds of self-scrutiny?”
I do not mean to minimize the real suffering caused by structural 
oppression. But I do mean to humbly and respectfully ask that we begin 
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to consider our mutual entanglements in this structure. We are all com-
plicit in each other. And if therapy nowadays can help, it can benefit 
enormously from getting away from reified truths.
 The Complicit Therapist: How Therapy Heals
“[I]f we want to create a world in which conflict and trauma aren’t the 
center of our collective existence, we have to practice something new, ask 
different questions, access again our curiosity about each other as a spe-
cies” (brown 2020, p. 73). brown is talking specifically about the ten-
dency in restorative and social justice movements to act against each other 
from the places of wounding caused by being the victims and survivors of 
histories of oppression and the systems of supremacy these histories con-
tinue to construct and fuel. This is an example of complicity, where allies 
are unconsciously driven by the methods they cannot help but have inter-
nalized as a result of being subject to them, subjected by them. Naming 
this, as brown does, is the necessary first step to finding ways to be differ-
ent. We have to practice something new. But as a career in the humanities 
taught me via the theory I learned there, we will practice whatever the 
content of our common sense is. Common sense is always invested, 
always historically and politically produced. And it will always present 
itself as natural, obvious, the best and/or only way to think about things. 
This book has presented a way of thinking that tries to interrupt some of 
the common sense of Western culture: that binary thinking is inevitable, 
that we are not psychically and biologically co- created. If human being 
can be thought of as complicitous, we can open up to changes to our 
systems and ourselves, as the two will always influence each other.
We have looked at some psychotherapeutic approaches that, in their 
various ways, are systems oriented but also allow for a depth approach. I 
have added a focus on the necessity of a nonbinary understanding of how 
these dynamics work. The system is always nested in, and woven into, 
other systems: the individual is a system physiologically connected to their 
past, to their community, and to their caregivers and family, and all their 
systems in turn. Our parts are forged in these relationships, experiences, 
inheritances. The therapeutic dyad is also a system, made up of therapist 
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and client co-creating their intersubjective third space, which itself holds 
all the nested systems, including the social-political inheritances and bur-
dens at play in each unique space. The work of the therapeutic bond is 
neurobiological and an experience of deep human connection (Geller & 
Porges, 2014), poetic in its inability to be accounted for scientifically out-
side of affective, embodied experience. Brains, minds, bodies, hearts and 
souls, we are connected. Therapy heals through complicity.
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The work of this book has been to engage with notions of human being 
that are mainstream in Western modernity. These common sense ideas 
have been forged and disseminated in the psy disciplines. I have sought 
to offer an alternative way of thinking about self and other that might 
alter how and why we think about our psychotherapeutic work. In the 
first chapter, I argued that the psy disciplines benefit when they learn 
from the humanities. In the final chapter, I outlined existing psycho-
therapy practices that already apply an understanding that human being 
is complicitous, even if those are not the terms they use. In between, I 
offered illustrations to bring into focus how systems of power evolve from 
specific historical events and from material practices, and then reinforce 
or underwrite these practices (see Kendi, 2016 for the example of racism 
in America as an illustration of how material practices can cause cultural 
formations as much as the other way around).
I have sought to show how the institutions, culture and material prac-
tices of the modern, currently neoliberal West assumed and perpetuated 
binary ways of thinking about what it means to be human. This binary 
thinking structured and developed common-sense notions about bodies 
and the identities these bodies carried, were made to carry or formed in 
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response to the meanings placed on them. I have suggested that patriar-
chy, capitalism, racism, misogyny (and the homo- and trans-phobias 
misogyny helps to feed) and colonialism have been at play in historically 
specific and accountable ways (Perry, 2018 offers a detailed account 
of this).
This history matters because too often the mainstream psy disciplines, 
one of the key technologies of modern (individualized, liberal) subject 
formation, have operated as though human being is a series of synapses, 
response times, behavioral programming, chemical reactions, biological 
drives and other such quantifiable, individualized, scientifically explica-
ble forces (see Tosh, 2015 for a detailed example of how psychiatry has 
understood sexual violence as an individual pathology, and the conse-
quences for normative gender). As I argued in Chap. 1, drawing on the 
work of critical psychologists, human being is not a science.
This is one reason the psychological humanities are so important: As I 
hope I have illustrated here, we can only start to work our long way out 
of the interpersonal, environmental, structural mess we have inherited we 
begin to see ourselves—our humanity, and the relationships on which 
our individual human being depends—differently. A complicitous 
approach invites us to think in nonbinary ways, and to not take for 
granted Western cultural common sense, which, like all human mean-
ings, is based on historical, material, relations of power, not god, nature 
or science—themselves cultural constructs.
I have joined the chorus which argues for the importance of under-
standing that culture is not a scientific enterprise, as much as some pro-
ponents of social psychology would like to offer us “scientific” studies 
that explain why people do the things they do (see Fine, 2014 for an 
incisive critique of how gendered assumptions structure the social psy-
chological research into gendered norms and behaviors). Instead, the psy-
chological humanities invites us to work with the complex symbolic 
operations of human meaning-making, always also material and embod-
ied. If the mainstream psy disciplines can expand their frames of refer-
ence, a new way of working with the people we serve will become possible.
Of course, this requires a paradigm shift into interdisciplinarity. This 
in itself would necessitate massive structural change in the way medical 
models are taught. It also requires a greater societal valuing of the 
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humanities as a field. These issues fill books in themselves, and I will just 
note them here, with the acknowledgment of their economic and institu-
tional complexities, especially as the world starts the slow and uneven 
process of emerging from the coronavirus pandemic. It remains to be 
seen how universities and training institutes are changed by the world to 
come, as well as whether the citizens of the world, and our leaders, take 
this opportunity to consider how interconnected we all truly are.
The arguments I make here about the importance of the psychological 
humanities for improving the medical model of human being are by no 
means new. The editors (Gorski & Goodman, 2015, pp.  1–2) of 
Decolonizing “Multicultural” Counseling Through Social Justice write 
hopefully,
[W]e find ourselves spending less and less energy trying to convince col-
leagues of the merits of approaches that acknowledge difference and chal-
lenge the imposition of Euro-, cis-male-, Christian-, or hetero-centric 
norms onto counseling and psychology. This is an important step forward 
for our professions… We do not lack frameworks and approaches for 
deconstructing problematic counseling and psychology paradigms and 
practices, nor do we lack counselors and psychologists who desire to adopt 
the paradigms and practices that will help them connect more effectively 
with the full diversity of humanity or create a more equitable and just world.
However, they detail the ways in which practices that they summarize 
under the title of “multicultural” approaches have tended to recapitulate 
the current structures of power, both symbolically and institutionally. 
This is what happens when underlying processes—driven by binary 
understandings of “cultural difference,” and by liberal good intention, as 
detailed in Chap. 2 here—are not interrogated. I hope Complicities pro-
vides a rationale, and examples, of how to think differently about these 
matters.
I began this book with reference to one feminist dystopian vision, 
Naomi Alderman’s (2016). I will end it with reference to another. Octavia 
E. Butler’s Parable series (Parable of the Sower 1993 and Parable of the 
Talents 1998) tells an eerily prescient story set very close to our own time: 
It begins in 2024. America has been ravaged by climate change and 
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political corruption, and has been overtaken by inequality, the break-
down of social institutions, racial division, gender violence and obscene 
exploitation of children and the poor. It is a brutal society, where the 
struggle to survive erodes human ethics, trust and connection.
Butler creates this world by magnifying existing conditions, much as 
Margaret Atwood does with gender in The Handmaid’s Tale (Atwood, 
1987) or biotechnology in The MaddAddam trilogy (Atwood, 2003; 
Atwood, 2009; Atwood, 2013). Butler’s vision encompasses all aspects of 
life in modern America, to trace forward their consequences. Hers is a 
devastating critique of the effects of our institutions and systems of power 
on our planet, and on our humanity.
With one prediction, Butler’s timing was late. By the second book, in 
2032, despite the polls’ expectations, Americans elect a populist dema-
gogue who talks of “making America great again” (Butler, 1998, p. 21), 
incites his followers to violence without taking responsibility for his 
words and demonizes racialized others, and non-Christian Americans, 
“like nothing we’ve faced before…. I don’t know that this country has 
ever had a leader… as bad as [he] might turn out to be” (Butler, 1998, 
p. 176). This leader falls from power, but not before he has done terrible 
damage to the lives of the marginalized.
The protagonist, Lauren in the first book and going sometimes by her 
last name, Olamina, in the second, is the prophet of a new religion, which 
she calls Earthseed. Its principle is that god is change. Lauren sees this 
meaning in the chaos around her:
All that you touch
You Change.
All that you Change
Changes you.
The only lasting truth
Is Change.
God Is Change. (Butler 1993, p. 3)
Her message is that change is inevitable, inexorable and amoral, and 
that human beings have the power to anticipate and react to this univer-
sal truth whose energy drives all things. If you do not shape the change 
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that flows all around you, you will be shaped by it, she preaches. Hers is 
a vision of human agency in the face of overwhelming forces. She finds 
the possibility for humanity’s goodness precisely in the face of human 
brutality, because the immeasurable suffering the books present force 
each person to choose how they want to respond to the world that never 
stops assaulting them. The continuous threat presented by other people is 
also an opportunity to help each other. Butler explores leadership, faith, 
responsibility, community and family, all through what we would now 
call a trauma lens.
The salvation Lauren sees in embracing change, in all its uncaring, 
destructive dynamism, begins and ends with mutuality. One of her 
Earthseed verses reads:
Partnership is giving, taking,
learning, teaching, offering the
greatest possible benefit while doing
the least possible harm…
Any entity and process that
cannot or should not be resisted or
avoided must somehow be
partnered. Partner one another.
Partner diverse communities. Partner
life. Partner any world that is your
home. Partner God. Only in
partnership can we thrive, grow,
Change. Only in partnership can we
live. (Butler 1998, p. 132)
Lauren is unsentimental in her creed, and committed at the expense of 
all else to her project of building a following so she can disseminate her 
message, which she feels as a truth that must be spoken. She is not soft- 
hearted, but she is uncompromisingly compassionate. As this verse sug-
gests, she sees that human being cannot succeed alone, at least not in the 
world America has built. Her sense of the necessity of partnership is 
driven by the need to survive.
Part of Butler’s brilliance in these books is her ability to suggest that 
kindness is not softness, but strength, the key to survival. The choice to 
7 Conclusion 
250
receive the humanity of others, with the mutual responsibility that fol-
lows, is how Lauren shapes her god. Again, this is not sentimental or 
self-sacrificing. It is difficult to maintain, and it requires the members of 
the community Lauren builds to pull their weight in material terms, and 
respect each other in their differences. The Parable books are simultane-
ously devastating social critiques and offers of hope. Butler suggests that 
as much as human beings made this world of inequality and suffering, 
and are capable of horrific exploitation of our most vulnerable, we remain 
agents of change within it. But only together, as we understand all the 
ways we are responsible for shaping the change that we cannot control.
I hope the notion of complicity is another way to say what Butler says 
in her novels. I hope, too, that I have illustrated the importance of learn-
ing from ways of thinking that are other than “scientific.” Indeed, if we 
take all this to heart, it means that even the scientific, at the level at which 
we can understand it, is cultural, that is, human. The biological strata 
that interweave with the other dynamics of human being are complicit in 
them, and vice-versa: proverbial “nature” is not in binary relation to “nur-
ture,” but shaped by it (Gerhardt, 2004). Despite its aspirations to objec-
tivity, psychology emerged from human history, and was shaped by 
relations of domination, which it went on to legitimize. It also birthed 
voices that resisted, insisted and enlightened. Psychology (like its related 
disciplines) is fundamentally human, more than the sum of its parts, and 
implicated in the systems that shaped it and that it went on to shape. Its 
institutional voices developed out of and perpetuated binary thinking, 
with all the implications I have detailed here. Its other voices continue to 
suggest otherwise. The theory of complicity aims to articulate the limits 
of traditional psy thinking and to suggest some of the possibilities that 
emerge if disciplinary boundaries change from binary either/ors. This is 
why Complicities is a project of the psychological humanities.
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